Doctoral (PhD) dissertation

Ekaterina Popova (V11O4P)

2025

UNIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE
Doctoral School of Public Administration Sciences

Draft

Russian Immigration to Hungary: Identity, Integration, and the Impact of Migration Policies

or Between Homeland and Host Nation: Russian Identity, Integration and Identity Policy in Hungary

Ph.D. Public Administration

Ekaterina Popova

Supervisors:

Dr. Koller Boglárka

Dr. Zachar Péter Krisztián

Budapest, 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

Introduction

In 2010, Angela Merkel made a statement about the end of the era of multiculturalism (Friedman, 2010). Besides, at the beginning of 2015, the European migrant crisis, known as European refugee crisis, took place when the rising number of immigrants, primarily outside of the EU, arrived in the EU for the purpose of seeking asylum or economic improvement of living standards (asylum-seekers, refugees or migrants).

The EU faced challenges of uncontrolled migration (MRI, 2016) and as a result, the lack of coherence existence of multiculturalism and rising nationalism from country to country: "in this respect the Migration Crisis is one of the biggest humanitarian disasters since the Second World War, in the sense that it affected not only the targeted member States, mostly Western, but the EU as a whole by showing the weakness and the feebleness of the European Project itself" (Apetroe, 2016, p.2)

Thus, it can be said that globalization is the continuous, unstoppable process of worldwide economic, political, cultural, and religious integration. On the contrary, it served as the activation of the archiving needs for national identity, tradition, and economic protection tools.

National identity is a complex set that includes language, religious denomination, cultural affiliation, and historical destiny. Identity in the psychological aspect means a collective "I am" concept that seeks to answer the questions imposed by society: "Who are we? Where do we come from? What is our mission?"

Nowadays a stable national identity is characterized by a politically strong state and, vice versa, a weak national identity, and its crisis leads to a loss of geopolitical positions in the world. The period associated with the fragmentation of the state, regionalization, and artificial identity construction ends, for example, the former Yugoslavia.

Simulations of global cosmopolitanism are replaced by the development of ethnogenesis and nationalism. Such examples include the annexation of Crimea by Russia, global coronavirus crisis, Russian invasion and full-fledged war against Ukraine, instability of the Middle East and the war between Israel and Palestine, the growth of national conservative

movements in Eastern Europe, attempts at referendums in Scotland and Catalonia, and Brexit. The world is returning to the unresolved problems of the XX century.

The localised conflicts in the specific areas not only plays against globalisation but also creates and nurtures hatred between its contreparties. As a result of insufficient political governance escalated to the new level of politics the world faces a new challenge called uncontrolled migration. If so in the paper it seems that policy making can handle it it proves the opposite. It limits the cases but doesn't fully address or prevent the problem, therefore political populism enters the space and demandas for more local and native priorities: no job places for immigrants, no propaganda of different values. All over written leads us to the boosted movements of nationalism, as the event that protected the historically existed of native communities against immigrants and that reflected in the policy-making.

The question appears here, should societies integrate their immigrants into one, national-lifestyle or should they instead embrace all the different cultures represented in the country? Considering the facts of national interests in pursuit and extension of of a language, history, religion, and culture, the existence of dominant group represented by indigenous citizens and minority cultural groups on behalf of immigrants, and facing barriers in pursuing their social practices, the other questions are imposed based on theories: should the minorities be tolerated equally to dominant groups? (Kukathas, 1995); or should the rights of the dominant group be the normative basis for the minority? (Kymlicka, 1996).

Considering the macro picture and existing problems the decision was made to analyse the Russian migration in the context of European multiculturalism with the case study of Hungary. Why?

Firstly, according to the United Nations, there are roughly 10,5 million ethnic Russians living outside of the Russian Federation. This fact makes Russians the fourth biggest diaspora in the world, after India, Mexico, and China, according to the International Migration Report 2019 (UN DESA, 2019a).

Secondly, following the first figure, it’d be absorbing to find out what are the reasons for Russian immigration to Eastern Europe, especially to Hungary since the practice shows that this is the reversed case of economic migration factor?

On the one hand, it brings many more questions to a researcher such as is Russian emigration to Hungary followed by pragmatic factors such as they attempt to escape Putin’s political regime, gaining economic freedom, or following the historical or ethnic line?

On the other hand, the fact of migration from the more developed economies to the less developed country pioneers the research conduction with the introduction of such a term ‘as

immigration for love of the country and its culture' that describes moving to Hungary in love with the country's cultural heritage or developing the patriotic feeling to a destination-country despite the initial migration reason.

Certainly, no matter what are motivations of Russian immigrants, migration is considered as a two-way transactional process of a migrant from the sending country Russia to the receiving country Hungary, which cannot be carried out without the legal status and purpose of immigration, which is regulated both by the national migration policy of Hungary and the migration policy of the European Union to third countries.

The above-mentioned motives for emigration hypothetically can be categorized further and distinct Russian immigrants in Hungary into two groups. The first one that experiences an external need for migration and uses one of the legal reasons for immigration to Hungary and will undergo a more rigid adoption in the country of residence. Many immigrants from this group use Hungary as a transit country and are considered opportunists who choose this country at the behest of opportunities.

The second group is guided by internal motivation (choice based on the cultural factor) or external-internal, and also enjoys the legal status of staying in the country. This group undergoes soft adaptation, considering the basic knowledge of the history, culture, and Hungarian language.

The considered approach is followed by discovering the integration approach of Hungary towards Russian immigrants and immigrants in general with consideration of Hungarian national identity and needs to perceive it.

This research pursues three followed goals:

1. Identify the motives of Russian immigration.
2. Study of Russian identity, its change, and capability for integration.
3. Study Hungarian migration policies and integration approaches of immigrants in the context of the EU and suggest the preferable migration model towards Russian immigrants that can help to aim at immigrants with potential that would nurture the national interests and bring the economic benefit for Hungary.

Thirdly, the author's background and ethnic Russian origin can help make quality research due to language proficiency and the fact of immigration to Hungary.

In general, the research will help to understand the motivation of Russian emigration to Eastern Europe and their ability to integrate by using the similarity of ethnic background; demonstrate the role of national migration policy in deterring unwanted migrants and targeting favorable migrants for both identity politics and the economy.

1.1 Background of the Study

Migration is a complicated phenomenon and study, which draws on anthropology, history, politics, economics, law, sociology. It can be approached from different fields and angles. It can be seen as focused as defused since it's an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary study, depending on the methodology and complexity of the narrowed topic.

In this dissertation, the major angle of the study is moved from studying migration particularly but precisely focused on the case study of Russia and Hungary, where the object is a Russian immigrant to Hungary and the subjects are identity politics, immigrants' integration and approaches, migration policy in Hungary.

Despite the designated focus of the research, this dissertation, as well as the first chapter, will provide general literature on the field of migration studies in order to identify general terms and concepts, show problems in the theoretical study of the general field, leading to a deeper understanding of the case of the stage and elimination of these gaps in the theoretical chapter of the thesis, approaching more meaningful concepts and theories that will be relevant to this research.

In addition, this will help to form a solid basis for further research and the creation of new theories that will be based on the source material, but will close the resulting scientific gaps due to time frames, changes in international systems and processes, as a result of new problems and conditions, opportunities to their solution.

Following the background of the studies, some important milestones should be mentioned.

Hungary joined the EU in 2004 and has been part of the Schengen Area since 2007. This event can be seen as an improvement of the political and economic environment of a country since the following events of the XX centuries, including withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty and the dissolution of the Soviet bonds. The country's entry into the European Union not only followed the democratization and economic stabilization of the country but also made Hungary an attractive country in terms of migration.

However, it is also necessary to emphasize the development of Russian-Hungarian relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union, where the growing nationalism of Hungarians towards Russians and its decline after accession to the EU can be clearly traced and further populism politics that empathised Russians among many other immigrants groups residing to Hungary.

Despite the fact that nationalism in Hungary as a whole did not subside; it took other forms with the identification of a "difference" and therefore applied to the group of immigrants as an external commerce, with empathises of distance in treatment and relationships of these groups. In general, nationalism in Hungary is a rather complex phenomenon, which reflects the formation of a strong collective and national identity, which Hungarians could not enjoy due to the chain of historical events.

If one evaluates the nationalist manifestations in Hungary, excluding rare cases in the manifestation of extremism, one may find that it reflects the sensitivity of the people in relation to national security and has a slightly primitive connotation.

According to the United Nations migration statistics (1990-2019), the total number of immigrants in Hungary is 156,000 cases. The top three trends for EU immigrants include Romania (86,252), Germany (8,179), Austria (2,313). The top three trends in third-country immigrants include North Macedonia (20,451), Russian Federation (16,919), Ukraine (1,313) (UN DESA, 2019b).

Based on these data, the following conclusions can be drawn the percentage of immigrants in Hungary per population is about 1-1,5%, depending on a source (KSH, 2020), which is quite a small percentage compared to other EU countries, for example, Germany, where the percentage of immigrants to the population was 26% in 2019 (DESTATIS, 2020).

The majority of immigrants are from the EU and have EU identity. It is important to mention the multi-layered models of collective identity (Koller, 2010), where regionalism and membership in organizations can prevail the national identity and, moreover, divide all migrants into "us" and "them" when applied to the EU migrants and the third-countries.

As for the aforementioned trends among immigrants from third countries, one of the peculiarities can be traced here, this is in a certain degree the similarity of cultures, languages and, in part, religions among Russia, Ukraine, and North Macedonia, which creates a kind of cultural and ethnic unity, which, although not go apart from the Hungarian culture, but still creates a certain minority on the basis of "Russian world" (Suslov, 2018).

This research will be based on the use of theoretical literature on the formation of collective identity and nationalism.

1.2 Supporting Core Literature

Eric Hobsbawm "The Invention of Tradition". The author argues that ideas of nation and nationalism are invented by "social engineering". According to Hobsbawm "invented

traditions" are: "a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past" (Hobsbawm, 1983, p.1). Hobsbawm considers that this idea serves the benefits of the ruling elites. And as a fact, it's not a nation and nationalism that make a state but a state and nationalism that make nations (Hobsbawm, 1983).

Anthony D. Smith "The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?". Smith considers that nation and nationalism are modern phenomena. According to the author, both are formed by such modern conditions as capitalism, industrialism, bureaucracy, mass communication, and secularism. Smith highlights the significant place of ethnic identity. Using the word "ethnie", the author refers to ethnic communities also known as "a named human population of alleged common ancestry, shared memories and elements of common culture with a link to a specific territory and a measure of solidarity" (Smith, 1996, p.447). The term "nation" means a "nation" as a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties" (Smith 1996, p.447). Smith confirms that immigrants can't be fully integrated into society due to ethnic ties to a home-nation.

Chandran Kukathas "Are there any cultural rights?". This theory is important for understanding the objectives and significance of ethnical and cultural minorities.

Will Kymlicka's "Multicultural Citizenship" is a liberal theory of minority rights. In the book, the author states that the rights of the dominant group should be the normative basis for the minority. Although Kymlichka highlights that there is no single formula that can be applied to all groups and that the needs and aspirations of immigrants are very different from those of indigenous peoples and national minorities.

Francine Hirsch's "Empire of Nations. Ethnographic Knowledge and the making of the Soviet Union". Hirsch writes about the Soviet Union as a political union and the formation of collective identity under this apparatus with different ethnical backgrounds. His work helps better understand the concepts of "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft", the formation of the collective identity of Russia during the Soviets period and its transaction to modernity, where each individual becomes less connected to the society. This transaction leads to the formation of Russian immigrants' identity and creates pre-motivation for emigration. It also helps to understand the formation of different identities during the Soviet Union.

Attila Kolontari "Hungarian-Soviet Relations 1920-1941". The encyclopedia of Russian-Hungarian relations that explains the further bilateral relation formation in the

historical context (Kolontári, 2010). Despite the fact that the author analyzes the relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union during the interwar periods, it defines the important milestoles in the formation of two states during world crises.

Samuel P. Huntington “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order”. His work develops a hypothesis that people’s cultural and religious identity is the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. The literature can adapt to the cultural clash concepts and apply to immigrants’ integration based on cultural ties. Using the background of the theory it can be explained why some immigrants integrate better than the other ones and why Russian immigrants can be a good fit for European multiculturalism (Huntington, 1997).

Paolo Ruspini “Russian transnational migrant communities as agents of cooperation and integration?”. The paper gives an overview of the Russian diaspora and migration policies in the post-Soviet Union. In this context, Russian migration policy towards its compatriots has been briefly evaluated in view of the EU expansion eastwards. The author aimed at sketching a profile of the Russian migrant communities in Switzerland in light of the broader and historical presence of Russians in Europe. The short analysis attempts at evaluating the potential of the Russian communities as agents of cooperation as well as integration for Russian migrants in Switzerland but the background can be used and applied for testing hypotheses of Russian immigrants in Hungary (Ruspini, 2015).

National self-images and regional identities in Russia by Bo Petersson 2001, shortage publishing company.

Nations Abroad Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union, edited by Charles King, Neil J.Melvin Westview press 1998

Identity in Formtion David D.Laitin The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad Cornell University Press 1998

Russian Nationalism Past and Present edited by Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service Macmillan press ltd 1998

Imperial and National Identities in pre-revolutionary , soviet and post soviet Russia

1.3 Research Basics

The focus of this study is twofold: first, on Russian immigrants and their identity, and second, on Hungary as a destination country within the broader framework of migration movements. The key subjects of analysis include identity politics, immigrant integration approaches, and Hungary's migration policies.

Conceptual questions in this case study contribute to the development of the literature review and serve as the foundation for defining research variables. The study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. **Migration Motivations & Patterns**
    - What are the primary reasons for Russian immigrants choosing Hungary as a destination?
    - How do political, economic, and cultural factors influence Russian immigration to Hungary?
    - Are there significant differences in migration motivations across different waves of Russian immigrants (e.g., post-Soviet migration vs. recent migration due to political instability in Russia)?
2. **Transit vs. Long-Term Settlement**
    - Do Russian immigrants in Hungary intend to stay long-term, or do they perceive Hungary as a transit state to other EU countries?
    - What factors contribute to the decision to settle permanently or use Hungary as a temporary migration route?
    - How do visa policies, employment opportunities, and residency laws shape the migration patterns of Russians in Hungary?
3. **Integration & Identity**
    - Do Russian immigrants actively integrate into Hungarian society, or do they maintain strong transnational ties with Russia?
    - How does the duration of stay impact the level of integration (e.g., language acquisition, employment, cultural adaptation)?
    - What role does Hungarian national identity and societal attitudes toward Russian immigrants play in their integration?
    - Are there significant differences in integration levels between Russian immigrants who settle permanently and those who plan to transit?
4. **Migration Policies & Structural Influences**
    - How do Hungarian migration policies shape the experiences and trajectories of Russian immigrants?
    - How does Hungary's historical relationship with Russia influence its policies and social perceptions of Russian immigrants?

- How does Hungary compare to other EU countries in terms of attracting or discouraging long-term Russian immigration?

This research primarily explores Russian identity and integration within the context of European multiculturalism. The study aims to analyze how Russian identity is constructed and whether Russian immigrants can integrate successfully into Hungarian society. Understanding these dynamics can provide insight into broader discussions on ethnic identity, identity politics, and their implications for immigration and integration in Europe.

The study also engages with the ongoing debate regarding immigrant integration: should host societies assimilate immigrants into a unified national lifestyle, or should they embrace multicultural diversity? Should minority groups be treated equally to dominant groups (Kukathas, 1995), or should the rights of the dominant group serve as the normative framework for minority integration (Kymlicka, 1996)?

Understanding the relationship between Russia, as the country of origin, and Hungary, as the destination country, is crucial. This includes examining Hungary's historical patterns of immigration, labor market demands, and institutional structures shaping immigration policies. Additionally, the study assesses Hungary's socio-economic, cultural, and political preparedness for integrating Russian immigrants, as well as public perceptions and treatment of Russian immigrants in Hungary.

1.3.1 Key Features of Russian Migration to Hungary

Several contextual factors in Russia help frame the analysis of migration flows to Hungary and outline the limitations of this case study:

1. **Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in Russia**
   Russia is the largest country in the world and home to a diverse range of ethnic groups, including Eastern Slavs, Turks, and Finno-Ugric peoples. Despite this ethnic diversity, a shared political identity as "Russian" unites these groups. Exploring possible Russian-Hungarian kinship and ethnosymbolic similarities could provide insights into the integration process.
2. **Economic Factors**
   Russia has a large and developed economy with an orientation toward Asian markets. Comparatively, Hungary's economy is smaller but has historically been integrated into

the European market. Prior to the war in Ukraine, Hungary maintained strong economic ties with the EU, but during the war, it adopted a more semi-closed market approach. Given these differences, economic incentives for Russian migration to Hungary may be limited, though individual cases still exist.

3. **Political Motivations for Migration**
   Russian migration to Hungary may be driven by either cultural affinity or political reasons. While some Russians may migrate due to a personal appreciation of Hungarian culture, others may view emigration as a response to political pressures in Russia.
4. **Historical Relations between Russia and Hungary**
   Russia was historically a dominant power, first as the Russian Empire and later as the Soviet Union. Hungary, as part of the Eastern Bloc, shares a Soviet past, which has influenced its political relationship with Russia. While past tensions remain, contemporary relations are evolving.
5. **Socio-Cultural Factors**
   Russia's emphasis on traditional values, particularly regarding gender roles and social structures, may create commonalities between Russian immigrants and Hungarian society, potentially facilitating integration.

1.3.2 Problem Statement

The study of national identity and migration dynamics in Hungary presents a complex and multidimensional issue. One of the primary concerns revolves around the rise of nationalist movements in Hungary, particularly in response to immigration. This phenomenon has been amplified by historical tensions and linguistic considerations, particularly in relation to Russian-speaking migrants.

The historical context is crucial in understanding the underlying factors influencing contemporary nationalist sentiment. Hungary has experienced a long history of external political and cultural influences, including Ottoman occupation, Austro-Hungarian rule and influence, and Soviet domination. These historical experiences have contributed to the development of a strong national identity, which has been shaped through significant events such as the Revolutions of 1848 and 1956 (Bideleux & Jeffries, 2006). The post-Soviet period, particularly Hungary's accession to the European Union (EU), further complicated the national

identity discourse by reinforcing European integration while simultaneously reviving unresolved identity gaps.

In recent years, the migration crisis following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has added another layer of complexity. Hungary emerged as one of the most accommodating EU nations in terms of hosting Russian businesses and their employees. Concurrently, it also received a significant number of forcibly displaced Ukrainian refugees, many of whom identify linguistically and culturally with the Russian-speaking world (Duncan, 2023). This duality may possibly lead to tensions within Hungary's nationalist discourse or become further political manipulation, as linguistic centrism and historical narratives influence perceptions of Russian-speaking migrants.

From a linguistic perspective, the Soviet-Hungarian relationship historically included mandatory Russian language education and cultural exchange programs, which left a lasting impact on Hungarian society (Fodor, 1999). The integration of Russian-origin words into the Hungarian lexicon, such as *zálog* (pledge) and *dacha* (summer house), serves as a linguistic marker of this historical relationship. However, nationalist movements often view these remnants with suspicion, associating them with past subjugation rather than cultural enrichment.

Another significant aspect of the issue is the impact of the Treaty of Trianon (1920), which resulted in substantial Hungarian ethnic communities living outside Hungary's borders. This historical loss continues to influence contemporary Hungarian policies, particularly concerning language rights. For example, Ukraine's education policies restricting the use of the Hungarian language in schools have generated further nationalist concerns (Kovács, 2021). This context has contributed to broader apprehensions regarding both Russian-speaking and other foreign migrants in Hungary, as preserving national identity remains a central political priority.

A fundamental issue in this discourse is the conceptualization of nationalism itself. From an anthropological and ethnolinguistic perspective, Hungarian nationalism can be examined through the lens of kinship, language, and collective identity formation. The modern Hungarian national identity has been constructed in part through political narratives and historical experiences, rather than purely through shared ancestry or linguistic heritage (Brubaker, 1996). This raises critical questions about the role of migration in shaping or challenging national cohesion in Hungary.

Despite the growing significance of Russian-speaking migration to Hungary, there is a notable gap in academic research concerning the identity, integration, and policy responses toward this population. Current Hungarian migration policies, including the 2024 policy update that introduced the *Magyar Kártya* for select nationalities (including Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Serbia), highlight a selective approach to migration that prioritizes cultural affinity with Hungary (Hajnal, 2024). However, a more comprehensive and evidence-based policy framework is necessary to address the socio-political challenges associated with Russian-speaking migration.

By identifying these research gaps and problem areas, this study aims to contribute to the formulation of an immigration policy that balances national identity preservation with pragmatic integration strategies for migrants. Addressing these issues through an academic lens will provide valuable insights into the intersection of migration, nationalism, and identity politics in Hungary.

1.3.3 Research Questions

Based on these contextual factors, the study aims to answer the following research questions:

- What are the key motivations driving Russian immigration to Hungary?
- Do Russian immigrants perceive Hungary as a long-term destination or as a transit state?
- How does the length of stay influence integration into Hungarian society?
- What are the key factors in Russian identity formation that contribute to their integration in Hungary?
- How do ethnic identity, integration, and transnational ties interact, and what factors influence these interactions?
- To what extent do Russian immigrants maintain transnational ties with Russia, and what is the nature of these ties?
- Can Russian immigrants integrate successfully into Hungarian society, and does their political-ethnic background impact their integration?
- If integration levels vary, how can Hungarian immigration policy be optimized to support integration while benefiting national development?

1.3.4 Variables

- **Dependent Variable:** Russian Identity Formation, shaped by Russia's historical and political context.
- **Independent Variable:** Immigration Purpose, influenced by the voluntary decision to emigrate but constrained by immigration opportunities.
- **Dependent Variable:** Integration Outcomes, shaped by migration policies, societal attitudes, and immigrants' choices (e.g., asylum-seeker, economic migrant, student, family reunification, business-related migration).
- **Independent Variable:** Migration Policy Development and Identity Politics, influencing which immigrants are targeted and how they are integrated.

1.3.5 Hypotheses

1. **Motivations for Migration**
    - **H1:** Russian immigrants move to Hungary primarily for political and economic reasons, with recent waves of migration driven more by political instability than economic hardship.
    - **Alternative Hypothesis (H1a):** Russian migration to Hungary is primarily culturally driven, with immigrants selecting Hungary based on historical, linguistic, and ethnic ties rather than political or economic factors.
2. **Transit vs. Long-Term Stay**
    - **H2:** The majority of Russian immigrants use Hungary as a transit state to access other EU countries with better economic opportunities and political freedoms.
    - **Alternative Hypothesis (H2a):** A significant portion of Russian immigrants choose Hungary as a permanent destination due to its migration policies, cultural affinity, and quality of life.
3. **Integration Process**
    - **H3:** Russian immigrants who stay in Hungary long-term demonstrate higher integration levels, including language acquisition, employment, and social adaptation.
    - **Alternative Hypothesis (H3a):** Despite long-term residence, Russian immigrants maintain strong transnational ties to Russia and struggle with full integration due to linguistic and cultural barriers.
4. **Impact of Hungarian Migration Policies**

- **H4:** Hungary's migration policies, particularly in light of evolving EU migration laws, significantly influence Russian immigrants' ability and willingness to settle permanently.
- **Alternative Hypothesis (H4a):** Hungarian migration policies have limited impact on Russian immigration patterns, as migration is primarily shaped by external factors such as political events in Russia and broader EU trends.

The study will test these hypotheses using statistical data, case studies, and an analysis of Hungary's evolving migration policies to evaluate their impact on Russian immigration and integration outcomes.

1.4 Justification and Significance of the Study

While most migrants choose economically favorable countries to move to, the reason for the resettlement of Russians to Hungary is not entirely clear. In addition, Russian identity has not yet been systematically and deeply studied.

In 2019 Atlantic Council Eurasia Center conducted and published the results of the study on the problems of the new Russian emigration and its political background. The main results of the study established the general 'image of the new Russian emigrant', people aged 25 to 44 years (80.5%) with completed higher education master's degree, candidate of sciences or Ph.D. (43%). Among the motivations for moving are the following: general political atmosphere (40%), lack of political rights and freedoms (33%), general economic situation, lack of economic prospects (32%), persecution and violations of human rights (29%), professional reasons (26 %) and education (24%) (Atlantic Council, 2019).

In addition, in 2019, the Levada Center published the results of a study on the emigration sentiments of Russians, where it was revealed that 53% of young Russians want to emigrate. This is the highest rate since 2009. The most frequently cited reasons for thinking about emigrations are: the better life for children with a decent future abroad (45%); economic situation (40%) and political situation (33%) in Russia; high-quality medical services (35%) and high quality of education abroad (26%); opportunities for career growth abroad (28%) (Levada-Center, 2019).

Along with previously mentioned statistics, the UN should conclude that the motivation for the emigration of Russians and trends in immigration will only grow due to political instability mainly, which means, perhaps, the future host countries will be the countries of the European Union that do not have knowledge of Russian identity.

The baseline figures suggest that future Russian immigrants may be potentially beneficial to the national economies of countries, as long as they are potential 'high-skilled immigrants'.

If we understand how Russian identity works, then many countries will be able to visualise a model of migration, both for the adoption of human capital to grow the economy and without creating potential dangers to national identity.

The significance of this study is built on problem spots of a particular country (Hungary) but sees the broader scale for its implementation in the future.

One of the main features of science is not problem-solving but its prevention through analyses of possible problematic spots of the presence linked to the past but aiming at the future.

If we find out how Russian identity is constructed and whether Russian immigrants can be integrated into a destination-country (Hungary), then we can understand the political-ethical factors cause the negativity and nationalism towards immigrants, how to create a right immigrants' strategy in the content of European multiculturalism and prevent nationalism movements, perhaps a government can use that information in effective immigrants' integration in an immigrant' destination country.

Besides, previously, migration studies were seen only from a problematic point of view (labor force) or from the point of view of political agenda and security (Martiniello & Rath, 2010). Nowadays, the migration study can be seen as the reverse case, when a country can select favorable immigrants by restraining migration policies from the history, knowledge, and experience of contemporary migration.

1.5 Methodology

The first chapter examined general approaches and trends in migration. In the chapter, the basic concepts, global migration problems were considered, the foundations for the study were determined, including the concept, research questions, problems, specifications and ways of implementing the research plan. The methodology of research has become an equally important component. A brief description and prerequisites for use were given.

The special attention should be drawn to the current or the fifth wave (including 2.0) of migration, which is least studied, but nevertheless is a very important event in modern reality applied to global issues.

Methodological bases are built and interconnected within the following units:

1. state-building and identity, ethnicity, citizenship, migration, nationalism;
2. history of applied countries and bilateral relationships of Russia with them, cultural background;
3. Public Administration and the EU migration-related regulations towards third-countries citizens.

The goal is to explain such a broad topic and narrow it to the core with subsequent layers, which are a single body of this dissertation and thematic unity.

From the mentioned background it's seen that we aim at conducting multi disciplinary research with a centralized topic in Russian immigrants' identity and integration with a limited Post-Soviet, contemporary timeline.

As follows, there are several methodologies that should be applied: the case study supported by the semi-structured interviews, comparative and historical methods with a comparative and historical perspective oriented to analyse the migration patterns and policy development. In order to process and analyse the interviews, the decision was made to use the elements of grounded theory as the methodology that enables to seek out, conceptualise the latent social patterns and structures the area of specific research interest in multidisciplinary study. The author does not fully implement a grounded theory to the approach due to the limitation of samples and the lack of background study that focuses on Russian migration in Hungary, a case that covers contemporary trends and partly during the war period.

1.5.1 Case Study Approach

One might argue that the case study isn't a research method and can't be used as a methodology and it should be dissertated in this part of the research.

First of all, "case study research comprises two parts: a subject and an analytical frame or object" (Thomas, 2011, p.14). To defend the point, it should be mentioned that in the research it can be applied as both, specifically, the case study of applied countries and the subject timeline of immigration (Post-Soviet Union, modern timeline limitation from 2000).

The other point that supports the case study is that it doesn't apply limitations on using the other research methods. Moreover, it requires the use and need of the formation of the methodological base under one umbrella that would give the complexity of the research the right direction aimed at specific narrowed results. In my dissertation that linked with theoretical blocks and hypothetical questions development.

The case study uses many methods and sources of data and aims to look at relationships and processes: "the…case-oriented approach places cases, not variables, center stage. But what is the case? Comparative social science has a ready-made, conventionalized answer to this question: Boundaries around places and time periods define cases…" (Thomas, 2011, p.11).

To sum up, the case study method in this dissertation investigates a unique phenomenon. Data collected and analyzed a large number of features of each case. It studies naturally occurring cases where the aim isn't to control variables and quantification of data is not a priority (Thomas, 2011).

To start with the point that might be important for the research construction. We see the nature of objective reality as being socially constructed, and not existing independently of any human presence, e.g. that's why social constructivism over realism has been chosen. The school of social constructivism claims that reality is constructed in the human mind, so construction is related to a certain time and social environment, and that what is called reality evolves as the social context changes. Constructionism asserts that there is no reality and no facts until they are conceptualized and shared by a group of people. Social constructivism is supported by the school of modernism in nationalism, namely constructivists Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson.

Adhering to conceptual unity, from all the variety of schools and methodology presented in the subchapter "Interview Method and Grounded theory", the most resonant and logical is considered to be constructivism. The constructivist form of grounded theory has been developed and advocated by Charmaz (1995, 1999; 2000; 2003; 2006; 2009), Bryant (2002), Thornberg (2012) and others. It's anchored in pragmatism and relativist epistemology. This viewpoint assumes that researchers generate facts and hypotheses as a result of their interactions with participants and developing analyses, rather than discovering them (Charmaz, 2006; 2009; Thornberg and Charmaz, 2012). Data is co-constructed by researchers and participants, their socio-cultural backgrounds, academic expertise, and personal worldviews (Charmaz, 2009). This position strikes a balance between reality and imagination, it discovers multiple realities and multiple visions on it.

In the subchapters 'History and Classification of Migration', 'Conceptualizing Emigration and Immigration', 'Economic Factor in Migration', 'Political Factors in Migration' introduced the basic concepts of migration. They serve as a base of support for strategy creation and interview implementation. Chapter 'History and Classification of Migration' and its subchapters mainly was used for the interview pre-structure.

With the above-mentioned resources, the goal was to find Russian citizens living in Hungary for more than twelve months ('immigrant' definition by UN). Why exactly Russian citizens? In connection with the political events between Russia and Ukraine before and after 2022 and national self-identification, an acute issue of ethical standards arose, therefore, in this study, it was decided to make an informal selection using a Russian or former Russian, USSR passport.

The entire strategy of the methodology is divided into conditional 4 stages, which include a number of other sub-stages:

Part I. Theoretical background study, where we prepare the core bases for further theoretical development and outline the research bases

Part II. Active data collection and case study development that includes collection of Interview data that included the following process:

1. Search for interviewers and their validation.
2. Preparation and implementation of interviews, writing memos.
3. Interview transcript, its correction (data reduction, data reorganization, data representation).
4. Beginning of interview analysis, development of categories, groups, codes and comparative analysis of interviews in the process.

Part III. Thematic narratives that target the specific qualitative data analyses.

Part IV. Migration policy analyses applied to the case study.

1.5.2 Interview Method and Grounded Theory

Interview

For this research, seventeen semi-structured interviews were conducted, with questions formulated based on existing knowledge regarding Russian migration to Hungary. While most questions were prepared in advance, flexibility was maintained to allow for participant-driven narratives. Each interview lasted between thirty to fifty minutes and focused on the participant's migration experience, motivations for leaving Russia, the process of moving to Hungary, experiences of living in Hungary, and future aspirations.

Participants were recruited through the Facebook group 'Русский Будапешт' [Russian Budapest], utilizing elements of netnography. A pre-screening questionnaire was used to collect preliminary data on participants, obtain consent for interviews, and address anonymity

preferences. Following this, participant profiles were reviewed, and interviews were scheduled. Both face-to-face and remote (telephone) interviews were conducted, with the majority of Budapest residents preferring in-person interviews, while participants residing outside Budapest opted for telephone interviews.

The general trend indicated a high level of openness among migrants in discussing even politically and economically sensitive issues. However, one interview was excluded due to the interviewee providing only monosyllabic responses. Interview questions were primarily open-ended, with occasional structured choices to enhance clarity. During interviews, clarifying questions were asked to ensure transparency and to capture the subjective yet experience-driven nature of the migrant narratives.

At the outset of each interview, participants were informed about research ethics, potential platforms for data usage, and the right to decline answering any uncomfortable questions. Notably, no participants in the initial sample refused to answer any questions.

Many interviewees referenced elements of Russian culture or phenomena, which were annotated with explanatory notes in brackets during transcription. The technical aspects of the interview process included audio recording, with most interviews conducted in Russian. For the accessibility transcriptions were subsequently processed using machine translation with manual corrections. To ensure accuracy, a collaborative agreement was made between the interviewer and interviewees regarding the final approved versions of transcripts.

After each interview, a memo was written, serving as an informal note from the researcher reflecting on preliminary insights. These memos underwent iterative revisions to refine theoretical sampling. A total of seventeen interviews were conducted, and at present, the data analysis is in its fourth phase—analysis and coding. The analyses, including coding and decoding, categorisation and pattern extract were conducted using the original language, Russian.

Different approaches to narrative analysis were employed, guided by two key principles: (1) examining participants' storytelling structures and performative aspects, and (2) employing 'narrative cognition' to represent findings as individual stories, potentially supplemented by thematic data presentations (Flick, 2014, p.10). Grounded theory serves as the foundation for shaping these interviews. It is essential to note that interviews were conducted before 2022, and thus, they provide a crucial foundation for subsequent qualitative insights.

Grounded theory

Grounded theory was firstly introduced by sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in 1967 (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and it has been further developed and reshaped in different schools, e.g. Glaserian (Glaser, 1978; 1992; 1998; 2001; 2003; 2005), Straussian (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; 1998), constructivist (Bryant, 2002; Charmaz, 2000; 2003; 2006; 2009; Thornberg, 2012; Thornberg & Charmaz, 2012), Clarke's postmodern version or situational analysis (Clarke, 2003; 2005), and multi grounded theory (Goldkuhl & Cronholm, 2010).

Grounded theory belongs to the group of qualitative research methods, and is at the intersection of case studies, etnograthies, phenomenological studies and content analyses (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). It is the mixed approach. On the one hand, it belongs to a group of inductive approach, e.g. it systematically proceeds the analyses of qualitative data collected (Thomas, 2006). On the other hand, the elements of abduction can be found since the generation, selection and construction of hypotheses take place during constant data collection and constant comparative analyses (Thornberg & Charmaz, 2014).

Despite the ambiguous views on this methodology, it has a fundamental set of principles that allows it to be effectively used in multidisciplinary research in the study of a certain social phenomenon or event with a limited amount of information in the field of study (Goulding, 2002). Therefore, some researchers choose grounded theory as a methodology due to the lack, shortage or complete absence of information on the research topic since the methodology allows to collect data from sources such as interviews, questionnaires or mixed methods design, generating hypotheses through theoretical sampling until theoretical saturation.

Some scholars dispute whether it is 'a must' incorporating a theoretical framework into earlier chapters, replacing it with a literature review (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015) or using theoretical sample implementation during or after active data collection (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010; Glaser, 1978; Goulding, 2002). On the one hand, the logic of emergent theorirsts states that theory construction is impossible with a blank state or a *tabula rasa* (Jaccard & Jacoby). On the other hand, the invention of grounded theory and its use guarantees the emergence data and as a result of it the generation of hypothesis or a theory construction that can be further tested empirically. Given my awareness of both points of view, I believe that this grounded theory allows to a researcher choosing whether he or she prefers either 'top-down' approach with some generalisation before the actual discovery and then narrowing to the

point or ‘bottom up’ approach, which is like a skeleton on which additional layers or parts are built up during the ongoing study itself.

Thus, when using grounded theory, the researcher, based on the area of knowledge, competence of supervisors or personal interests, identifies and proposes a problem statement, conceptual, research question on the studied phenomena and a strategy for the implementation of the study, while the debated issue of literature or theoretical background use ‘before’ or ‘after’ data collection is timely determined by the researcher’s way of thinking, information availability and plan.

Creative part of the grounded theory can be also seen in the possibility of mixed-methods research that mix or combine quantitative or qualitative methods of data collections (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2002). It isn’t limited to a single data collection method. Additionally, it gives a certain flexibility in methodology, so it can reduce the risk of a researcher's failure in conduction and\or personalise the design of methodology to the problems addressed.

Considering the fact that qualitative research methods are being frequently criticized for subjective data collection and analysis, the opportunity for combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in one study, may bring the research to another level. One of the examples of how it can be is rooted in the research of Louise Marie Roth “Selling Women Short: Gender and Money on Wall Street (2006)”, where she examines gender inequalities in the workplace. She was curious about the wage disparity between men and women among high-performing Wall Street MBAs. So, in the frame of grounded theory she incorporated both open-ended questions as a qualitative approach, and close-ended questions as a quantitative method in in-depth interviews (Hesse-Biber, 2010). That decision allowed her uncovering not only gender inequality but also proving gender wage gap and creating the set of strategies for equal work opportunities.

As it was mentioned by Goulding, citing Glaser: “grounded theory method although uniquely suited to fieldwork and qualitative data, can be easily used as a general method of analysis with any form of data collection: survey, experiment, case study. Further, it can combine and integrate them. It transcends specific data collection methods” (Glaser, 1978, as cited in Goulding, 2002, p.56).

The grounded theory is not limited in the choice of working methodology, but also in its mix. It has already been suggested above that it might be a survey, experiment, case study and the list can be continued on. However, one of the most popular methodologies is

in-depth interview since it allows studying social patterns of a selective group of people on a stated problem.

If one could mention the advantages of the interview as a research method then that definitely would be flexibility, in-depth analyses, cost-effectiveness. Contrary, it's being mainly criticized for the lack of transparency in sampling strategy, questions offered, analyses that include coding and decoding, and the time consumption on the technical side (from the collection of information to its decryption and correction). Undoubtedly, the mentioned disadvantages call into question the use of this method in the research design. However, their awareness and recognition allow preparing for better strategy and interview questions, and the process can be automated if there is a budget for it. On the other hand, the presented advantages distinguish this method over others. For example, comparing mainly the interview and the questionnaire within the framework of a social phenomenon, one can find that the questions of the questionnaire can lead the respondent to a point of view with which they partially or completely disagree due to the lack of flexibility of the question (partially human factor). The idea is perfectly given in the interview definition as an "interchange in which one person… attempts to elicit information or expressions of opinion or belief from another person or persons" (Maccoby and Maccoby, 1954, as cited in Young et al., 2018, p.11).

The key development of interview stages may vary but still reflects the classical model that includes: research questions identification, interview type selection, initial interview questions division, sampling, ethical review, interview pilots, process of interview, coding, analyses and dissemination (Young et al., 2018).

It is important to note the role of the interview in the grounded theory itself, since in addition to the classical stages of the interview, it also includes a comparative analysis of the data (its abduction) of the interview and the reform of further strategy in accordance with the data obtained, which makes possible to think ahead while doing theoretical sample.

A special role is writing a memo or a kind of field notes, informal comments of the researcher about the interview. Usually it is written immediately after the interview, and is a kind of mental map or the researcher's insights about the interviewee. Memos are defined as "the theorizing write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they strike the analyst while coding" (Glaser, 1978, p.83); or "documentation of the researcher's thinking process and theorizing from data" (Thornberg, 2012, p.254).

1.5.3 Comparative Historical Analysis

One of the methodological approaches in the dissertation is a comparative and historical research method from a comparative and historical perspective applied to migration policy analyses and changes in the case study.

In the book 'Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences', the article 'What We Know about the Development of Social Policy' by Edwin Amenta notes that the development of social policy influenced by historical timeline, i.e. History in general dictates the needs and conditions for the development of policies.

Comparative historical approaches explain why some countries succeeded at implementing some policies and others failed: "comparative and historical scholars have developed methodological approaches, in particular, by synthesizing comparative and historical and quantitative techniques in individual projects" (Amenta, 2003).

In the dissertation area, the historical method will take a place as well since we analyze Hungarian Russian identity, relationships and immigrants' perceptions within the timeline.

The historical method, in this case, helps to conduct theory-building, building knowledge and policies developed in the context of local, regional and level of the European Union.

One might argue that the regional policies don't take a major place in immigration management since the European Union policy domination and using the historical method helps to prove the opposite referring exactly to historical and political events and development of selected ethnicity nationalism in Hungary and perception of Russian immigrants due to the existence of previous bilateral relationships (Warsaw Pact that impacted post-soviet space and further cooperation and relationships).

In this case, the empirical contribution of comparative and historical research can be applied. As it was mentioned "comparative historical social scientists reconceptualize the problem, ask the large comparative questions – why democracy or revolutions occur here and not there, and so on – scour historiography on several countries and time periods regarding the surrounding issues, and then produce more comprehensive explanations that account for development across the countries" (Amenta, 2003, p. 97).

Such foundations of historical and comparative methodology form a solid foundation of a theoretical base on the basis of which it is possible to suggest the development of selective Hungarian nationalism towards some ethnicities and to form opinions and predictions in the society in relation to Russian immigrants, the Russian language and Russian culture as a whole.

That refers to the national level of policies-making and regulations towards immigrants of third countries and possibilities of Russian people to enter and settle in the country legitimate question wise and possibilities for integration with a country's integration immigrant policies.

The historical approach, in this case, refers to former relationships between countries and time-limitation. By the comparative analyses meant to be the studies that address the experience of two or more country cases (Amenta, 2011). It is important to mention that in this dissertation we exclude a holistic understanding of the case, so the study applies to the cross-national analyses.

The study will be made in a narrative form of causal argumentation based on sequences of events that will attempt to explain serious historical differences and trajectories. The study will include previous research on a related topic. New theoretical arguments will be developed refining theoretical argumentation along the way and uncover new empirical facts as a result of both.

The comparative approach based on policy research and historical context will answer the questions: why some countries accept refugees or immigrants and others are not or to be more specific, what is the Hungarian approach and perception of immigrants (namely, Russian immigrants). Is it positive or negative and why?

On the other side, the argument about institutionalization will be given. How local, regional and European level policies affect each other and influence the third-countries migrants that try to access Hungary with granted access to the European Union. How the lack of policy or adoption of those policies can cause and effect Russian immigrants and how it can be referred to as the international pressure of migrants' movement to the European Union?

The historical and comparative approach helps to generate theoretical arguments to be tested on larger data sets.

1.5.4 Limitations

Some delimitations have been already shaped by the methodology that can be found in interdisciplinary and its clarity that means that the researched topic includes micro and macro elements that make the study complex. However, the core of it is strictly limited to the mentioned disciplines.

Additionally, delimitations are applied to objects and subjects of the study.

First of all, immigration is limited to generations that refer to the historical timeline and nationality. The selection of immigrants for the initial netnographic survey was based on the

following parameters: Russian nationality is confirmed by a Russian or Soviet passport, its former possession, or dual citizenship (Russian-Hungarian). This strict requirement aims at providing accurate results in the study of Russian identity. However, I also reserve a right to include Ukrainian passport holders in the case of unsuccessful immigrants mapping and the lack of numbers for the survey. Perhaps, these measures will introduce a certain inaccuracy in the study, but the proportional number of Russian immigrants will still exceed the rest and there will be group results redistribution and explanations given on final results.

Secondly, limitations on collective identity formation linked to generations of immigrants that includes Soviet time that built the socialism identity that has a reflection on the Post-Soviet identity (will be given in the concept of "gemeinschaft" in general characteristics); and Post-Soviet time that forms post-soviet (modern) and contemporary identities. Thirdly, the milestones of Russian-Hungarian bilateral relations will be mentioned briefly and as such, they are not an object, not a subject of this study, but a connecting link in the analysis. Last but not least. Timeline limitations. While this research is primarily focusing on post-soviet time with modernity, it mostly covers the timeline of 2000-2022. Although limited, nevertheless it encounters further historical development and includes notes on the events of February 2022 as a cumulative moment not only in migration movement development but also in policy of destination country changes. Thus, gives many researchers a ground for further studies development that includes social policy and realism in global migration study.

CHAPTER 2: THEORIES AND FACTORS INFLUENCING MIGRATION

Introduction

Migration, in its many forms, has been a defining aspect of human history, influencing societies, economies, and political landscapes for centuries. As both a personal and collective experience,

migration is shaped by a complex interplay of factors that range from individual aspirations to broader socio-economic and political forces. This chapter delves into the multifaceted nature of migration, exploring the distinctions between emigration and immigration, as well as the underlying motivations that drive individuals to leave their home countries in search of better opportunities. While migration is often seen as a response to economic, political, and environmental conditions, it is also deeply influenced by personal circumstances, including family ties, identity, and aspirations for a better life.

The phenomenon of migration is further complicated by the policies of both sending and receiving countries, which may either facilitate or hinder the movement of people across borders. These policies not only determine the legal status of migrants but also impact their ability to integrate into new societies. Central to this discourse is the concept of citizenship, particularly the issue of dual citizenship, which has significant implications for both migrants and the countries involved. The chapter also examines the historical trajectory of migration, from its early biological and survival-driven roots to the more complex and intentional migration flows of the modern era.

By analyzing migration from both a historical and contemporary perspective, the chapter aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the causes, patterns, and consequences of migration in the globalized world. Through this exploration, we gain insight into the socio-economic and political factors that shape migration processes, as well as the challenges and opportunities faced by both migrants and the countries that receive them. The following sections will further unpack the various theoretical frameworks, historical events, and policy considerations that have shaped the migration phenomenon, setting the stage for a deeper analysis of its impact on the global stage and gradually leading to the analyses of Russian migration and its motives.

2.1 History and Classification of Migration

Population migration is a significant component of important processes of our time, but the phenomenon of migration itself appeared long before modernity.

Migration was a natural process in the history of sapiens and from the point of view of human biology, the primary needs and instincts of self-survival were directly related to several factors, ecologically pleasant and suitable conditions for settling, including the temporal,

resourcefulness of the territory and safety (e.g. the absence of tribal enemies, mythological evil spirits and dangerous animals).

The resettlement of peoples at that time was a communal necessity, dictated exclusively by vital biological needs. Then there were no state or country borders, but there was a prerequisite since often the territories were occupied by other tribes.

Migration of peoples continued in ancient times, it was then that the first prerequisites for the raids and conquests of the lands of other peoples appeared with the aim of ultimately settling in a place favorable for habitation with vast natural resources. A little later, at the same time, the first prerequisites for the national identity of peoples began to form, which consider themselves as a single whole, speaking a common language, creating the legends and myths that lead to a culture formation. People of one tribe linked by biological blood ties and common cultural features.

The milestone of the rise in the history of human migration is considered to be the XVI-XVII centuries when the flow of emigration significantly increases, it becomes an individual conscious decision.

At the same time is the enlightenment of nationalism and the initial preconditions for the final formation of a meaningful national identity based on symbols, common political nationalities, a common language that is used both orally and in written (printed) form. In addition, the country's geographical borders are also becoming politically sovereign.

The transport system plays an important role here, which facilitates migration and activates the flow of volunteer migration. Since this milestone, migration is gaining ever greater coverage.

In the XX century, there are at least two events that triggered global, to some extent, uncontrolled migration. It was the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Migration at this time is especially interesting for its political and economic effect. It was at this time that most of the sound-related theories for migration were created, as well as the tightening of the resettlement policy of countries.

One can assess such a rapid increase in global migration in different ways, but the most objective way is to take a retrospective and consider each new surge in migration as a response to past events.

So, if in the XX century it was historical events that became the trigger, then it can be assumed that the prerequisites for these events were such milestones in human history as industrialization and the formation of empires, which later ceased in strong economic and political states, as a consequence, the emergence of a gap between developed and developing

countries, and the formation of the national identity of peoples, their needs in economic and political security, similar to the survival instinct.

Population migration is a significant component of all the most important processes of our times. The existence of the migration process is based on state borders and concepts of national security, differences in cultural values and linguistic differences, climatic, and natural features of different parts of the planet. Migration is a complex social process that affects many aspects of the socio-economic, political, and cultural life of society, migration is an object of international regulation. Attracting foreign workers in priority specialties in accordance with the needs of the state is a necessity for economic development.

However, one should admit that the problems of population migration are also political since they are associated with the crossing of national borders by a significant number of people, as well as with the formation of often large communities with unstable migratory behavior on the territory of the country, which contributes to an increase in social tension.

The history of migration in the XXI century has become even more acute. Here at least two triggers can be disclosed. First, it is the military instability of the Middle East and south-central Asia regions, including the war in Lebanon and Syria; Israel and Palestine; Afghanistan. Secondly, the economic poverty and political instability of the African and Asian regions.

Both events happened as a result of the cumulative effect. On the one hand, that is the ignorance of the global community of a fact acknowledgment in the existence of political conflicts in the Middle East region and inaction in mediation and intervention. On the other hand, it is a consequence of postcolonial dependence and inaction of countries-colonizers in helping the development of post-colonized regions.

Migration as a phenomenon has been further exacerbated by the complexity of structural institutions and created entities. If earlier the phenomenon of migration was considered as a conditional process of movement of human capital from the sending to the receiving country, accordingly, the migration policy included the regulation of two parties, i.e. the sending and receiving countries. Under these conditions, appropriate models of migration between the agreed parties could be projected, in which limited reasons and quotas for migration would represent economic supply and demand and ensure the control of organized migration.

Among the most attractive countries for migration in our time are the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and all the countries of the European Union.

This division is primarily due to the economic development of these countries in general terms. If the listed countries are considered in a detailed context, then additional features can

be distinguished, such as: the rapid development of information technology, start-up businesses and power of economy in the USA; attractive resettlement policies in Canada's multicultural context; rapidly growing Asian economies and entry into the Asian business market in Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. While the first two countries can cause some political-democratic mistrust and instability, Singapore is characterized as a multicultural, democratic, economically developed, and stable country; the countries of the European Union are especially popular because of their developed democratic freedoms, the vastness, and unity of the economic market, and the free movement of goods, services, capital and people (also known as four fundamental freedoms of the EU).

Such a limited list of developed countries creates an excess interest of the vast majority of emigrants who aim at resettling with economic and political benefits. Most potential emigrants come from economically and, most often, political, disadvantaged countries and are unskilled or low-skilled workers in its majority.

One of the most common migrations is international labor migration. According to the International Labor Organization, a UN specialized agency, "migrant workers contribute to growth and development in their countries of destination, while countries of origin greatly benefit from their remittances and the skills acquired during their migration experience" (ILO, 2020).

Any act of movement can be endowed with pathos and viewed from the point of view of subjectivity. However, considering objectivism and liberalism as an opportunity and a trend dictated by the globalization of economic and political systems, it is important to note that in this case, subjectivism is the opposition and contradiction of the objective reality of the modern world.

International labor migration is, first of all, a voluntary act (if it was non-violent with the participation of a third party) of temporary or permanent resettlement from a permanent habitual place of residence to a country of destination in order to generate income.

International labor migration is subdivided into legal and illegal. Its status depends on the country's need for migrant workers and the act regulating these movements, recognizing their legal effect. Illegal immigration is described as a violation of current legislation of a state by foreign citizens or forced relocation to a country without its consent and approval.

The seriousness of the problem of illegal immigration is associated with the difficulty of determining quantitative parameters of this phenomenon, which significantly exceed the officially registered data on migration that's a particular threat to national unity and security as well as an economic one.

The effect of uncontrolled migration, observed in the XXI century, is associated with the complexity of the phenomenon of migration at all its stages from migrating residents, the number of immigrating foreigners, their national and cultural identification, the purpose of staying in the country, their duration of residency, the country's ability and policy in integrating and assimilating, control and movement of legal and illegal immigrants in the country.

In 2020 the United Kingdom withdrew from the European Union. One of the key campaigns of Brexit had been the reduction of immigrants from the European Economic Area since it imposed challenges on the UK educational system, including the research area, and national security. Despite the simplicity of campaign objectives, the immigration problem has had a real impact since back to the time the UK was a major colonizer.

The foreign policy of the UK that has been established back to the time had a tremendous effect on the immigration flow to the country since the XX centuries that has been continued and overlapped with the European Union policies and cooperation in immigration area since the amount of uncontrolled immigration has been unbearable even for the developed country such as the UK.

The problem of the migration of the XXI century, compared to the previous stages of migration history, gained perhaps the ideological character that can be seen at the preservation of a national identity of a country and ensure the transparency of elections giving the primary right of decision for indigenous citizens.

The aim of cultural preservation and heritage can be seen as the post-production of national identity or invented traditions (Hobsbawm, 1983), thus it's not mentioned as the fundamental for the creation of a national identity that has already been formed earlier.

Particular attention should be paid to the general problems of the European Union, which will be the key to understanding subsequent cases. The idea of the European Single Market was to create a common unhindered space for organizing business and trade processes between the participating countries, which also involves residents and citizens of the European Union. European culture implies the geographical proximity of the countries of Europe, the key moments of history and culture, shared by all members to one degree or another as initial data.

The European Union means economic and political unification, an organization with an interethnic superstructure while preserving to some extent the national interests of a particular country of the EU.

Returning again to the concept of multilayer identity, it is important to note that migration flows within the EU by the EU citizens are quite normal practice and are considered as a part of an integration process.

However, the experience of the EU on the example of the UK shows that the admission of new members and their economic imbalance in comparison with stronger economic countries can lead to a recurrent division of identity when within the union itself a division into the concepts of "we" and "they" can appear.

In this case, an even greater impact is exerted on immigrants from third countries. It is difficult to control movements within the EU and such miscalculation in numbers can significantly affect both the national economy and harm the national security of those countries that are not ready to accept "other" immigrants based on national interests and resources. Such a complex institutionalization of the EU system and its inaccuracies create the basis for illegal immigration.

In most cases, illegal immigrants target more economically developed countries in order to obtain an economic advantage, but the situation may change and free movement within the Schengen Area and the EU may serve to create and support the underground economy at a higher level.

2.2 Conceptualizing Emigration and Immigration

Migration as a phenomenon can be seen as a two-sided process. The term of emigration can be applied as the act of moving from a country of acquired nationality either by jus sanguinis or jus soli that is considered to be a country of origin and departure by term to another country that is considered to be permanent or temporary residence within an international border. The temporary residence or short-term term migration is not defined by impermanence but indicates a duration between three and twelve months permanently residing in a destination country, according to the UN (UN Refugees and Migrants, 2020)[1].

The term of immigration is reversed to emigration and describes the perspective of a country of destination or arrival in the perception of a migrant that becomes a resident.

Despite the fact that the UN sees a migration process as both voluntarily and involuntarily move, including the cases of smuggling or abduction of a person, migration

[1] *Migrant – "while there is no formal legal definition of an international migrant, most experts agree that an international migrant is someone who changes his or her country of usual residence, irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status. Generally, a distinction is made between short-term or temporary migration, covering movements with a duration between three and 12 months, and long-term or permanent migration, referring to a change of country of residence for a duration of one year or more."*

caused by climate or political disruption (UN, 2020)[2], in this dissertation migration is researched as a voluntarily motivated act dictated by the set of reasons of an immigrant and the legal status of an immigrant in a destination country.

In this work, migration is viewed as a causal relationship, where a limited number of reasons serve as a trigger for migration.

From the point of view of the original country, this may be the political and economic ineffectiveness of the policy that impacts the quality of life. From the point of view of a destination country are a favorable environment and a number of legal terms, conditions, and reasons for an immigrant.

The policy of a destination country can aim at immigrants' attraction or just give a historical, political, economic, or educational opportunity for migration. The study also accounts for ancestry-based residence, migration by blood belonging, family-reunification, and transnational marriages but doesn't evince significant pragmatic motives.

As an important part of the sided process states' role in promotion or limitation of international migration should be designated objectively in policies and citizenships variety given. "The acquisition of citizenship in the destination country has implications for one's rights and entitlements, socioeconomic integration, and prospects for their family members. It also affects the links of migrants with their countries of origin. When the countries of origin and destination do not allow dual citizenship, migrants are compelled to make a decision regarding their choice of citizenship" (UN DESA, 2013, pp. 70-71).

Although it applies to one of the last stages of immigration and it takes years to acquire citizenship of a new country in most of the cases, one needs to remember that a decision about dual citizenship policy has to be made and approved and accepted by both governments. The policy of dual citizenship has its pros and cons, but, above all, it guarantees the establishment of friendly political and economic ties between countries and the free movement of citizens while preserving their rights and freedoms to self-determination both in the identification and in a place to live. In this case, governments should rely on several preferential factors such as

1. *Identical* that includes similar ethnic and cultural identity or common elements formed by collective identification without the threat of destruction and domination of one another;

[2] *Migrant – "The UN Migration Agency (IOM) defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is".*

2. *Common political values* and the absence of current contradictions between countries, including on ethnic and national grounds;
3. *Economic integration of markets*, including cooperation and mutual assistance, while the size of the economies of countries also matters, but doesn't play a decisive role for the unimpeded movement of goods, services, capital, and labor.

It's important to mention that if a dual citizenship policy isn't settled then it creates a possibility for an immigrant to return to a country of origins within the return policy and benefits.

2.3. Economic Factors in Migration

One of the methods for analyzing migration as a process is that migrants are viewed as a human resource placed in the conditions of the economic system.

Commonly, emigrants are driven by macroeconomic factors. Based on this, the terms 'low-skilled' and 'high-skilled' migrants were created in order to specify the migrants' groups and their contribution to a receiving country's economics.

Shughart, Tollison and Kimenyi (1986) see three interest groups in immigration policy enforcement: workers (migrants), capitalists (producers), and landowners going through the business cycles and economic growth.

Considering the country's economics, the supply and demand of migrants are changing both within workers themselves and capitalists and landowners. Policymakers count these shifts for immigrant policies.

In this regard, the interest of the above-mentioned parties should be listed. Migrants pursue higher wages, capitalists in contrast aim at the reduction of production costs due to low worker's payment. Landowners benefit from migrants and rent increase due to higher interests in properties and the real estate market boom.

This is reflected in the neoclassical economic theory, which considers an individual (consumer, entrepreneur, employee) as an economic being and studies a behavior, aimed at maximizing profits and minimizing utilities (Weintraub, 1985).

Massey integrates world systems theory, segmented labour market theory, social capital theory, and neoclassical macroeconomics to explain the socioeconomic behaviour and motivations of international migrants in the context of globalizing economy: "in the short run, international migration does not stem from a lack of economic development, but from the development itself" (Massey, 1999, p.304).

On the one hand, migration studies objectively single out two historical events that triggered the flow of migrants from 'sending countries or countries of origin', namely the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union (Frejka, 1996).

On the other hand, host countries for migrants and events related to economic attractiveness should be mentioned, this may include the post-Cold war environment and economic rise of countries such as the USA in the modern world, the creation of the European Union, and globalization of economics in the contemporary world.

Such a parallel historical division is necessary, first of all, for comprehending changes in the economic space and trends in the migration of the economic context.

Secondly, this is a change in academic thought and school in the analysis of migration processes, which consider the migrant from a different angle, not only from the point of view of economics.

Thirdly, this is a change in the immigration policy itself and its subdivisions, associated with political instability and events in the modern world, which, as a result, introduces additional terms for migration, such as a political refugee, asylum seeker, stateless migrants.

Thus, it can be emphasized that mentioned scholars and their outstanding followers of economic international immigration were able to highlight the lobbying interests of states in accepting migrants on a labor basis, but didn't foresee the turbulence of the XXI century and, as a result, the shifted angle of migration processes.

Despite the transaction from modern to contemporary migration processes, several criteria extracted from the previous theoretical backgrounds can be identified, transformed, and used in further migration analyses and immigration policy-making.

Labour market segmentation. According to Gordon, "the role of labour migration appears to be simply one of equilibrating the geographical balance of aggregate labour supply and demand through responses of potential migrants to differences between areas in attainable real incomes" (1995, p.140).

Social Capital and International Migration. The social network of immigrants is a special type of social ties between visiting compatriots, as well as their contacts with compatriots who have remained at home; the characteristics of these connections, in general, can be used to interpret the social behavior of the immigrants involved in the network, and the structure of social networks reflects the nature of the relationship between them. "Migrant networks are a set of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants to one another through relations of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin" (Palloni et al, 2001, p.1964).

Low-skilled and high-skilled immigrants differently influence economics. The study "The economics of Immigration" by Borjas sets up the timeless definitions and variables given in mathematical formulas and conclusions: "immigration also generates a sizable redistribution of wealth in the economy, reducing the incomes of natives who are now competing with immigrant workers in the labor market and increasing the incomes of capitalists and other users of immigrant services" (1995, p.19).

International migration is characterized by inconsistency, the complexity of the process, and positive-negative consequences in trends for both sides of the socio-economic process. If we consider the benefited side of a *'sending' country*, then the following advantages can be found (Rakovskaya et al, 2013):

- The export of labor helps to reduce tensions in the national labor markets, reduces the level of unemployment and the cost of its social services;
- Citizens working abroad transfer most of their earnings to their homeland;
- Some of the emigrants return home, bringing capital with them for starting a business.

On the contrary, considering the indicator of the non-return of the migrant to the homeland, the following disadvantages can be found (Rakovskaya et al, 2013):

1. The expenditure and investment of GDP resources on human capital and the nurturing of the labor force is considered as an ineffective allocation of state funds as an investor;
2. emigration of the most competitively capable and enterprising workers weakens the country's business environment and the national economy as a whole, including at the international level;
3. the outflow of highly professional, scientific and technical specialists known as brain-drain negatively affects the innovative development of a country. Moreover, it potentially creates high competitiveness on the international scene with a high concentration of intellectual immigrants in another county (Rakovskaya et al, 2013).

From a 'receiving' country perspective the following advantages and disadvantages can be listed, depending on the short and long-term run. In general, the demographic situation in a host country improves, since migrants either can be considered as additional labor force (low-skilled) or innovative, intellectual entrepreneurs (high-skilled), i.e. if in an applied designated triangle with workers (migrants), capitalists (producers) and landowners, the expectations of capitalists can be minimized or reversed in a case when an immigrant-worker becomes a

producer, then the expectations of the benefits of landowners and the real estate market will tend to a single benefit of a host-country.

However, the widespread use of low-skilled migrants labor leads to the conservation of a low level of wages, dishonest practices in the domestic labor market, the creation and further development of a segmented market that possibly may affect citizens of host countries if the number of low-skilled immigrants are correlated to low-skilled citizens, together it creates a higher unemployed rate and market segmentation in certain industries and regions.

Immigrants stimulate production growth and additional employment in the host country with their qualitative and quantitative ratio. However, if there is an imbalance in migration policy and the bulk of immigrants come from poor countries and fill niches in the lower segment of the labor market, they concentrate at the bottom of the social pyramid, which leads to their marginalization.

Additionally, regardless of the qualifications of a migrant but considering the quantitative balance, entire sectors of the economy either trade (high-skill) or construction (low-skill), with long-term use of migrant labor, become dependent on them.

Frequently, businesses that rely on cheap immigrant labor lose incentives to improve working conditions and qualify workers. However, it has another side, using economic immigrants as cheap labor, allows medium and small businesses to remain competitive, thus increasing the availability of goods and services for low classes of citizens, i.e. to some extent it reduces poverty.

The characteristics listed above are given in general terms and may vary from country to country. The presented data provide a generalized view of the work of the socioeconomic apparatus of migration. For accurate forecasting, a direct model of migration needs to be created and analyzed, which will be specific for a certain country.

One of the overlooked elements of the socioeconomic model itself is a migrant, with one's feelings, difficulties, and contradictions. It takes quite a long time to adapt to new living and working conditions in a new country.

2.4. Political Factors in Migration

Considering the global economic emergence and globalization in general, there is no doubt that labor migration is one of the most dominant among international migration trends.

Even though the globalization of the economy has created a significant gap between developing and developed countries, this is not a reason to believe that migrants are fleeing

poverty in their own countries. Migration itself has a psychological- identical factor, related to complex dissatisfaction with residence in the 'sending' country.

If the psychology of migration can be studied deeper, it will be acknowledged that key factor in migration is directly related to a complex identical crisis, when an individual, regardless of blood and land belonging by birth, finds oneself lost and becomes 'a stranger among one's own' or 'one's own among strangers'.

An identity crisis can also be accompanied by political dissatisfaction and persecution in the country, which is directly related to the conflict of identical interests of both an individual and a collective majority in the case of the transgender, gay, religious identity, and the quantitative and qualitative minority and majority in relation to state policy or disagreement of an individual with a qualified majority.

Frequently, migration patterns from a migrant's position have intermingled motives that include a variety of reasons: "indeed, the impact of war, political oppression, and environmental degradation in many countries, often in association with worsening economic conditions, are also major contributors" (Yeoh et al, 2020, p.93).

Changes in the position of various groups of the population predetermine civil and political behavior, and also entails significant shifts in the structure of society and changes the level of relations between its members, sharply activates their migratory moods, accelerates the formation and implementation of migration attitudes, which constantly increases the percentage of non-organized or voluntarily migration in the structure of international migration.

"Brain drain" is the irrevocable emigration of highly qualified specialists, including examples of specialists (students, graduate students, trainees), due to the special policy of the countries of immigration, which, as a rule, has negative consequences for the countries of emigration.

Migration from a 'sending' to a 'host' country is a triple-sided social, economic, and political phenomenon since it impacts three sides. 'The climate' for migration should be encountered since it shapes migration policies based on previous political-historical sending-receiving countries' ties, for example, military occupation, colonial past; or current trade and investment flows.

Besides, migration flows are directly connected with the national security of three parties. Spatially related migration with displacement with people between the two poles of movement: sending and accepting countries, already in the first approximation represents a real or potential security challenge.

Analytically, the problem of "migration and security" breaks down into two sub-problems: the security of the people themselves, who form migration flows, and the security of society and the state affected by migration flows.

It is becoming clear that the link between migration and security is two-sided. At the same time, both from the point of view of the safety of migrants and any environment that they leave or into which they are introduced, structural characteristics are extremely important.

First, the difference between life circumstances, which the freedom of choice of a migrant is not limited, and those which don't have freedom of choice, i.e. the level of safety is largely determined by what aspects of safety are available to everyone, to what extent and in what range.

At the same time, thinking carefully about a migrant's circumstances or emotionally reacting to them, a person proceeds from personal experience and the concepts of security that's been assimilated.

One needs to notice that the choice of a migrant is limited from the beginning and while choosing a country for emigration, a potential emigrant has the objective set of legal reasons for immigration; resources and capabilities, including skills, financial safety; desire and interest towards the host country as a psychological motivating factor.

So, migrants' choice is forcibly narrowed and that requires the need of personal security endowment and its contribution.

Although the security threats that are relevant for them in the country of departure, as a rule, are removed or noticeably weakened due to the very fact of displacement, other ones await them in return in a host-country since it can be unpredictable. That incompleteness of subjectivity (for example, language barriers, cultural characteristics, etc.), with which they are forced to face during immigration impose some new challenges at all aspects of migrants' life.

The situation with societies is different. Since for them migration, even regulated, inevitably turns into excessive tension in social relations, they tend to perceive it not so much as a challenge, but as a potential internal (in the country of departure) or external (in the country of arrival) threat to their security.

Moreover, closed communities with their developed group self-awareness, such as a separate state, regard immigration as a rather constant threat.

The opposition between "newcomers" and "indigenous" is especially negative when migrants, really sharply distinguishing themselves by their appearance and norms of

behavior, do not immediately accept the adaptation model, which assumes the fastest getting used to the environment and rapid dissolution in it.

Migration can pose real or potential threats to almost any aspect of security. Society can face threats to economic and political security, such as the problem of “brain drain”, focal deformation of the demographic, territorial, and socio-professional structure.

The problem of brain drain can also be in their circulation (known as “brain drain circulation”) when a highly-skilled immigrant returns to the country of origin, offered by the govermenets the set of opportunities for return that can include unique trade and business opportunities (Yeoh et al, 2020).

An important role in this phenomenon is also played by the social network of the immigrant and a connection with homeland country: “network ties to the host country can thus facilitate the job search, provide initial housing, and serve as insurance to mitigate the enormous risk associated with migration” (Klabunde & Willekens, 2016, p.3).

Considering migration flows as a phenomenon with three active participants, namely the 'sending', 'receiving' country and the migrant himself, it should be noted that the final decision in this chain is made by the immigrant, who can be guided by both objective and subjective factors when making a decision.

In order to assess this decision-making, migration imitation models are used as a flexible tool to reproduce a wider range of stylized facts and prediction-models (Rehm, 2012).

CHAPTER 3: RUSSIAN MIGRATION WAVES AND PATTERNS

3.1 The Problem of Russian Emigration Stage Identification and Study

Historically, migration processes in different countries and political systems have been generated by various socio-political shifts, which are generally determined by some societal crisis state: political, economic, or other ones. The history of Russia in the XX century is marked by a number of wars, conflicts, and global historical changes, which entailed numerous migration movements abroad (for a more detailed discussion of Russian history and identity, see Chapter 4 Russian Identity Formation). This chapter aims to contribute to the discussion of the Russian emigration waves by contextualising them in the historical, social, political and economic contexts. Besides, it suggests applying an interdisciplinary conceptual framework to facilitate the analysis of the waves, focusing primarily on the motivation to leave the country and economic outcomes for a migrant, sending and receiving countries.

In the research literature of Russian emigration, several periods are generally distinguished. In sources studying the contribution of Russian emigrants and the formation of the culture of Russian emigration abroad, known as diaspora, three waves are most often discerned: the first, which was caused by the Russian Revolution and the Civil War (1910-

1920), the second, associated with the outcome of the Second World War (the 1940s) and the third evolving in the times of Cold War, so formally associated with the strengthening of ideological dictatorship (late 1960s - early 1980s) (Matveeva, 2017; Aleksenko, 2020).

Other researchers identify four waves of Russian emigration, referring to the country's historical and political milestones (Aleksenko, 2020). So, the period following and echoing the Third wave is described as a separate one (1986\1990-2000). For example, Beyer (2013) describes it the following way: "The complete collapse of the Soviet Union clearly marked a new period and a new reality for Russians and their ability to cross frontiers and national boundaries freely now referred to as 'The Fourth wave'" (Beyer, 2013). Additionally, the fourth wave of Russian emigration is called "economic" (BBC News, 2012) since Russian emigrants were moving abroad not because of political persecution or repression, but due to Russia entering the globalizing world, which made it possible to simultaneously live in two or even more countries legally.

Some studies also distinguish a relatively new phenomenon – the ongoing Fifth wave of Russian emigration, taking place in the XXI century and being counted from the beginning of 2000. This period has not yet been sufficiently studied, but it has received important recognition in both social and media debates. The Fifth wave is being called the "emigration of disappointment" (Medvedev, 2019), referring mainly to the disappointment in the development of the political regime in the country. Still, there are various interpretations of the motivation for emigration in the Fifth wave that rely on emigration studies in general and preliminary analysis of those who have left the country since the beginning of the 2000s. Thus, three point views could be identified:

- **First case:** political motivation. As discussed previously, political upheaval and infringement of liberal rights may provoke people to leave their home country. Regarding the Fifth wave, some argue that its cause is the tightening of Putin's regime and general authoritarian turn in Russia (Vladimirov et al, 2018). As a result, the reduction of rights and freedoms, the growth of repression, where the events on the Bolotnaya Square[3] are an important milestone (Medvedev, 2019) leading to exiting the country.

[3] Mass protests that took place in 2011 - 2013 as a result of election fraud resulted in mass arrests of protestors alleged in the organisation of mass protests and violence against the police.

- **Second case:** search for better opportunities and improvement of living standards. So, some people ascribe the Fifth waves to the advantages of globalization and, as a consequence, suggest that the migration of this period can be circular since many Russians leave in search of better opportunities but not yet ready to leave the Russian Federation once and forever (TASS, 2017).
- **Third case:** combined view. Some studies suggest to consider the motivation to emigrate as a complex set of factors, including the political and economic context in both the sending and hosting societies. Therefore, according to this approach, the Fifth wave emigration can not be called unambiguously political since the overwhelming majority have not been subjected to any persecution. However, it also claims that political motives undoubtedly influenced the decision of many along with the economic and opportunity considerations (BBC News, 2012; Bushuev, 2019).

Besides the problem with the identification of the waves and their timing, the other problem that can be applied both to the theoretical background of migration and the process itself is the statistical accountancy of migrants' track and movement. In migration research, the figures of total numbers of emigrants and immigrants help to analyze the scale of overall migration and the impact that it has on the countries of origin and destination.

At the moment, there are several sources of statistical information in the study of Russian emigration to foreign countries and Russian immigration as countries that receive Russian emigrants can be listed: data from the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat); data from the Federal Migration Service of Russia; data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; expert assessments; data from national statistics of countries that received the main flows of migrants from Russia; data from international organizations such as the United Nation (UN), The International Organization for Migration (IOM), The International Labour Organization (ILO), The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), etc.

The problem is that the absolute indicators of migration may differ many times from the relative ones due to many reasons, including the differences in legal definitions, varying approaches to counting border crossings, and varying time periods of data (Palnikov, 2007; UNECE, 2011). To illustrate the magnitude of the differences between various sources, the study "Demographic Challenges of Russia" showed that according to the statistics of the receiving countries, the number of immigrating Russians is many times higher than the statistics of emigrants. Thus, according to it, "the German estimate of the migration growth of Germany

at the expense of Russia is 22 times higher than the Russian one, the Spanish statistics is higher by 28 times, the Austrian one shows 18 times greater. The number of Russians who received immigration status in Canada is 46 times higher than the number of those who, according to Russian data, left for Canada for permanent residence" (CSRHR, 2017, p.62). Some authors suggest that this difference is due to a fact that Russia accounts only for "the legal departure for permanent residence" (Ryazantsev & Pismennaya, 2013, p.28), while statistical offices of other countries also include temporary residence permits along with some estimation of illegal immigration.

Furthermore, there are countries where the official statistics do not even give a rough idea of the real scale of emigration. The list of such countries is noted by Palnikov (2007), including the countries of Eastern Europe, namely Poland and Hungary. He mentioned that Hungary did not even provide data on Russian immigrants with permanent residence, so in this case, we can only rely on inaccurate Russian statistics.

So, studying Russian emigration is challenging due to an ongoing debate on the number and timing of the waves, unreliability of the statistical data, and the fact that the process is still ongoing. While First - Fourth waves of Russian emigration have received substantial attention in the academic literature, the Fifth wave still requires careful consideration, especially in terms of motivation for leaving the homeland and economic losses and gains for the sending and hosting countries. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind when debating the topic that migration is a natural part of the globalization process. Historically, migrants' movements have always been directed and behaviourally driven towards more attractive opportunities in terms of decent income, interesting work, high-quality and affordable education, medical care, safe living, political freedoms, etc. The remainder of this chapter is structured the following way. First, a conceptual framework is developed to facilitate the analysis of Russian emigration by discussing the difference between types of migration (circular, return and permanent) and the issues of "gain" and "loss" from the migration process. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the description of the Russian emigration waves, contextualising them and applying the conceptual framework to analyse each phase deeper. The chapter concludes with a brief summary and discussion of the main results.

3.2 Types of Migration: Circular, Return, and Permanent Migration

As briefly discussed in the Introduction to this chapter, the discrepancy in the estimations of migration numbers may also be attributed to the difference between *de jure* and *de facto* migration cases. Thus, while the former focuses only on the legal cases of migration, the latter also counts those who migrate in an irregular way. However, the main challenge is that sometimes the difference between de jure and de facto migration is blurred due to a lack of shared definitions of migration forms. However, it should be pointed out that migration, despite its type, should be the right to choose the country of residence in accordance with more favourable conditions for a migrant with consideration of the legality of migration policies of both sending and receiving countries.In the absence of clear definitions, it is challenging to establish the difference between circular, return, and permanent migration. In the literature, the following definitions of circular migration/migrant can be found as followed:

- Changing the place of residence of a migrant between a country of origin and a destination country on legal or illegal bases until the final settlement due to age or family reunion (Bustamante, 2002).
- Return of a migrant to a sending country one or several times over a period of time (O'Neil, 2003).
- The third-country nationals settled and working in the EU but wishing to start an activity in a country of origin or the third-country national that reside outside the EU that wishing to come to the EU for temporarily work, study, training or a combination of all mentioned before reestablishing back to a country of origin (European Commission, 2007).
- A repetition of legal migration between two and more countries (EMN, 2011).
- "The fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or long-term movement which may be beneficial to all involved, if occurring voluntarily and linked to the labour needs of countries of origin and destination" (IOM, 2011, p.19);
- A person, i.e. migrant that has dual household membership (Posel & Marx, 2013).
- Repeated travel or movement between different destinations (Schneider & Parusel, 2015).

A more or less structured understanding of circular migration can be found in Fargues (2008). According to his typology, there can be several types and criterion of circular migration: temporary residence (time-limited permits); possibility for renewal (multiple entries into a destination country); circularity and freedom of movements between a country of origin and a host country during each period of stay; legality; migrants' rights protection; labour demand and satisfaction in a destination country with possibly additional criterion of suiting labour

market needs, migrants' skills upgrade, transfer of knowledge and skills to the country of source in order to mitigate the effect of the brain drain (Fargues, 2008).

Given terminology is the theoretical one, although in practice every country has its own definition and approach that may differ from others, which makes the definition of circular migration even more unclear. This thesis adopts the approach suggested by Fargues (2008) as it is one of the most comprehensive when analysing circular migration.

Additionally, one term should be mentioned as an addition to the circular migration is the *spontaneous circular migration* that "refers to people who decide themselves whether or not to migrate to a different country, about the length of their stay, and whether or not, and when, to return to their country of origin, and eventually migrate again" (UNECE, 2016, p.4). That is an important concept, which can show how the possibilities of globalization and circular migration can create some competition between countries for human capital in relation to high-skilled migrants. Despite the fact that this is still a more individual and psychological aspect in the decision of a migrant oneself, one should not forget about the race of globalization.

As to return migration, there is also a lack of universally accepted definition. In particular, return migration includes, but it is not limited to, repatriation, removal, deportation, assisted return, as well as return on an individual's own initiative to their country of origin (Carling et al., 2015). As it could be noted from various forms of return migration, it could be divided in two groups - voluntary (for instance, returning on an own initiative, repatriation) and forced (for example, removal, deportation) return.

Applying the criteria of comprehensiveness and generality, this thesis will rely on the definition of return migration suggested by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). According to it, return is "in a general sense, the act or process of going back or being taken back to the point of departure. This could be [...] between a country of destination or transit and a country of origin, as in the case of migrant workers, refugees or asylum seekers" (IOM Glossary on Migration, 2019).

Permanent migration is also a debatable concept given the complexity of the phenomenon itself but also the variability of legal approaches to it from one country to another. For example, OECD applies settlement as a criterion for permanent migration, stating that "permanent immigrant inflows cover regulated movements of foreigners considered to be settling in the country from the perspective of the destination country"[4]. The UN Department

[4] https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/permanent-immigrant-inflows.html#:~:text=Definition,well%20as%20free%20movement%20migration.

of Economic and Social Affairs (1998) suggests that a person living in another country than their birth country for a period of at least one year can be considered as a long-term resident. The IOM, in turn, defines permanent resident as "a non-national with the right of permanent residence in a State of destination," highlighting, therefore, the legal status of a migrant.

The academic research also shows a lack of convergence in defining permanent migration. For example, Bell and Ward (2000) suggest that permanent migration is characterised by a lasting relocation, single transition, minor seasonal variation and a lack of intention to return. However, this definition is restrictive by highlighting that an emigrant does not have an intention to return back to their sending country. Therefore, this research will use the following definition of permanent migration suggested by Chen (2023): expected final settlement in a host destination, "either based on the registration status or settlement intention." It should also be noted that an important criterion for the residence of a migrant and his\her final decision is the fact of paying taxes in the country. By where the emigrant\ immigrant pays taxes, one can determine one's administrative and legal involvement in the welfare of the country in which the migrant settles, which contributes to the understanding of the benefits of sending and receiving countries.

Given the complex problem of defining migration types, it can be noted that migration in both cases of immigration and emigration could be seen not as a problem, but rather as a win-win strategy, where human capital is seen as an advantage in the destination country since it can have control over migrants' stay and permit issue, pension and social security, mobility partnership with a sending country. For sending countries, benefits can be found in unloading the national economy, including jobs; retraining, improving and circulation of skills, partnerships with a host country, trade and investment networks. Gains for migrants themselves can be found in a variety of options and flexibility since they are not committed to definitive return, legal circularity and mobility, enhancement, retaining and application of skills, the establishment of networks, community development, and possible institutional improvement (Dayton-Johnson, 2007). Receiving countries can benefit from fresh labour power, attracting talent, higher investments in the economy, partnerships with sending countries, and others.

Thus, considering the possible outcome for three parties, namely the migrant (1) and his\her welfare that constitutes a part of welfare of one of the countries, the country of birth, in this thesis, Russia (2), and the destination-country, in this case, Hungary (3) in terms of movable human capital on behalf of a migrant (1), one can build a theoretical "gain" and "loss" system.

3.3. Migration Systems: “Gain” and “Loss” Migration Models

In the context of international migration, the issue of “gain” and “loss” is quite a debate. The question “who benefits from migration?”: the sending country, the receiving country or the immigrant herself\himself is still open due to a number of changing factors, which include the demographic issue, the time frame of migration, the skills and qualifications of the migrant, the economies of both countries, their legal regulation of migration and even identity politics and approaches to integration.

Some scholars are inclined to believe that emigration or immigration brings neither “gain” nor “loss” to those who leave or remain behind in the country of emigration. Grubel and Scott propose the following: “if a person is paid his true marginal social product, his emigration leaves unchanged the incomes of those remaining in the country from which he leaves, except for the redistributive effects of government taxation and spending” (1968, p.545).

In contrast, another group of researchers suggests that high-skilled emigrants lower the growth of the welfare of the country of emigration (Johnson, 1967; Lundborg, 2006). This could be illustrated by brain drain and a proposed tax on emigration, characterised as one of the most negative impacts for a sending country(Bhagwati and Hamada). Further, the negative impact has been reformulated by the new growth theorists (Miyagiwa, 1991; Haque & Kim, 1995; Wong & Yip, 1999). According to this approach, humans’ desires and unlimited wants foster ever-increasing productivity and economic growth; so, if a country loses the most qualified and educated workers, its economic and human capital development may be hampered.

On the contrary, it has been suggested that human capital can be fostered in prospects of sending country growth, especially in the case of return migration. For example, if education abroad is higher or of better quality than in the country of origin, returning immigrants may promote further growth and development by bringing back new knowledge and skills (Stark et al., 1997; Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003). This also concerns entrepreneurial activities and trade networks: so, when a returning migrant gets new skills, expertise, expands their business networks and then transfers them in their home country (Dustmann & Kirchkamp, 2002).

Perhaps one of the most comprehensive analyses is presented in Panagariya's article “Migration: Who Gains, Who Loses", where the author considers the migration process as the complex phenomenon, respectively considering one-good, a two-factor model that describes an

economic process between the "source country" and "the host country" with the one-way flow of human capital of a high or low-skilled migrant. According to the author, the migrant generally benefits, although the gain of other parties, referred to as countries, depends on terms. Under the circumstances of a small volume migration with consideration that a migrant does not own any capital either before or after migration, in this case, countries and their population are not altered. However, if it is finite, or in terms adopted in this thesis permanent, migration then it affects the welfare of both countries and it is generally considered that it causes the loss for the sending country and gain for the native population of the host country. This phenomenon is followed by income redistribution (Panagariya, 2006). So, according to the author, the greater wealth is generated in the host society, which benefits the society as a whole by a possibility to redistribute it. In contrast, the sending country may be negatively affected by permanent emigration by having less wealth to be redistributed across the society.

To sum up, the above-mentioned literature review shows the relevance of the problem under study and is a provocation of thought for further research. Furthermore, the analysed literature shows an important connection between, on the one hand, the gains and losses and, on the other hand, type of migration (circular, return and permanent). However, it is important to note that these purely economic theories imply a theoretical probability that can hardly be applied to practical migration, which includes many aspects, ranging from the aims and reasons of migration, for example, family reunification, which changes the system of "gain" and "loss" in general since the demographic question plays a crucial part in this type of migration.

In the economic research on gains and losses of migration, it can be emphasised that in most cases the research is aimed at analysing highly skilled migrants and does not consider or consider a little the effect of low-skilled migration and illegal migration in general. Furthermore, the studies tend to ignore the transformation of the labor market and changes in the digital economy, which can have an impact on migration flows and trajectories.

3.4. Historical Waves of Russian Emigration

As it was analysed earlier, various waves of Russian emigration have been identified in the literature. When analysing Russian emigration, the term "waves" is commonly used to define flows, periods, and stages. When studying the motives of people leaving Russia, three are often distinguished, namely political, economic and religious. In addition to the classically

accepted model of three to five waves, one can also find an approach when waves are considered in the context of motives for emigration. So, for example, Pushkareva ultimately singles out seven waves of political, three waves of economic and three waves of religious emigration (Pushkareva, 1996). Here, rather, the question is whether these motives are really objective or it is still worth considering the waves from the point of view of the possibility to emigrate both during the political repressions and dictatorship of the Soviet Union and based on the migration policies of the host countries, as a formal agreement of at least one country to satisfy desires and needs of the Russian emigrant. Another interesting aspect that does not contradict this approach, but calls it into question, is the Russian diasporas, which were created not in connection with the motives for emigration, but against the dictatorship of the Soviet power for the most part as a primary goal and mission abroad.

Since the periods of emigration are easier to integrate with each other, creating some connection between the periods of emigration, rather than trying to understand the cause-and-effect relationships of changes in longer time periods, this work will adhere to the approach of Five waves of emigration. Another reason in favour of this approach is the historical, political and societal changes that Russia has undergone and, as a consequence, changes in the national identity and belonging of the Russian migrant (for the discussion on Russian identity see Chapter 4). So, adopting the approach of Five waves allows to contextualise each of them, especially, in terms of social, political, and economic context of the sending country. Thus, if the Fifth wave was not considered separately, but as part of a classically defined Fourth wave, its length could be extended over several decades. In turn, it would hamper the analysis of the motives to migrate, the demand of a migrant in the labour market, the contingent of the Russian migrant himself\herself and, in general, his\her opportunities for integration because all of them would be very different from what could be seen at the beginning and at the end of the extended Fourth wave.

At least two Russian emigration waves are concentrated around global major historical events such as the Russian Revolution, World War I, Civil War and World War II. There is certainly an undeniable connection between wars and migration. Since the wars themselves are the form of violent conflict, they create different migration trajectories in one case and no migration in the other one (Knudsen et al., 2013). The combination of the World War I, Civil War, and the Russian Revolution provoked high migration activity, making it possible to assume that exactly during these time periods the first Russian refugees, prisoners of war and

émigrés[5] appeared. It should also be noted that with the First wave of the Russian emigration, two terms were introduced into international use, one of which is still used in relation to international migrants. For the first time, the word "refugee" was used in 1922 when forming an agreement on refugee issues in the League of Nations, where it was decided to issue identity cards to Russian refugees (Sarashevsky, 2000; UNHCR, 1951). The other one was the "émigré" that has been specifically applied to Russian refugees that planned to return back to Russia when the situation stabilised there but in fact, it would never happen.

Historical events are objective milestones in Russian migration, but in addition, there are relatively subjective micro-events that can play a rather important role in analyzing the motives of the Russian emigration, such as family reunification, returning to ancestral homeland (especially, in the case of Jews or Volga Germans), and so on. Besides, subjective motives to migrate are in a complex interplay with objective political, social, and economic events. So, they can include, but are not limited to, the change of political regime and events followed within the country even when there are no military operations on the territory of the country, which can provoke the feeling of insecurity; the globalization of the world, open migration policies of destination-countries, the acceptance and perception of Russian migrants as the human capital of the host country, which may serve as an incentive to emigrate in search of better opportunities. They are labelled as subjective from the point of view that in many ways, partly, migration is associated with the mobility of the world, that is, the prerequisites for migration come from both sides. So, the matter of subjective perception plays a crucial role in migration.On the part of the emigrant, prerequisite can be an unwillingness to put up with the political regime, living conditions and circumstances in the country of birth and default of residence, that is, non-violent emigration or emigration at will in order to improve. On the part of destination-countries, they include the readiness and demand for migrants based on the national, economic, political, religious, demographic interests. It is important to note that there are prerequisites for controlled and voluntary migration. However, such conditions do not always meet two ends, as it is shown in more detail in the remainder of this section.

3.4.1 The First Wave of Russian Emigration

[5] There is a blurred difference between "refugee" and "émigré". The term "émigré" describes forced emigration due to abnormal circumstances, such as the threat of violence back home. However, unlike a refugee, it describes an emigrant who plans to return back to their homeland when the situation resumes (Peeling, 2014).

The first massive wave of modern Russian emigration occurred at the beginning of the XX century and was marked first with the First World war and then was followed by the Russian Revolution and Civil war. It is interesting to note that Robert Williams considers the period of the first wave of Russian emigration between 1881 and 1914 (Fialkoff, 1973). Among other historians, it is generally accepted to count the First Russian wave of migration from the beginning of the twentieth century (Raeff & ProQuest, 1990; Harold, 2015). The First wave of emigrants can be considered as the face of Russian emigration in general since it set the tone for the subsequent waves of emigration. It was very unique in its nature, not only in its mass character but in its originality, the unification of Russian-speaking emigrants according to common values. Their love for the country and unwillingness to put up with the regime were the driving force behind progress and outstanding achievements in their countries of residence.

Both events, the Russian Revolution and Civil war, caused a national, social and political split in society. This period is characterized as the end of the Russian Empire, the beginning of the Bolshevik regime, known as the ditch period in the history of the country. The Civil war and its aftermath became the cause of the so-called "white émigré"[6] that was also known as "ideological dissenters". The First wave of Russian emigration was not homogeneous in terms of reasons to exit the country. Some became victims of political and religious persecution, others left on their own accord due to a negative attitude towards the new government, there were also those who ended up on the territory of other countries, such as Finland or Estonia, due to the transfer of some Russian territories into the possession of other countries.

The official estimate of the number of Russian emigrants of the First wave differs from source to source. Generally accepted that there were around 2 million Russian exiles across the world (Stone & Glenny, 1991). However, according to other estimates, it was around 1 million (Huntington, 1931; Marrus, 1985). The main centres of Russian emigration were Paris, Prague, Berlin, Constantinople, Sofia, Belgrade, Harbin. Table 1shows how the First wave of Russian emigration was distributed across various countries.

Table 1. *The First wave of Russian Emigration by Residence Countries.*

Country of Residence	Estimated Number of Accepted Russian Emigrants in thousands
France	500

[6] The term refers to the opposition between the White (supporting the Tsarist family and the Russian Empire) and Red (fighting against the Empire and for the Bolshevik regime) Armies.

Germany	35
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes	30
Bulgaria	15
Poland	30
South America	15
Turkey	3
Romania	10
Greece	10
Austria	1
Hungary	5
Czechoslovakia	10
Free City of Danzig	From 2 to 3
Belgium	10
British colonies	50
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	50
Syria, Palestine	5
Finland	5
China	50
Canada	50
Australia	2
Philippines and other islands	50

Source: Zelenin & Leukhova (2015, p. 263).

It could be pertinent to discuss how the geographical choice of Russian emigrants is historically formed, based on locations from the First emigration. Russian emigration was divided into two cardinal points, namely “European” (western) and "Asian" (eastern), as could be observed from Table 1. The Western was more politically progressive in terms of the production of thought and opposition. On the eastern side, there were both supporters and opponents of the Soviet regime, and in many ways, it lagged behind in the progress when compared with the western. Perhaps it is worth hypothesising that the West has been historically associated with a more liberal and freer world, opened for the creativity and thought of the Russian people, combined with the relative political stability in this region after WWII.

In terms of identity, it should also be noted that Russian culture and the Russian state did not officially recognize racial or national discrimination, since in the regime of imperial

Russia everyone had the right to their own ethnic identity and religion, which was indicated in their passports (Sotnikov, 2010). Simultaneously, Russia was a single empire, just like the people of the empire themselves, from that the identity of the Russian émigré of the First wave was unified and self-identical in its diversity – they were Russians.

It is important to note that the term "Russian emigrant" did not mean an ethnically Russian person, but any person involved in the physically existing Russian Empire that refers to the different identity that one may observe today. So, the emigrants of the First wave were proud to call themselves Russians on nationalistic basis rather than ethnic. Perhaps it was the soft cultural nationalism that was the hallmark of the identity of the Russian émigrés, which later helped in the creation of an imaginary community outside of Russia.

With the First wave of emigration, the first Russian communities were born outside of Russia (Horowitz et al., 1993). They were divided along several lines based on the identities of emigrants themselves. The concept of "Russia Abroad" or "Russia beyond the borders" appeared to constitute the society in exile and projected the image of the pre-Soviet Russian Empire that served the needs of émigrés to carry a culturally creative country beyond its original borders (Raeff, 1990). For example, there was a prototype of the civil community consisting of a re-grouping of the remaining White Army; or an association of intellectuals and professionals on behalf of artists, scientists, writers. So, Community building (diaspora formation) abroad served mainly as culturally identical divisions. Despite the common roots, subsequently there was a split in the community into those who supported the Soviet regime and culturally nourished Soviet propaganda and who advocated independent cultural development from abroad (Horowitz et al., 1993). The split became especially evident at the beginning of World War II and the Great Patriotic War, as it will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

The Russian community abroad and its activity partially reflected the idea of Imagined Communities proposed by Benedict Anderson. Although the theory itself appeared much later than the First wave of Russian Emigration, it perfectly describes the foundations of the structure and activities of Russians abroad on the basis of language, culture and common values (Anderson, 1998). Russian emigrants were scattered around the world, but together they managed to create an imaginary community through which they could communicate and broadcast their values. However, later a problem arose that many intellectuals, especially writers ultimately could not reach their readers due to censorship imposed by the Soviet government.

Considering the First wave in terms of the types of migration - circular, return, or permanent, the literature shows that it was a complex phenomenon. Thus, a distinctive feature

of the emigrants was that many of them considered their stay in the country of residence as temporary (émigrés), that is, it was a prototype of some kind of planned circular migration, and many of those who left, planned and hoped to return to pre-Soviet Russia, which did not happen. On the other hand, it could also be considered in terms of return migration: while their exit was usually involuntary (some people were sent away or pushed out from the country), they hoped to return to the country voluntarily. Furthermore, among the emigrants of the First wave, one can observe both repatriates and volunteers upon their return to Soviet Russia.

Raeff (1990) stated that precisely because among many emigrants there were émigrés that were planning to return to their homeland, they did not consider and did not need to integrate and / or adopt in the host country due to their planned temporary stay, although in the long run under changed circumstances the refugees were able to integrate and as the result, the second-generation (childrens of immigrants) became bicultural . There is also another view that Russian refugees were able to integrate in relation to British society, according to Kushner (Harold, 2015). Hence, the literature shows that the majority of the emigrants gradually settled down, adopted in the receiving countries (although for many of them the entry country was not the final destination and can be mentioned in the context of re-emigration outside the borders of Russia) and continued their activities in the Russian community, at some point merging into one with the Second wave of Russian emigration, the events of which in many ways became a serious test for the Russian diaspora abroad. So, the analysis indicates that there was a transition from planned circular/return migration to the permanent one.

The First wave could also be considered in terms of "gain" and "loss." For example, it consisted mainly of intellectuals, aristocrats and nobles, government officials and their families, religiously persecuted Jews, church leaders, military and civilians subjected to political persecution due to emerging Soviet power that marked the last ones as the enemies of the regime. So, these social and ethnic groups were part of human capital that Russia lost at that moment, while host countries gained.

The emigrants themselves have made quite an important contribution to both the host countries and international culture in general. Among the Russian emigrants of the First wave, there were many recognized talented people and experts in their field. For example, there were three Nobel laureates, namely Bunin in the field of literature, Leontiev in economics, Prigogine in chemistry; Vladimir Nabokov that left a bright mark in Russian and English literature of the XX century as well as Chaliapin, Rachmaninov, Kandinsky, Chagall and their outstanding contribution to the world of arts. Russian church emigration had a great influence on the spread

of Orthodoxy in general and the formation and strengthening of Russian identity abroad. Later on, it was also used by the ideological concept of Russki Mir.

3.4.2 The Second Wave of Russian Emigration

The Second wave of Russian emigration is notable for its tragedy, which was endured as a result of the tightening political regime in the Soviet Union, the dictatorship of Soviet power and the consequences of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. Additionally, the Second wave of Russian emigration coincided with the global emigration following the post-war processes. Many Europeans (especially Eastern Europeans) sought emigration opportunities. Thus, migration was mainly directed towards the Americas as well as just established Israel, which was a destination point for many Jews.

The embeddedness of the Second wave into the global trends is germane for the discussion, especially from two points. Firstly, the final emergence of the term and phenomenon "Displaced persons"[7] (DP) happened during this period, defining the difference between refugees, stateless persons and displaced persons in terminology and practice. The difference is that refugees could leave their country voluntarily while DPs were forced to leave due to described circumstances (Ginsburgs, 1957). Thus, many Russians happened to find themselves in DP's camps in Germany, Austria and Italy along with other DPs and refugees from Eastern Europe waiting for the interviews, "screening" and approval for further emigration. Some of them were so morally exhausted that they were ready to repatriate to their homeland, despite the possible political persecution. Secondly, two organisations to deal with issues of exacerbated emigration appeared in the 1940s. Namely, they were United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and International Refugee Organisation. Furthermore, various civil foundation, among which the one founded by Alexandra Tolstaya, helped with the increasing migration movements.

The time frame of the second wave of emigration is also debatable and some researchers note the period of emigration in the 1950s (Iontsev et al., 2001), as a consequence of the war and Stalinist repressions, including the forced repatriation of Russian emigrants. Nevertheless,

[7] "The term "displaced person" applies to a person who, as a result of the actions of the authorities of the régimes […] has been deported from, or has been obliged to leave, his country of nationality or of former habitual residence, such as persons who were compelled to undertake forced labour or who were deported for racial, religious or political reasons" (UNHCR, 1946)

in this work the second wave is considered from the moment of its growth and its climax, which covers the events of the WWII and the Great Patriotic War as a driving force and to the beginning of the Cold War. The choice of this time period is justified by a shift in the formation of the identity of Russian emigrants and a change in the Russian community under the influence of these events.

Given the circumstances of the Second wave - war, displacing people, moving borders, - it is challenging to estimate the volume of the Second wave of Russian emigration. Still, Pushkarev estimates that "by the summer of 1944, 5 million Soviet citizens had found themselves outside the USSR in Western Europe as Eastern workers, prisoners of war and refugees fleeing from the Red Army. After repatriation they were "returning to their homeland", no more than 2-3% of them remained in the West" (Pushkarev, 2008, p.326).

The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 and the Great Patriotic War in 1941 actually split the Russian immigrant community in two, without mentioning the fact that the last hopes of many emigres of the First wave to return to "Pre-Soviet Russia" were dashed. In the émigré environment, two points of view were formed in relation to the war between Germany and Russia: "defensive" and "defeatist" (Iontsev et al., 2001). The Russian émigrés faced the problem of cooperating with the occupiers or advocating for the protection of the countries in which they lived. The dilemma became more acute and one had to choose if one should support Nazis against the Bolsheviks or Bolsheviks against the Nazis. So, the Russian community abroad was split into right and left wings supporting either Hitler or Stalin, both of which were dangerous ideologies. Political indifference was another choice. It is interesting to note that those who called themselves "patriots" (right-wing or monarchists), for the most part, went to cooperate with the Nazis against Stalin (Iontsev et al., 2001). The literature concludes that at the time, Russian emigrants faced the dilemma of integrating into the host country and taking its side or patriotically fighting for the rights of the USSR.

To understand the core of the issue better, it is also necessary to recall the main centers of the Russian emigration of the First wave, which were in occupied Europe - Paris, Berlin, Prague, Belgrade, and Sofia. Besides the Nazi occupation during the war, the majority of these cities were under occupation after WWII. Berlin partially came under the control of the Soviet government after WWII, as did the Russian emigrants and refugees themselves. In addition, the countries of Eastern Europe, including Hungary, were under occupation and influence. Some other countries were occupied by allied countries, which means that Russian emigrants of both waves were trapped in a way.

In light of this, the main centres of Russian Second wave emigration shifted to New York, San Francisco, Buenos Aires, São Paulo, Caracas, Toronto and others. After a series of Stalinist repatriations, Russian emigrants tried to flee as far as possible from Europe. The USA, Australia and Canada enjoyed the greatest demand and popularity among Russian Orthodox refugees. This was primarily due to the fact that these countries already had such Russian social infrastructures as Orthodox churches and parishes, Russian schools, Russian printing houses, etc. The Second wave of emigration began during the war and consisted mainly of Soviet citizens who for various reasons ended up in the Third Reich zx Ostarbeiters[8] and prisoners of war. Later on in the 1950s to this list the citizens of the Baltic republics, Ukraine and Western Belarus were added who did not want to recognize the Soviet power. The defining moment in the history of the Russian emigrants of the Second wave was the Yalta Conference of the Allied Powers, at which a decision and agreement of the parties were adopted on the repatriation of the Russian military and civilians. In fact, it was an agreement according to which the United States of America, Great Britain and other countries forcibly transferred Soviet citizens and Russian emigrants (non-Soviet passport holders) to the Soviet side (MSU, 2021). Obviously, it was not the passport that mattered to Stalin, but the fact of birth on Soviet territory (Ginsburgs, 1957). People were seen as an attachment to the land, not vice versa. There was not even such a human right as to define one's identity since it was determined by belonging and destiny. It is also worth noting that Russian emigrants were intimidated that they might be extradited to the authorities of the USSR.

In this context, in order to understand the scale of the problem, it is necessary to mention the tragicomic joke retold by one of the Second wave emigrants, a participant in camps for displaced persons, Valentina Sinkevich: "At the 'screening'[9], a bewildered official asked Ivan how he, who was born and raised in Hungary, speaks only Russian and Ukrainian? To which the terrified Ivan replied that he lived in the forest. Later, when the settlement of the displaced persons began all over the world, they sang in the camps, "Along the blue waves of the ocean, Ivan is being taken to Argentina..."" (2012, para. 33).

Notably, a part of the emigrants did not associate themselves with Russian ethnicity or considered themselves to be Russians by identity but still were called Russian emigrants, although linguistically there is a difference between "Russkij" that refers to ethnicity and

[8] "Soviet forced labourers in the Third Reich" (Grinchenko & Olynyk, 2012, p.401).

[9] "Screening was the suitability testing of displaced persons for care from international organisations and military authorities. In other words, the fate of the displaced persons rested on the outcome of the screening – whether it was appropriate to continue living in the camp or if they would be forced to leave, and sometimes, but not often, forced to return to their homeland" (Camps in Germany for Refugees from Baltic, n.d., para. 1).

"Rossijskij" that associates with nationality (Pronin, 2014) (for a more detailed discussion on the conceptual difference see Chapter 4 Russian Identity Formation). This identity issue differentiates the emigrants of the Second wave from those of the First wave.

A separate phenomenon is the maintenance of Russian culture and identity in conditions of constant fear of repatriation. The publishing activities of the displaced did not stop but were in limited quantities. *Posev* was one of the publishing socio-political journals during the Second wave, based in West Germany. Simultaneously, the Russian language and Russian culture helped to maintain a strong spirit of Russian DPs during the trials of the DP camps. Later, the collector Philip S. Penka was able to preserve the remains of the works produced and capture them in the book collection: *"Temporary Spiritual Sustenance": The Print Culture of Russian Displaced Persons in Post-War Germany (1945-1951)*.

The onset of the Cold War also played an important role in the acceptance of Russian emigrants and, consequently, on their identity. Russian DPs and refugees understood the unpleasant consequences of the Cold War, so many of them tried to emigrate as soon as possible, while there was an opportunity or this opportunity had to be created by forging documents due to the bias of the host countries. These actions illustrate that the immigrants sought opportunities to change, at least formally, their identity. This trend was also partially reinforced by the context of the Cold War, when the criteria for accepting Russian displaced persons were changed, taking primarily those who served on the side of the Nazis against the USSR (Ginsburgs, 1957).

This section shows that the Russian emigration of the Second wave was a very complex phenomenon, but still it could be considered through the lens of the type of migration. Given the prevalence of DPs, at least partially this wave could be considered as involuntary migration, since the emigrants were not given almost no choice in being displaced. Furthermore, the characterisation of this wave as involuntary migration can be corroborated by the occupation of some European countries by the Soviet regime, so that the Russian emigrants were involuntarily returned to their home country. As to those who managed to move in countries outside of the Soviet control, these emigrants could be considered within the framework of permanent migration, especially considering that they sought to forge their documents and cut almost every tie with their homeland due to the repressions they had experienced or had been in danger of. Therefore, permanent Russian migrants did not believe that their return to Russia could be possible and were more aimed at integrating in their host societies.

From the point of view of gains and loss, unlike the First wave of the Russian emigration, the second turned out to be more monotonous and mainly consisted of completely

ordinary people. So, the Second wave of emigration passed unnoticed, leaving no well-known names, except a few such as historian Avtorkhanov, poetess Anstey, artist Gollerbakh, etc. (Pronin, 2014). Despite the fact that the emigration consisted of completely ordinary people, they continued to bring Russian culture to the masses and nurture the Russian community abroad, but on a smaller scale. This could be attributed to a fact that the bulk of the emigrants of the Second wave, in contrast to the First, was less educated and, having formed under the Soviet regime, less rooted in Russian national culture, which largely determined its role in the Cold War against the USSR. The fates of these emigrants were very different, but each eventually found one's place in a new country and was able to integrate into the conditions dictated by the migration policy.

Although the Russian emigrants of the Second wave were not well-educated, still in the post-WWI world, blue-collar workers were the backbone of the economic revival in many countries across the globe. Therefore, it could be suggested that the hosting countries mainly won from the arrival of such workforce that had a potential to contribute to the production revival, while the Soviet Union mainly lost in terms of human capital that could have been useful in the economic and social restoration of the country after the detrimental losses of the Stalinist repressions and the Great Patriotic War.

To sum up, the Second wave of emigration was a difficult phenomenon for the Russian people for many reasons. First, there was a communal split and an ideological trap. Secondly, there was the forced displacement of people and the political persecution of emigrants. Thirdly, these were actually disastrous conditions in which the Russian refugees found themselves. Fourth, WWII was followed by the beginning of the Cold War and, as a result, the deterioration of the attitude towards Russian emigrants and their rejection. Many Russian refugees were forced to forge documents and identities in order to be accepted by the destination country. Fifth, these are the coinciding flows of migration and an excess of migrants in general, which served to revise and strengthen the migration policy of those countries that were politically and economically favorable and in demand among potential emigrants.

It is also important to understand that the Second wave of emigration largely changed the face of Russian emigration. In general, the Russian refugees had a political stigma of shame, due to the decisions taken by the split Russian community and the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet Union. Among the consequences of the stigma was a change in the identity of Russian emigrants, who were humiliated and insulted in so many ways. Furthermore, they were not yet desired and not accepted or accepted with difficulty in their destination countries.

The last, but not least, thing that needs to be mentioned is the pathos and hopes with which the First wave passed and the despair and hope for a new, more favorable life in the Second wave. These were no longer emigres, but real refugees and DPs who fled from extremely tyrannical conditions with no hope of returning, but still with great love for their own homeland.

3.4.3 The Third Wave of Russian Emigration

The emigration of the Third wave took place between 1950 and 1986 and was directly related to the Cold War and the change in the leaders of the USSR. In 1953, Stalin died, he was replaced by Malenkov and later Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov. Although Stalin's death provoked not a huge change, but a shift in politics, that was a period of so-called Khrushchev Thaw or period of De-Stalinization. So, the Soviet government gave permission for Soviet Jews, Germans, Pontic Greeks and Armenians to leave for the purposes of family reunification or ethnic repatriation. During the Third wave, the level of emigration was entirely dependent on the current state of relations between the USSR and the West. As soon as they got complicated due to the events of the Cold War, the countries of potential emigration refused those who wished to emigrate, often without explanation.

In general, the emigrants of the Third wave can be conditionally divided into two parts: dissidents and forcibly expelled and ethnic (not national) emigrants such as Jews, Germans, Armenians and Greek. Basically, there was no other opportunity for emigration. The former group voluntarily or involuntarily left their homeland, while the latter travelled to their historical homeland, mainly to Israel, Germany and Greece.

It would be deceiving to simply assume that the trajectory of the second group was predetermined. Not all ethnic emigrants flew directly to the countries mentioned; thus, many Jewish emigrants travelled through Poland, others made stops in Vienna, Rome, Bucharest, Budapest and other cities and, as a result of the changed plans, many stayed there, or flew to the final destination of Israel (Sotnikov, 2010) or re-emigrated to the USA (Freedman, 1984).

The difference between the Third wave and all the previous ones is that ethnic emigration was legal, that is, it was allowed and indicated by the authorities but not for everyone; emigration had a slightly economic connotation since many ethnic emigrants used the ethnos as a motive, but in fact they were in search of a better political and economic life outside the USSR.

In terms of the volume, it is estimated that around 300 thousand Jews left the Soviet Union during the Third wave[10], almost 83 thousand Germans [11], and 40 thousand Armenians [12]. Allowing to conclude preliminarily that, in total, there were around 500 - 600 thousand ethnic emigrants who left the USSR at the time. Things were different with the group of dissidents. Firstly, there were quite a lot of creative and intelligent people among both forced and voluntarily deported from the Soviet Union. Secondly, their ethnic composition was heterogeneous, since under the Soviet Union, ethnic identity may have differed from the formal nationality and, furthermore, it was officially accounted for in registries and one's official documents. Thirdly, their final destination countries were not predetermined, but predictable, as many aspired either to the United States or to the more economically wealthy and politically stable countries of Western Europe.

The difference between these two groups of the Third wave of emigrantsalso lay in the different approaches to the national movement abroad. Those who emigrated for ethnic reasons deliberately tried to assimilate and integrate into the final countries as quickly as possible and forget about their Russian/Soviet identity and everything connected with it or they generally struggled to find their own self-identity over a collective one. The second group proudly carried its identity, joining the pre-existing Russian diaspora and continuing not only to fight the Russian government from abroad, but also stimulate change within the country as well. It is possible that the two groups could also overlap, but this is rather a minority compared to the majority.

Despite the differences, the two groups of Russian emigrants of the Third wave have one significant similarity - the type of migration movement. Due to the strict control over the border and the immense effort needed to justify the immigration, this wave can be considered permanent because those leaving or being deported from the country did not hope to return there in any foreseeable future. It is essential also to mention that those dissidents who were involuntarily expelled from the country can be considered through the prism of involuntary migration, which then transited into the permanent one for the reasons mentioned previously. Therefore, both groups of the emigrants were trying to adapt to their host countries, not believing - or in some cases even not wanting to return - that their return to their home country would be possible.

[10] https://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0303/tema01.php
[11] https://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2006/0251/analit01.php
[12] https://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2006/0251/analit01.php

When analysing the Third wave from the perspective of gain and loss, it was in connection with the dissident group that the Third wave of Russian emigration began to resemble the First in terms of its strength of intelligence and the output of labor of emigrating talents. The emigrants of the Third wave were able to bring new breath and hope to the diaspora, which was already formed from the First and Second waves. Among the prominent emigrants of the Third wave, it is possible to emphasize such personalities as writers Bukovsky, Zinoviev, Maksimov, Solzhenitsyn, poet Brodskiy, ballet artists Nuriev and Baryshnikov, and others who continued to nurture the Russian community abroad and carried on their mission, but also contributed to the development of the world culture in general Therefore, again, it is possible to suggest that the Soviet Union lost a valuable part of human capital, capable of creative outcomes, while the host societies managed to attract and accumulate the talent.

It is important to note the role of two published periodicals during the Third wave of emigration, namely the magazines Continent (editor Sinyavsky) and Syntax (editor Maksimov) (McMillin, 1989). Continent was created in order to unite all the emigrants of the Third wave and as an instrument of opposition to Soviet power on behalf of the countries of Eastern Europe (Giglio, n.d.). Syntax was the ideological and aesthetic confrontation of Continent, which set itself approximately the same tasks, but in a different format.

The real thaw in politics began much later, during the years of Gorbachev's Perestroika. Emigration as a phenomenon and process began to be simplified, cultural and scientific exchanges, and private travel expanded became possible; nevertheless, the movement was still controlled by the authorities and had to be justified.

To sum up, the Third wave was the longest one, compared to the previous waves, tightly regulated by the authorities and was of an ethnical and dissident character. The emigrants of the Third wave faced an identity crisis, as a result, many were in search of their self-identity, which was often in conflict with a collective identity, in most cases this refers to ethnic emigrants. The other part of the emigrants, mainly dissidents or ethnic dissidents (the intersection of two groups), were firmly convinced of their identity and made it their mission to carry their Russian identity to the masses, thereby nourishing the Russian diaspora and changing the Soviet ideological space with their creativity, that is, through a soft power.

3.4.4 The Fourth Wave of Russian Emigration

The Third wave flowed smoothly into the Fourth. Classically, the Fourth wave is counted from the 1986 or 1990s to 2000s, an important place is given to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the Federal Law in the procedure of exit from the Russian Federation and entry into the Russian Federation by Russian Federation's Constitution of 1993 with Amendments in 2008 (Article 27). The law officially determined the beginning of a new reality for Russian citizens and potential emigrants in general since everyone was given the right to travel freely, choose a place of stay or reside (Constitute Project, 2021). This societal shift makes the Fourth wave completely different from the previous ones due to social, cultural, political opportunities. Thus, people both by right and by law, not due to forced circumstances, were able to leave the borders of the Russian Federation and choose the life they wanted.

According to various sources, during that time from 1 to 3 million people left Russia. Considering Denisenko's research results, more than 90% of all emigrants went to three countries, namely Germany, Israel and the USA (Denisenko, 2012; Rybakovsky, 2021). In Israel, repatriates were mostly accepted. Germany accepted everyone in the status of "expelled" (Vertrieben), resettlers (Aussiedler) and late repatriates or resettlers (Spätaussiedler). The United States was ready to host ethnic and\or highly skilled immigrants.

Among the peculiar features of this wave is that perhaps one of the sufficient reasons for the previous emigration was the tense political environment in the country, which is especially proven by the First wave of emigrants who wanted to return to their homeland but could not. In general, it can be assumed from the opposite that the well-being, efficiency, and democracy of the governing apparatus of the state can hardly become the reason for emigration from the country of birth, where the ethnic and national identity and affiliation of a person are formed unless there is some psychological issuer and migratory sentiments driven by curiosity, globalization or better opportunities awaiting in the host country.

Someone may disagree and debate that if all potential emigrants were waited for by better conditions in the host country, it could be argued that emigration was rampant. There are many reasons to support this point of view, but this thesis would still adhere to the one that the Third wave emigration would remain flexible due to a number of factors, ranging from the shift of collective identity to the individual and its complexity to the national aspect and its attachment, ending with economic and administrative factors of self-restraining emigration. The social networks and contacts of the emigrant, the ownership of property and the availability of work are not even mentioned here, since even in times of nascent globalization these were not holding-back criteria. As for social networks and contacts, – they could be recreated since there had been active Russian diaspora abroad, meanwhile ties with friends, family and

professional community could possibly be maintained at a distance; real estate could always be sold or rented out; work could be found abroad due to high skills or high demand for labor, which could be performed by an emigrant.

A distinctive feature of this wave is that globalization and openness of choice spawned a round of circular emigration, which had never been observed previously in the history of Russian emigration. Many Russians who left Russia during the Fourth wave continued to live in two countries, holding dual citizenship or planned to return. Thus, the Fourth wave can be called economic, cultural and global emigration, as opposed to mainly forced one that had happened previously. Due to this character,the Fourth wave of emigration is often being called cosmopolitan because many Russian emigrants hold dual citizenship, so they still have been attached to their homeland and adapted to a new country of residence (Litovskaya & Litovskaya, 2018). Accordingly, they were also accepted not as emigres, exiles, displaced persons or refugees, but as emigrants and cosmopolitans. From the point of view of migration typology, this wave can be considered as predominantly circular due to open borders, not being pressured to renounce Russian identity, etc.

Simultaneously, it is germane to note that there was still a part of the emigrant who could be considered as permanent ones. Thus, ethnic emigration of Jews, Germans, Armenians (Heitman, 1991; Denisenko, 2012) and Greek in minority, which was the trend of the Third wave, also continued. The ethnic character of their migration allows to suggest that they intended to move permanently and built a new identity, based on the one of the host society.

Another feature of the Fourth wave is the mass emigration of women as a trend. The phenomenon is usually known as the “export of Russian brides” abroad, which involves going abroad for the purpose of marriage or family reunion, which can generally be studied as a separate branch of the feminization of migration. This part of the Fourth wave of migration can be characterised as either circular or permanent. The former refers to those women who retained some social or economic ties to their home country and did not wish to cut them. In contrast, the latter refers to those women who decided to move away for good and cut their social and economic ties, connecting them with Russia.Considering emigration as a two-way process, it is important to mention that not all countries were open to accepting emigrants: many Russian emigrants faced bureaucratic difficulties in the form of visas and other administrative obstacles. Perhaps, this, along with economic reasons, can be counted as one of the main restraining factors; otherwise, there would be more massive emigration in terms of numbers.

So, provided that the main reasons for migration were finding work, getting education, or doing business and that the major part of migration was circular, this thesis would argue that

the Fourth wave could be framed as a win-win wave for both sending and hosting countries. Hence, while hosting countries benefited from a relatively educated and cheap workforce, Russia gained more educated and experienced circular migrants, who wished to hold their economic and creative activities in Russia. The only serious loss that Russia may have endured at the time was the loss of women of fertile age, who decided to find partners abroad.

To conclude the discussion of the Fourth wave, its dark side is also worth mentioning. Due to the moderate openness of the migration policies of both sides, many criminals and semi-criminals used the opportunity to move from Russia abroad. It is also noteworthy that illegal emigration is observed when there is a massive departure to work on a tourist visa, which does not give the right to work (Tyuryukanova & Malysheva, 2001). Furthermore, the Fourth wave is characterised by the mass emigration of women, which, however, was not always legal. More specifically, it was actually illegal emigration for the purpose of work in the field of entertainment and intimate services; in some studies, it is also considered as a separate form of actual human trafficking (Palnikov, 2007).

3.4.5 The Fifth Wave of Russian Emigration

As mentioned earlier, the Fifth wave of Russian emigration is closely related to the Fourth wave and is most often viewed as its continuation. If at the beginning of the Fourth wave one can only mention the beginning of globalization and the existing restrictions on the possibilities for relocation, then in the Fifth wave one can speak of an increase in opportunities for emigration, but still the same obstacle or its selectivity in accepting Russian emigrants exist. Among these obstacles, treating Russian citizens as third country nationals in the European Union, and relevant migration policies as filtering tools can be mentioned. As a result of such a policy of containment, one of the trends of the Fifth wave is latent or illegal emigration, when a potential emigrant leaves for the country of destination on a tourist or visitor visa and remains there on a permanent basis until legalization or the fact of capture by migration services. This fact recalls the forced measures of the Second wave and falsification of documents to reach the country of destination, which exposes, on the one hand, the real political and economic situation in the country of birth and original residence, and on the other hand, the conditions of restrained globalization and its capabilities, limiting migratory activity of those lacking high qualifications. Obviously, this limited mobility does not affect refugees, whose rights and lives may be in potential danger in their home country.

Relying on the dynamics of research on emigration from Russia, one can note a twofold decrease in emigration, comparing two decades from 1993 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2010 (Iontsev et al., 2016). A more detailed analysis of statistics should be done starting in 2010, considering a number of economic and political events that happened in Russia and could possibly trigger the development of further emigration and its new forms. Among the significant political events under the Putin regime, several can be listed, including the Protests on Bolotnaya Square 2011 and further persecutions of Bolotnaya Square case 2012, which is part of the 2011-2013 protest movements are known as Snow Revolution, assassination of Boris Nemtsov, the assassination attempts and rallies in support of Alexei Navalny; Russian Financial Crisis of 2014-2016. These events are also associated with political persecution of businessmen, journalists, academicians; violation of human rights; destruction of civil society, including the announcement of some media and NGOs as foreign agents; dishonest or fraudulent elections. Within the framework of the Fifth wave of emigration, there are among possible factors to make assumptions about a new wave of political emigration that probably happened in the 2010s (Krechetnikov, 2012). However, due to the relative novelty of the phenomenon, further research investigating this political underlying reason for the Fifth way of Russian emigration should be undertaken.

Despite the decreasing trend, the problem of the Fifth wave is that the true scope of emigration is many times greater than the official statistics given by Russia's Federal State Statistics Service. The reason might be in the problem that the Russian side counts emigrants from the moment when a citizen of Russia, having moved to another country on a permanent basis and adopted the citizenship of that country, renounced the national passport given by birth. Since the Fourth wave of emigration, many Russian citizens hold two passports, since this does not contradict Russian legislation and the country that gives citizenship, or if dual citizenship is prohibited in the country potentially rewarding the migrant with a national passport, the Russian migrant may decide in favor of the Russian passport and permanent documents for residence in the country of residence, depending on his\her identity, integration and own beliefs.

Considering the aforementioned problem of accounting for emigrating Russians, Federal Law of May 31, 2002, N 62-FZ (as amended on July 13, 2020) "On Citizenship of the Russian Federation", where Article 6 on dual citizenship, paragraph 3 states that a citizen of the Russian Federation who has second citizenship or a residence permit in another country is obliged to submit a written notification of the presence of foreign documents to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation at the place of residence or place of actual stay in the Russian Federation (Konsul'tant Plyus. Nadezhnaya pravovaya podderzhka, 2020). On the one

hand, this law will help eliminate the problem of inaccurate calculations of emigrating Russians, illegal emigration and immigration at the international level of cooperation, and on the other hand, it reminds of the vulnerability of those emigrating, considering the experience and political persecution of the First and Second waves of the Russian emigration.

Particular interest and attention, as a separate phenomenon, should be given to the stage-by-stage form of legal emigration, when a highly qualified Russian emigrant leaves for the country of destination for temporary work or training and, after a while, obtains a residence permit there, and then citizenship. Another offshoot of this form of migration is educational emigration, which has a slightly different motivation when the host countries are interested in inviting and educating young personnel in those spheres of work that are either little in demand among the national population or are predicted to be in short supply in the future. If we consider the immigrant as human capital within the framework of neoclassical economic theory, which puts the behavior of the individual (migrant) at the forefront, several things can be found at once. Firstly, this is the benefit of the migrant himself\herself because the migrant always gains from migration. Secondly, this is the maximum gain of the host country, since during the training of a potential immigrant he or she can adapt to the country of immigration, its cultural values; a host country replenishes its national interest from a demographic and economic point of view. Thirdly, whether the sending country gains or loses in economic and human capital terms depends on the type of migration. If it is return or circular migration, the sending country gains as a migrant brings back not only new knowledge but also fresh perspectives they managed to internalise while adapting to another society. On the contrary, it is permanent migration, the sending country loses potential human capital and talent.

An excellent example of such a strategy is educational programs, grants and scholarships of the Balassi Institute (Balassi Intézet), the Tempus Public Foundation (Tempus Közalapítvány) in Hungarian case and Erasmus programs in the European Union framework, which annually accept students from Russia to study at Hungarian universities and institutes as part of an educational exchange. Many graduates from these institutions stay in Hungary to continue their studies and achieve a higher academic degree, find work in a Hungarian or international company or start a business, which is stimulated and encouraged by the Hungarian migration policy.

However, this form of migration also has disadvantages for the host country, for example, the circulation of trained migrants to other countries of the European Union, where higher wages are offered to already highly qualified migrants; or non-returnable re-emigration

to Russia. In both cases, this can be considered a brain drain for the hosting country, even if the migrant initially was not a national human capital.

In addition to the continuing trends of the Fourth wave, such as ethnic emigration, one can also note intellectual emigration (Zharenova, et al., 2002), which is more reminiscent of refugees of political persecution or political emigrants. The most famous figures of the Fifth wave are a Russian business oligarch, government official, engineer and mathematician Boris Berezovsky (died under mysterious circumstances in 2011), a former Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister of the unrecognised Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Akhmed Zakayev, a Russian entrepreneur, writer, scientist, Doctor of Technical Sciences Yuliy Dubov, a media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky, a Russian-Israeli businessman, investor, and philanthropist Leonid Nevzlin, creator and former owner of one of the largest retailers in Russia Evgeny Chichvarkin, former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, a Russian financial expert, economist, businessman, former President of Bank of Moscow Andrey Borodin and etc. (BBC News, 2012). In this respect, it is again possible to note that Russia loses its human capital and experiences brain drain by pushing out people with high economic, business, political, and other expertise. This is also confirmed by some studies that demonstrate that "for the period from 2002 to 2010 the number of [Russian] emigrants with higher education who left [Russia] for permanent residence has almost halved, and, conversely, the number of those who left for temporary employment has doubled" (Ryazantsev & Pismennaya, 2013, p.26).

The Fifth wave with consideration of the motives and identification of emigrants can be compared with the identification of the emigres of the First wave, given the fact that it also contains elements of circular migration or hopes for remigration. In general, the face of the Russian emigrant of the modern wave can be described as humiliated, but unbroken. If we discard the features of a literary character, then we can note the motivation of the Russian emigrant and his\her high potential as human capital for a possible host country in the case of permanent migration. Turning also to the elements of the First wave of emigration, it can be assumed that the Russian emigrant of the first generation may not be integrated into the community of the host country or partially integrated, like a cosmopolitan, globalised citizen, however, if this is an emigrant of the Fourth wave and is marked by settled in the host country, the second generation of the same a Russian emigrant can be fully integrated into society and describe himself\herself identically from the ethnically-national point of view of both countries.

Simultaneously, formally or "de jure", more and more Russians regard emigration as a temporary phenomenon rather than a permanent one. Many people retain their housing, social network and contact, registration and other documents confirming the status of a migrant in

their homeland in Russia (Ryazantsev & Pismennaya, 2013). "Post factum", it can turn out that temporary or circular migration and residence in the country of destination goes into the final decision of emigration. However, there are also informal cases, or "de facto", when an emigrant maintains social contacts and network in one's homeland, but at the same time does not plan to return back (Ryazantsev & Pismennaya, 2013).

So, if the Fifth wave of emigration is seen as one of the globalization advantages and it does contradict politically motivated migration (**first case** discussed in the introduction to this chapter), namely that the nature of Russian emigration is not related to 'Putin's dictatorship' and political prosecution, then it's possible to regard it as a circular or repeated migration.

Considering the variety of the given terms and the absence of a single, generally accepted definition of circular migration, one can refer only to the characteristic features of both the theoretical concept and the tendencies of the Fifth wave of the Russian emigration, such as:

1. temporality and repetition of movements across the border for the purpose of employment and/or education;
2. anti-cyclicality and the possibility of the spontaneity of such migration movements;
3. a tool for migration, development and cooperation, which is a win-win situation for both countries and a migrant.
4. the legality of migration, which is determined and regulated by laws, policies and international agreements between the sending and receiving countries (Bara et al., 2012).

However, if the decision to emigrate is initially and fundamentally based on political motivation (mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter as **first case)** or a mix of political motivation and the search of better life prospects (**third case)**, then most likely the Russian emigrant can take advantage of the opportunities of globalization in order to eventually emigrate from the country of birth (Russian Federation) to the destination-country (Hungary, Germany or elsewhere). This is especially relevant given the political instability and the infringements of human rights in the 2010s in Russia

In this case, it is important to note that the Russian emigrant will have to face the process of integration and naturalization in Hungary, given the fact that both countries demand local language proficiency, knowledge of history and laws for the adoption or integration of citizenship as the endpoint of emigration. Although if this is a permanent residence permit, then the conditions for integration are more simplified, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

3.4.6 The Fifth Wave of Russian Emigration 2.0

In this thesis, the emigration wave after the beginning of full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war on February 24, 2022, is considered to be part of the Fifth wave due to the mainly political and economic reasons for exiting the country. However, still, it should be considered separately since new concepts entered public and scientific discourse on Russian outward migration. Furthermore, the process of leaving the country (and sometimes returning back, as it will be shown later in this section) is still ongoing and requires careful consideration as it has been a background for the current study. Given the novelty of the Fifth wave 2.0, the analysis mainly relies on some statistical and survey data, along with some rare qualitative studies trying to comprehend the phenomenon.

"Relocants": Conceptual clarification

At the beginning of the discussion of the Fifth wave 2.0, there should be conceptual clarification because a new term of "relocant" entered public and scientific discussion on Russians leaving the country since February 2024. The term initially appeared in the public discussion and was used as self-identification of those who left the country at the beginning of the full-scale war (Gudkov et al., 2024). Chernykh and her colleagues (2024) underline that the term "relocant", although initially referring only to employees of companies that move their offices to other countries, nowadays comprises various employment and social groups when used in the Russian context: labour migrants, IT migrants, "digital nomads", refugees, political emigrants, and even tourists. Therefore, as the researchers point out relocants' self-identification is based not on their employment situation, but on a shared event that triggered their departure, the practices of mutual assistance and adaptation, and the idea that their exit has a temporary status (Chernykh et al., 2024; Gudkov et al., 2024).

The last issue is of particular importance since this perceived temporal character of emigration might mean that relocants do not aim at being included in their host societies but rather retain their Russian identity. This hypothesis finds confirmation in survey data: for example, a survey conducted in 2023 among those who have left the country since February 2022 shows that the vast majority of respondents were still immersed in Russian political agenda, closely following news in Russian language. Furthermore, they sought to maintain regular contact with their relatives and friends back in Russia and other Russian emigrants with 58% saying that they spent most or all of their time with other emigrants from Russia in the last three months (Kamalov et al. 2023). Meanwhile, the shares of those who never socialise with

locals and those who spent most of their time with locals were almost identical - around a third of the respondents.

According to some researchers, the geography of a hosting country might be among the indicators allowing to differentiate between emigrants and relocants (Gudkov et al., 2024). While the former has had an opportunity and resources to plan their exit strategy (therefore, settling in the countries requiring a visa like the EU countries and the UK), the latter has left the country without any clear strategy for future actions, including those who left in the state of panic in the first days of the full-scale war and subsequent military drafting in September 2022 (therefore, settling in the visa-free countries for Russian nationals).

Although this standpoint offers some insight in the difference between emigrants and relocants, the author of this thesis would argue that it might lead to oversimplification. Thus, this thesis suggests to consider also various programs existing in the EU and other countries that may be attractive for relocation, especially so-called "digital nomads" and entrepreneurs. Currently, more than 40 countries across the globe activated digital nomad visa programs. Since 2022, it has been possible to apply for the White Card, a residency permit for digital nomads in Hungary. Under the permit, foreign nationals can live in Hungary while working for a company outside of the country. The permit is for one year and can be extended for an additional year. However, the Hungarian digital nomad visa is more suitable for single digital nomads because their family members cannot relocate under the family reunification, but should find other ways to stay legally in the country.

For entrepreneurs, Hungary has a programme offering residence permits for opening a business in the country. It is necessary to register an LLC, JSC, partnership or sole proprietorship from scratch, or buy a ready-made business. The most popular forms of company among immigrant entrepreneurs are LLC and sole proprietorship. Furthermore, since 2016 there have been various tax benefits, especially for start-up companies: for example, the program IP Box provides various tax benefits, including a 50% on revenues qualifying as royalties or tax deductions for R&D costs.

Additionally, other countries, among which are France, the UK, and the USA, offer special "talent" visas, among which are France, thus attracting highly qualified and talented workers from Russia. Outside the Western countries, for example, UAE have been seeking to attract Russian entrepreneurs, including highly technological ones, by offering a "zero tax policy", which, however, ended up being regular taxation.

So, considering these programs across the globe may allow us to analyse the difference between emigrants and relocants in a more complex way rather than by dividing the destination

countries into visa-free and visa-requiring countries. Thus, considering various visa and relocation programs may provide more insight in emigrants and relocants socio-economic background as obtaining a visa requires time and economic resources, their perception of the invasion as an urgent or not urgent trigger to leave Russia, etc.

Estimation of the volume of the Fifth wave 2.0

In terms of numbers, it could be challenging to estimate precisely the number of people who have exited Russia since February 2024 as the official statistics might be unreliable and with limited access to it (an issue especially acute during an armed conflict), not to mention that the definitions of emigration might differ from one country to another, which leads to the discrepancy in the numbers. For example, some researchers suggest counting in the following way: take data on entries and exits of Russian nationals to other countries and subtract one number from another. However, many factors influence these data: for example, in most countries, authorities count border crossings rather than individuals (each of whom may have many such crossings); the fact that Russia's neighbouring countries, where Russians do not need visas, become a “buffer zone”; or a person crosses the border of one country in order to travel to another, so they are reflected in the border statistics of two countries at once. An additional problem is that countries publish the data on border crossings in and for different periods; so, comparing the data might be challenging.

An additional methodological problem that makes the estimation more difficult is closely related to relaxed migration legislation characterising Russian migration waves since the Fourth one. Particularly, it refers to a legal opportunity for Russian nationals to have multiple citizenships; thus, according to some expert estimations, there are around 1.5 million Russians holding multiple citizenship [13]. So, people having, for example, a double citizenship, once they leave Russia as Russian nationals, can use their second passport to enter any other country. Therefore, this makes the data on the number of border crossings even less reliable for estimations of the volume of the Fifth wave 2.0.

Add a few more methodological problems, for example dual citizenship vs tax residency

[13] https://www.ng.ru/economics/2023-09-28/1_8839_citizenship.html#:~:text=%D0%9F%D0%BE%20%D1%8D%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%82%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%BC%20%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%BC%2C%20%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%B9%D1%87%D0%B0%D1%81%20%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B5,%D0%BC%D0%BB%D0%BD%20%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F%D0%BD%20%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%8E%D1%82%20%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%20%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B6%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE.

Maybe adding a few more cases about the EU, for example, migration of Russian companies to Hungary and Hungary's 'tax benefit' / mutual interest of both Russian emigrants and Hungary

Nomad countries that are more accessible to Russians (also the linkage to 'the closed marker' where Russians' bright minds employ other Russians who become nomads), for example Spain, Portugal (entrepreneurial hub for Russians), France, UK and USA when it comes to 'talent' visas; UAE and their 'zero tax policy' that just turned into normal taxation (lol)

Nevertheless, there are some pieces of data, allowing us to draw at least preliminary estimations of the number of emigrants and relocants as well as the geography of the destination countries. For the purposes of the research, it is more beneficial to start the discussion with the geography of the destination countries as it will allow us to narrow down the list of countries in which further statistics should be looked for. So, due to bureaucratic and institutional difficulties in travelling to the EU and other Western countries, the majority of Russian migrants settled down in the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus - Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan (Gulina, 2023). This suggestion is also confirmed by the research of the first sub-wave of leaving the country (end of February - March 2022) that showed that for more than half of the respondents (58%), the choice of the destination country was not made based on previous preparation, but at the moment and mainly based on such factors as no need of a travel passport, visa or affordable tickets (Kamalov et al. 2022).

Additionally, Gulina (2023) suggests the following (although inexhaustive) typology of emigration and relocation scenarios that allows to limit the geography of the hosting societies:

- "Ethnic repatriation" available only to a limited number of Russian nationals and mainly concerned Israel, Germany, and South Caucasian countries (for more information on these groups see *Chapter 4 Russian Identity Formation*);
- "Transit migration" has covered a number of countries that have become temporary reception centres for Russians. This type of emigration mainly concerned Georgia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan.
- "Asylum" in countries such as Germany, France and the Czech Republic, which have separate elements of institutional support for Russians from at-risk groups;
- "Relocation of business" affected representative offices of international and Russian firms that were leaving the country. Turkey, Armenia and Central Asian countries have become places of relocation of most small and medium-sized businesses from Russia.

During the first almost 10 months of the war - the period from the end of February 2022 till the end of December 2022, there were two main waves for exiting the country - the beginning of the war, which brought high uncertainty and fostered many rumours such as about a possible border closure, and the military drafting announced in September that fostered leaving the country. Researchers and experts give various estimates of the number of those who left the country in 2022, ranging from 700 000 to 1.2 million people (Gulina, 2023). Although the author of this thesis does not aim at identifying the most accurate number of emigrants and relocants, based on the statistical data and reports, she suggests that the more conservative estimation seems more realistic. Thus, at the time, Georgia was one of the main destination or transit countries for Russian nationals. According to the report by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, around 112 000 Russians entered and remained in the country in 2022[14]. Almost the same number (around 100 000) of Russian nationals also entered and settled in Kazakhstan[15]. Another 200 000 Russians settled in such visa-free countries as Turkey, Serbia, Armenia, and Kyrgizia (78 000[16], 50 000[17], 40 000[18], and 34 000[19], accordingly). While the EU and the USA were a destination point for around 60 000 Russians altogether[20] during this first period of the war. Therefore, it could be preliminary estimated based on this circumstantial evidence that around half a million Russians left the country during the first 10 months of the war. However, it should be borne in mind that the author considered only the main destination countries of Central Asia and South Caucasus and the main Western countries, while the countries of South-Eastern Asia and South America were not analysed due to the language barrier and could have accommodated another 200 000 Russian nationals.

Additional evidence in favour of the more conservative estimation on the number of people who have exited the country since the beginning of the full-scale war is offered by the journalistic project The Bell. In their report[21], they show that during the first two and a half

[14] https://info.parliament.ge/file/1/MpQuestionContent/19959

[15] https://www.interfax.ru/world/874590

[16] https://www.goc.gov.tr/ikamet-izinleri

[17] https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-race-to-lure-russian-talent-and-capital-serbia-emerges-as-front-runner-11666793707?mod=mhp

[18] https://www.rbc.ru/economics/04/11/2022/6363dd599a7947466a7db50c

[19] https://24.kg/obschestvo/249138_prostofaktyi_skolko_rossiyan_vyehalo_vkyirgyizstan_snachala_2022_goda/

[20] https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters and https://x.com/Frontex/status/1588432139607240704

[21] https://thebell.io/posle-nachala-voyny-iz-rossii-uekhali-i-ne-vernulis-bolshe-700-tysyach-chelovek-issledovanie-the-bel

years from the start of the war, around 700 000 Russian nationals settled all over the world. This report can also be used to analyse the trajectories of Russian emigrants and relocants. Thus, by the end of 2023, Armenia remained among the main countries where Russian nationals entered and remained with approximately 110 000 people. In the meantime, it seems that Russians started gradually to leave such countries as Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkey (as of the end of December 2023, around 74 000, 80 000 and 28 000 Russians settled in the countries, accordingly), making them transit countries rather than destination. Besides these countries being a transition point, this might be due to the fact that Giorgia began to be a somewhat insecure country for Russians as there were cases when people were not allowed to enter the country after a visa-run, while there were cases when people were extradited to Russia from Kazakhstan. As to Turkey, the country started to refuse to prolong or even annulled the residence permits for Russian nationals, which led to many leaving the country.

Additionally, the report prepared by The Bell shows that some Russian nationals took their time to move to countries more demanding in terms of bureaucracy and documents either not rushing to exit Russia in the first months of the full-scale war or preparing the documents in transit countries. For example, Israel is among the top countries for Russian emigrants mainly due to its program of repatriation, accommodating around 80 000 Russians in the period since the end of February 2022 - July 2024. It seems that in the long-run more Russians managed to legally settle in the EU and the USA than during the first year of the war. As the official statistics in the EU countries indicate, by the end of December 2023, almost 86 000 Russian nationals settled in the countries of the Union, while in the States the number was almost 48 000.

Some authors estimate that among these 700 000 Russian nationals who have settled in various countries across the globe since February 2022, around 4 000 - 5 000 people could be considered as “fighters against regime” (Gudkov et al., 2024) - those who had actively opposed the current political leaders of Russia before the beginning of the full-scale war and continue doing so after exiting the country. At the same time, it should be pointed out that it has been difficult for Russians, who left the country out of the threat of persecution, to obtain asylum in the European Union. According to the Asylum Report 2024, Russian nationals seeking asylum in the European Union got 30% and 33% recognition rate in 2022 and 2023, respectively, signifying that only around a third of Russian asylum applications got a positive outcome.

Cases of Nomad visas, their complexity for settling down as the residents of countries

Social portrait of the Fifth wave 2.0

Emerging survey data allows to draw a preliminary social portrait of those who decided to exit Russia with the beginning of the full-scale Russia-Ukraine war. Generally, various

surveys demonstrate a difference in terms of socio-demographics between those who decided to leave the country and an average Russian national. For example, the survey data from Gudkov et al. (2024) indicates that there are more men than women (63% vs 37%, which differs significantly from the internal Russian population where 53% are women and 47% are men). The survey undertaken by the Exodus 22 (2022) project may shed more light on this sex difference as they conducted surveys in spring 2022 (studying those who decided to leave the country due to the beginning of the full-scale war) and in autumn 2022 (studying those who left due to the partial military drafting). Their data clearly indicate the difference in sex composition of those who left Russia in spring and autumn 2022: while in spring women and men were approximately equal, with a slight predominance of women (women - 51%; men - 49%), in autumn there were approximately twice as many men (women - 36%, men - 64%). This clearly indicates that the threat of military drafting prompted men to leave Russia.

In terms of age, there is a prevalence of young adults between 18 and 44 (83% while this age group in Russia comprises 30% of the population) (Gudkov et al., 2024). The same skewness towards younger age groups was shown in the survey done by the research project OutRush in 2022. Exodus 22 (2022) also confirms the hypothesis of younger average age of those leaving the country as in their data the average age is 32.

The OutRush (2022) data reveal that 70% of them originate from large cities with the population of at least one million, while 26% of total Russian population lives in such urban areas. Exodus 22 (2022) project shows that 75% of their respondents came from Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Additionally, at least half of the emigrants and relocants had previously moved from one place to another within Russia, most often from smaller cities to larger ones (OutRush 2022). This evidence shows that younger people and inhabitants of larger cities, who also more frequently share liberal and pro-Western views, are more prone to emigration.

The OutRush data also shows that those who have left the country since February 2024 are highly educated citizens, with 80% having a higher education diploma, which is in contrast with 23% of Russians. Mainly, the respondents were employed in the spheres of intellectual labour and entrepreneurship such as IT, data analysis, business, science, culture and art, and "white collar". According to Exodus 22 (2022) data, 45% of respondents were IT specialists and other high-level specialists. New emigrants and relocants are much better off materially than the Russian average. Suffice it to say that 42% of them could afford to buy a car or not deny themselves anything at all (compared to 5% of Russians in the same financial situation) (OutRush, 2022). The Exodus 22 (2022) insights also confirm relatively high economic well-being of those who left Russia: 32% of "spring" and 42% of "autumn" emigrants and relocants

could live from 6 to 12 months on their savings. These features taken together indicate both a high degree of social and spatial mobility and adaptability.

A similar conclusion can be drawn based on the data from Gudkov and his colleagues (2024), who claim that new emigrants and relocants are more economically active and flexible when compared with traditional emigrants. The authors suggest that although relocants have been motivated to leave the country because of the discrepancy between their own political views and the current political course in Russia (first case from Introduction to this chapter), the main reason for emigration has been a search for better professional and, hence, economic opportunities, a comfortable place to live in and raise children (second case). Same reasoning could be found in a survey conducted by Gulina (2023) in Germany. According to it, there were three dominant reasons that prompted respondents to exit the country: full-scale war in Ukraine (87%), toughening of criminal legislation and/or the threat of persecution of the respondent and/or a member of their family (59%), lowering living standards and/or lack of prospects (56%). Among other reasons for leaving the country (ranged according to their popularity), respondents mentioned the impossibility to live and work in Russia due to the sanctions, announcement of partial military drafting, receiving job offers outside Russia, high level of anxiety, unwillingness to pay taxes to the Russian state and be complicity in the war (Gulina, 2023). The data from Exodus 22 surveys also confirms that the majority of respondents had not perceived any immediate danger or threat in their home country: in spring 2022, 22% of the respondents indicated that their departure was forced, while in autumn - 47% respondents, which might indicate that military drafting and changes in legislation were perceived as endangering the security of those leaving the country. Therefore, given the reasons for leaving and socio-demographic profile, it is possible to draw some assumptions that the vast share of people have left Russia without facing immediate threats to their safety or liberal rights, but rather due to a fact that their professional activities - be they business, scientific or artistic - have been put in danger or somehow affected by the country's actions.

Nevertheless, the various surveys show that there is some connection between the geography of destination countries and economic well-being and strategies of relocants and emigrants. For instance, the survey by Gudkov and his colleagues (2024), conducted in Germany, France, Poland, and Cyprus, demonstrates that the majority of their respondents have high incomes (€3000), corresponding to the European higher middle class. On the other hand, Kamalov and his colleagues (2024), who conducted their panel survey globally, show that the financial situation of the emigrants and relocants is not improving. Thus, in 2022 they observed a strong fall in the incomes of their respondents and by summer 2023 the overall level of

incomes did not recover, but remained at the same level, although there was a noticeable increase in the share of middle-income categories. This was due to a recovery in the incomes of the poorest of Russian emigrants and relocants (probably a sign of adaptation to the economies of the host societies) and a continued increase in the share of the wealthiest emigrants.

The empirical research, undertaken by Volkova and her colleagues (2023) in Armenia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Serbia and Turkey, shows that there is a connection between the destination country and an emigrant's economic and employment strategy. For example, in Israel, migrants prefer either to work for the local market or for international companies. In Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Serbia, migrants are more likely to work in local labour markets mainly in companies opened by other migrant Russians. As the study shows, entrepreneurial initiatives of Russians are often orientated towards Russians themselves, which can create closed markets. Also in these countries, migrants and relocants either continue to work for employers from Russia remotely (most common in Kazakhstan) or seek employment with an international company or engage in freelancing oriented towards the international market.

Besides the geographical location of and political situation in a destination country, the level of preparedness to leave the country can explain the difference in economic and labour adaptability. According to Gulina (2023), 54% of respondents who moved to Germany had planned emigration in the distant future. Almost a half of this group stated that despite the planning, the emigration or relocation happened unexpectedly. While 46% of total respondents said that the emigration or relocation was completely unplanned and spontaneous. The survey data from Exodus 22 research project also confirms that the majority of respondents had not planned their departure from Russia prior to the full-scale war: thus, almost 80% of those who left in spring 2022 had not planned emigration or relocation, while in autumn 2022 this share decreased slightly by ten percentage points. So, it is possible to hypothesise that general unpreparedness to the leaving the home country could also contribute to the adherence to work for Russian employers located either in Russia or in other countries or developing businesses aimed at Russian consumers due to a lack of insight on local markets and consumers.

The OutRush (2022) survey also partially confirms the suggestion on the general unpreparedness for leaving the country among the participants of the Fifth wave 2.0. In particular, their data show that for every second respondent the choice of the country of residence was almost random. Nevertheless, some signs that their respondents are ready to settle down and integrate in host societies could be found: the majority of respondents have permanent partners who have moved with them, half of the respondents plan to move family

members from Russia in the near future, the majority of the respondents, around 60%, were willing to learn the local language.

At the same time, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the majority of new emigrants and relocants spent most of their free time with other Russian emigrants and relocants. This might also explain both economic and adaptation strategies. For example, entrepreneurial initiatives in new diasporas are often linked not only to the desire to make a profit, but also to finding people with common values and solidarity (Volkova et al., 2023). Furthermore, as other survey data shows Russian emigrants and relocants continue to help each other, do charity work and volunteer work (Kamalov et al. 2023). Half of emigrants continued to financially support Russian independent NGOs and media. Another 40% of respondents had helped other Russian emigrants the previous three months to the survey. So, new emigrants and relocants use their diverse resources to maintain links with other emigrants. Social ties between the new emigrants are strengthened by their similarities: their similar attitudes, their ingenuity and willingness to be productive and relevant in their host countries, and their experience in organising and maintaining communities that they draw on in emigration. As could be noted, the list of similarities does not include common national or ethnic background, which is also confirmed by the study undertaken by Volkova and her colleagues (2023). The researchers state that professional identity and the notion of common destiny - that is, finding themselves in difficult circumstances because of the same events and therefore needing to come together and help each other to overcome them - seem to unite those who emigrated and relocated since February 2024. Ethnic and religion becomes a point of convergence for ethnic and religious groups not related to the titular nation (for example, for Bashkirs and Russian Muslims).

Therefore, the currently available research data show that there is a duality in the approach towards integration and preserving one's national identity among new Russian emigrants and relocants. On the one hand, they might seek to integrate by learning the language of a host country, seeking to establish new connections and expanding their networks through locals. On the other hand, they still seek to maintain their Russian identity by supporting other emigrants and relocants, consuming Russian-language media, and maintaining their ties with their home country. This might at least partially be attributed to a fact that the majority of new emigrants and relocants did not plan their departure from Russia and, therefore, they have vague plans for the future, which might explain this dual desire to be integrated in the host society and preserve their Russian identity.

To add to the complexity of the current situation and identity formation in emigration, the research by Volkova and her colleagues (2023) reveals a peculiar point of convergence in

the opposition of oneself to other groups and the distinction between "us" and "others". Thus, Russians who have left are more likely to consider themselves in contrast to other Russians: those who moved to the host country before the war; those who stayed in Russia or do business there; and those who have different values and political views. Therefore, given the unexpected nature of the need to leave the home country, choosing the host country randomly, and attempts to build local and Russian networks, it is not a surprise that there is a complexity in terms of identity of current emigrants and relocants which might undergo further transformation in the future under the influence of political and other events.

Migration typology of the Fifth wave 2.0

The cited above studies show the complexity of the Fifth wave 2.0 by highlighting various motivations for leaving the country, variety of destination points, identity issues, etc. Furthermore, the process is still ongoing in highly unpredictable circumstances. Therefore, the application of theoretical concepts to this phenomenon may be challenging, but this thesis still undertakes this task, acknowledging that future studies may shed more light and bring more insight about this emigration wave.

In terms of the type of migration, it is still early for drawing conclusions whether one of them has become dominant. However, it is possible to suggest that all the three types are met among the Russian emigrants of the Fifth wave 2.0. Circular migration is rather widespread, especially among so-called digital nomads, encompassing various professions from IT developers to social media managers. Here, it might be especially beneficial to rely on definitions by EMN (2011), IOM (2011), and Schneider and Parusel (2015) that highlight that the nature of circular migration lies in a continuous movement between countries. Thus, digital nomads are sometimes legally forced to move from one country to another due to their visa restrictions, making their migration circular, that is, not settling in one country. For example, in Hungary, time living as a holder of White Card does not count for permanent residence permit and citizenship. Furthermore, spouses of digital nomads in Hungary cannot relocate to the country through family reunification, thus restricted to find other ways to arrive in the country legally. Croatia considers a digital nomad visa as a non-immigrant one, meaning that a digital nomad can stay in the country for one year only and then they should leave it. On the other hand, Cyprus, although not creating limitations in terms of residence permits, obliges digital nomads and their family members not to work for local companies. These legal and bureaucratic limitations varying from country to country can provide some insights why at least one part of Russian immigrants move from one country to another during this period.

Another case when Russian emigration can be considered as circular is transiting through various countries to a destination point. As it has been mentioned above, transition mainly happens through visa-free countries, while destination countries are visa-requiring. Still, the transit period can last for several years due to various circumstances: waiting for family members to arrive, collecting necessary documents for visa applications, and others. Therefore, these circumstances may force Russian emigrants to settle, even if temporarily, in their transit countries, while waiting for an opportunity to move further in their migration routes.

Return migration can also be found among the Russian emigrants and relocants in its both forms - voluntary and involuntary. As it has been mentioned earlier, relocants have strong social and economic ties with Russia, which may at least partially explain why some of them have made a decision to return back voluntarily to the country. From the point of view of the statistics, this information is even more unreliable than on those who left the country because the latter could be estimated through the number of new residence permits and other sources, while the former is more evasive. Therefore, there are just estimates of a share of those returning (excluding those travelling back and forth) which differ from 15% (Kamalov and Sergeeva, 2024) to up to 50%[22].

Among the reasons for returning back to Russia, relatives and animals in need of care and obligation left behind in Russia have been the main ones. Additionally, some people returned because of the inability to obtain prescription medications or regular medical diagnostics. Economic reasons also play a crucial role in the decision to return back as some people moved back out of fear of losing their jobs or being unable to provide for their families. As early as March 2022, sociological surveys recorded that half of those who left had enough financial resources to stay outside Russia for 3 months, and the majority of those who left had their only sources of income only in the Russian Federation (OkRussians, 2022).

Besides economic and social ties, some Russian relocants return to the homeland due to bureaucratic and integration problems they faced in receiving countries. It especially concerns those who, facing various restrictive measures abroad because of their Russian citizenship, revised their political views in favour of the current political regime in Russia[23]. According to Kuleshova (2024), the relocants and emigrants of the Fifth wave 2.0 may feel resentment towards Western countries when facing one or a combination of the following issues: inability to find employment outside Russia, foreign banks refusing to open accounts, lack of residence

[22] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-02/russians-who-fled-war-return-in-boost-for-putin-s-war-economy

[23] https://www.dw.com/ru/s-obidoj-na-mir-kak-zivut-relokanty-vernuvsiesa-v-rossiu/a-69138776

permits, the need to move from country to country, inability to move family, difficulties with integration and poor housing conditions. So, they start to perceive restrictions as a push-out, perceiving their return not as a voluntary decision but rather involuntary. Furthermore, in some cases it may lead even to adherence to Russian narratives of the world rallying against Russia and increasing Russuphobia abroad. Overall, the proportion of respondents who reported any type of discrimination in the last three months before the survey increased from September 2022 to summer 2023, from 21% to 24% (Kamalov et al. 2024). So, although the majority of the emigrants and relocants do not consider the sanction and various measures in the Western countries as discrimination, there are still those who might potentially return back to Russia due to the perceived discrimination.

It is also important to underline that a substantial share of the Russian emigrants and relocants hope to become return migrants in the future. As it has been discussed previously, not all emigrants and relocants consider their exit from the country as permanent and plan to return to the country as soon as there will be changes towards democratisation.

Although the phenomenon is still developing and it is early to make any definite conclusions on the permanent form of migration, it is already possible to draw several hypotheses based on the available empirical research data. Firstly, it is possible to suggest the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine facilitated the exit of those who planned their emigration from Russia, including permanent emigration. This can refer to, for example, talented people, who felt the growing political pressure, or people considering repatriation to Israel, Germany or other countries. The second hypothesis suggests that some of those who initially were circular or return emigrants may decide to settle in their host countries due to integration in the society, meeting their partners among the locals, etc. Lastly, the third hypothesis suggests that some of circular or return emigrants may turn into permanent ones due to their disillusionment in the hopes of democratisaion of Russia and returning there, acceptance of the duration of the armed conflict as not a temporary situation, and, consequently, decision to integrate in their host society. So, the main difference between the second and the third hypotheses lies in the motivation to stay: in the former case, it is due to personal reasons, while in the latter - due to political ones.

“Gains” and “losses” of the Fifth wave 2.0

As it has been demonstrated in the discussion of the social portrait of the Fifth wave 2.0, the Russian emigrants and relocants are a highly heterogeneous group even though the majority share such characteristics as being younger and better educated than the country average and coming from larger cities. Furthermore, as it has been highlighted several times, the

phenomenon is still developing in highly uncertain circumstances. Therefore, this thesis offers a preliminary analysis of the gains and losses of the Fifth wave 2.0 and suggests some hypotheses to be tested in future research.

Generally, it is possible to hypothesise that host countries mainly benefitted from the influx of Russian immigrants who brought not only their education, expertise, and talent, but also wealth. Therefore, the host societies when having the right policies and the willingness to accomodate the immigrants can generate more wealth that can be redistributed further across the society. The only case when the host societies lose in these economic terms is when Russian emigrants arrived as refugees but there have been not that many such cases, so the general load from the Russian emigrants on the welfare system of a host country should not be high.

Countries having digital nomand, business relocation, or talent immigration programs (which might be both visa-free or visa-requiring) have won from coming Russian emigrants and relocants who brought their expertise, talent, and income to these countries. For example, Armenia experienced a pronounced economic growth[24] during the first year of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine which is partially attributed to the influx of Russian IT workers who settled in the country, opened start-ups there, etc. So, they brought not only their expertise, but also they contributed to the economic development of their host country by paying taxes, making mundane purchases, or even creating new job opportunities. Host countries should especially seek to gain from closed Russian markets, described above, rather than to marginalise them, as they potentially can have high levels of liquidity. Therefore, countries should seek to develop their digital nomad programs further seeking to make them even more attractive for immigrantsm, so that to enjoy more gains, while minimising the losses from reduced tax and general money inflows. As to digital nomads and talented emigrants and relocants, they have also gained during the peroid of living abroad by receiving new work and life experiences, contributing to the development of their soft and hard skills.

Other countries not offering such programs have still benefitted from Russian immigrants and relocants because they leaving the country due to the disagreement with its actions have frequently been motivated to find work, at least partially integrate in and contribute to the social life of their host country. Therefore, such countries have gained from the arrival of younger and economically active populations.

Although it might be early to discuss the contribution of the Russian talented immigrants such as artists, musicians, writers, scientists, etc., it is possible to hypothesise that they will

[24] https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/07/20/polza-ot-pobega

leave their trace in world culture. The majority of them still aim to work in Russian language, but with time the tendency may change and they may be more willing to contribute to the cultural or scientific development of their host societies. Among the current examples, it is possible to mention the name of the theatrical and film director Kirill Serebryannikov who had been prosecuted in Russia before his emigration. Since his emigration from Russia, he has filmed Limonov: A Ballad in English and presented it at the Cannes Film Festival and has staged several theatrical productions in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Based on the analysis of the past waves, it is possible to suggest that more and more artists will turn to the international audience in the future.

Russia, on the other hand, has experienced a loss in workforce and talent and economically active share of the population. So, the workforce market has been experiencing a manpower deficit and generally can be characterised by the braid drain. This situation may lead to less wealth to be accumulated and then redistributed across the society. However, it is possible to hypothesise that Russia can gain from those return migrants who experienced a push-out in their host societies, especially in political rather than economic terms. Thus, these migrants can return with a changed and more regime supportive outlook, seeking to contribute to their home country.

Preliminary conclusions

The shared idea of a temporary exit from the motherland can give grounds for the comparison of the Fifth wave 2.0 and the First wave of Russian emigration as the latter also hoped to return back to Russia soon believing in the failure of the Bolshevik regime. Thus, new Russian relocants and emigrants seek to maintain the connection with their motherland through the consumption of the news in Russian language, keeping strong social ties with people remaining in Russia (family, friends, colleagues), and something that makes them strikingly different from all other waves of immigration - depending on income or other receipts from Russia (although survey data showing that this link is weakening with time (see Kamalov et al. 2023 and Kamalov et al. 2024)).

Gulina (2023), analysing those who have settled in Germany since February 2022, also suggests that the two waves could be compared, at least in some respects. Thus, just like a century ago, German cities have become a point where emigrants can meet other emigrants, offering public spaces for discussions and debates. “Old” emigrants sought to create various associations and networks of support which has been done by “new” immigrants and relocants. Thus, since February 2022 various projects such as Kovcheg (The Arc), Map of Piece, and local associations have emerged seeking to provide material and emotional help to those leaving

Russia along with assistance in job seeking, finding an accommodation, medical assistance and others.

Furthermore, “new” emigrants, just like “old” ones, do not perceive their departure to be final but rather they leave the country to “outwait” the turmoil and return once the situation changes for better (Gulina, 2023). In both cases, it led to the formation of a government in exile or similar bodies: in the First wave, there was a Russian Council, nowadays there are such bodies as Russian Anti-War Committee (although not a government) - both aiming at developing pathways for the future of the home country.

Still, when considering this wave, an excessive focus on only political motivation (first case from the introduction to this chapter) can be somewhat misleading. It should also be acknoledged that some people migrated in search of better economic and life prospects (second case) mainly because of the sanctions imposed on the country rather than because of the disagreement with the actions of the country’s current government. So, once their economic prospects in their homecountry became somewhat bleak they decided to move out looking for better opportunities. Additionally, the mixture of the both political and opportunistic motivations (third case) should not be excluded from the analysis.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a general overview of Russian emigration, divided into five waves, main motives for emigration and the image of the Russian immigrant at each stage. In addition to historical context, the problems of Russian emigration, in general, were also raised, among which it is possible to designate the debate around the waves or stages of Russian emigration, the challenge to apply concepts of migration and its typology to the Russian case, the appearance of new concepts associated with Russian migration (refugees, emigres, displaced people, relocants), the lack of accurate data in figures and, as a result, the possibility of inaccurate future forecasts regarding migration.

Although this dissertation is done within mainly the field of migration and nationalism studies, this chapter shows the advantages of applying an interdisciplinary approach, by combining such disciplines as history, migration studies, nationalism studies, and economics. Each discipline proves useful for the analysis of such complex phenomena as the Russian emigration movement. Thus, history allowed us to draw a connection between migration waves and their historical contexts, while migration and nationalism studies shed light on the typology of migration in each wave as well as the matters of identity. Lastly, the economic theories have

also been applied to show the possible gains and losses from Russian migrants, analysing the benefits and drawbacks for Russian migrants themselves, host and the sending societies. The result of such interdisciplinary analysis can be a well-formed migration policy. This can be especially relevant to potential Russian emigrants, given the forecasts of an increase in emigration from Russia or to their demand, which can be satisfied legally or illegally.

Summing up the main findings of this chapter, it is possible to conclude that among the main motivations for leaving Russia throughout the history of the emigration movement has been political ones (**first case**, introduced in the beginning of this chapter). Only since the Third wave, it has been possible to trace the search for better opportunities (**second case**) or a combination of the political motivation and search for improved living conditions (**third case**) among the motivations for leaving the country, when ethnic minorities started to voluntarily leave the Soviet Union. Making hypotheses about the future of Russian emigration, it is possible to single out precisely the political motive for the future emigration associated with Putin's anti-democratic regime, censorship and secret repressions.

Furthermore, this chapter allows us to see that Russian emigration has always been a complex phenomenon because there has been a complex interplay of circular, return, and permanent migration, sometimes even one type switching to the other. In particular, this chapter clearly shows that there has been a constant aspiration towards circular migration, since the majority of the migrants, even if forced, have been wishing to return to their homeland or, at least, to know that they have such an opportunity. However, it was not always possible due to legal or political reasons.

Lastly, applying the economic approach to the case of Russian migration makes it possible to highlight that hosting societies have frequently won from Russian immigrants, by gaining more human capital in the form of the immigrants' education, work and life experiences. As to Russian migrants themselves, escaping political prosecutions and improved living conditions are undoubtedly among the benefits; still, as this chapter shows, not all the immigrants have managed to quickly and successfully adapt to new societies, they have frequently experienced identity crisis, and other problems. Lastly, Russia, as the sending country, has frequently lost due to brain drain and loss of valuable human capital.

So, aiming to understand the migration comprehensively as a complex process, this dissertation offers an interdisciplinary approach. This will prove that migration as a whole can be controlled, and it can leave a positive effect when taking into account more complex aspects when creating a migration policy as a deterrent tool.

This part of the dissertation study has some limitations, including a lack of connection between the Russian emigration and the nominated countries of Hungary and Germany. To overcome it, the author plans to continue her work and publish an article or a book chapter on the topic. Furthermore, it is also planned to publish a chapter or an article on the formation of the identity of the Russian emigrant with an analysis of the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, collective and individual identity with a wide range of theories on nationalism. The final chapters will be direct studies of the migration policies of Hungary and Germany in relation to potential Russian emigrants and a potential simulation model. A core of this dissertation will be the conduct of a questionnaire interview with Russian immigrants in Hungary and Germany to confirm hypotheses about their motives, identification and integration in the nominated countries.

CHAPTER 4: IDENTITY FORMATION – CASE STUDY OF RUSSIANS

Chapter 4 focuses on the theoretical study of the formation of self-identification and collective identification. It deals with the formation of an individual's self-identity and his/her relationship with community, group, or society. The chapter presents the views of various disciplines on the concept of building a collective identity.

The subchapter *Concepts of Identity and Approaches* discusses the main problems in the approach to the study of the identity of various schools of psychology, sociology, history, political science, including essentialism divided into primordial (Piere van den Berghe, Clifford Geetrz), perennials (Adrian Hastings, Steven Grosby, Liah Greenfield), ethno-symbolists (Anthony D. Smith, John A. Armstrong); modernists school, represented by pre-modernists (Ernest Gellner), theorists on uneven development (Tom Nairn, Michael Hechter), constructivists (Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson). It serves as a solid base for the subsequent analysis of Russian identity and its change.

In this chapter, we don't aim to argue on the given definitions but to show their variation and diversity in order to come to a single approach that would explain the components of Russian identity, its change in time and space.

4.1 Concepts of Identity and approaches

What is an identity? The question of identity can be studied in various disciplines of social science, including psychology, sociology, history, and even political science. Thus, vast approaches to conceptualizing and theorizing identity can be found.

Stryker and Burke define three different usages of identity, namely "culture of a people" that includes ethnicity; "common identification with a collectivity or social category", referring to Tajfel's social identity theory and Snow's and Oliver's social movements that develop a common culture among participants; and self-identity that consists of "the multiple roles" that people play situationally (Stryker and Burke, 2000). This subchapter is a conceptual and theoretical blender that acknowledges the multidisciplinary approach while studying aspects of identity formation and development.

Snow and Corrigall-Brown suggest at least three conceptually distinct types of identity: personal, social, and collective (2015). However, we consider the concepts of identity can be divided into "self-identity" and "collective identity" that are approached differently. All the concepts of identity formation can be described as psychological or political (Allahar, 2001).

However, not everything is as simple as it seems at first glance. Identity reasoning can be too simplistic or too complex. What exactly was learned in the process of collecting raw data in the form of interviews is that most people do not even understand what "identity" means. On the contrary, the problem for any academic is that we know too much about identity to offer a simple concept of it. If one tries to explain it to a simple reader, then it is necessary to mention a shared sense of 'one-ness' or 'we-ness' (Snow and Corrigall-Brown, 2015).

The theory is a prominent framework for delving more into self-construction issues. The concept of "self-identity" appeared in the works of Erik Erikson and described stages of personality formation through the prism of time, Erikson also coined the term "identity crisis" (Gleason, 1983).

Mead's identity concept assumes that self-identity is being developed through language, social and cultural life, and influenced by external relations (Dunn, 1997). As a divergent postconstructivist scholar Mead insists on the idea that the subject of self is the result of the socialization process and role-taking (Dunn, 1997).

Brubaker redefines the concept of group and proposes to refer to a nation as an ethnicity without groups, imagined as monochrome ethnic, racial, or cultural blocks under one concept (Brubacker, 2002).

Calhoun introduces culturally defined categories or "categorical identities" and this is how he describes the nation or ethnicity (2003).

Merolla et al. suggest that symbolic interaction through roles and roles-taking may grow into role identities (2012).

Snow and Corrigall-Brown see personal identity-forming from within on the basis of the uniqueness and dissimilarity of the individual and their social roles during the interaction, where A ≠ B, it is argued from this that even despite the presence of social roles and categories from which personal identity is formed and that can be shared collectively, they are not always commensurate (2015).

Self-identity seamlessly integrates or overlaps with the collective identity (Snow and Corrigall-Brown, 2015), it can be its additional part or its core, depending on the construction of identity. However, the absence of an individual's collective identity may indicate marginal status in society, while the collective identity is not capable of sole existence without self-identity, so they are interconnected and complementary.

Despite the merger of psychological-political identities, it is also necessary to mention the possible conflict of self-identity and collective identity that oftentimes applies to the concept of majority and minority figures. According to Weber, oftentimes social labels that form the identity of the majority are the subject of targeting by power in the battle for legitimacy (Weber, 1978). In this case, the social label can be attached to the above criteria such as gender, age, social and professional status in society, as well as race, ethnicity and ethnic origin, nation and nationality, citizenship, class, community, tradition, and even democracy. Given these assumptions, the success of populism as an ideology of appealing to the masses, identity politics, continued existence of authoritarianism in a country like Russia or the republican model in the USA can be explained since governments persuade people to self-determine themselves and identify with others.

On the one hand, "the majority rule presupposes a relative maturity of the people but also protects their individual rights" (Hermens, 1958, p. 39). Additionally, the majority can be represented by a minority of collective identity of religious, racial, social, or political character (Hermens, 1958). So, the democratic majority protects minorities.

On the other hand, the extreme difference in identities of minority and majority and their denial negotiation may apply to the "tyranny of majority". It can lead to the split of national identity, where one can find a satisfied majority and a suffering minority.

Malesevic associates collective identity with the action of individuals in groups for possible social action (Malesevic, 2006). So, both cases mentioned above at the end lead to the political mobilization of ethnic and national groups for peace in society or its further identity conflict and crisis.

It is impossible not to mention in this case the constructivism of identity and the sensitivity of the majority and minority to its change under the pressure of state government. A weak or strong prevailing identity can lead to class/racial/ethnic and national clashes. The best examples here are the ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia and the recent Russia-Ukraine crisis. Both are absolutely different conflicts but identity-related.

Additionally, one can argue that it is the conflict of identity that serves as an internal driving motive for the emigration of a person. It can be partly proved by the existence of dissident emigration. The problem is that with a weak collective identity, motives can be latent. This assumption also finds assertive confirmation in the first and second waves of Russian emigration; weaker or shifted emphasis in the third and fourth waves and the dominance of the fifth as the outcome of the Putin regime (preliminary hypothesis).

So, what's then the collective identity? The concept of collective identity is bound to the already mentioned "self-identity" and can be seen as its extension or complementary part. It's the shared sense of belonging to a community, group, class, ethnicity, nation, or another social label that refers to "we-ness".

Collective identity can be approached differently. Since it's situationally and timely changeable some may consider history as an instrument for its variation, transformation, and adjustment. However, it wouldn't explain the issues or emergence of one or another identity since communities, groups, and societies become structurally varied, divided, and culturally heterogeneous (Giddens, 1991). So, the issue of identity change should be addressed through constructing theorization: primordialism and modernists school, specifically social structuralism, and social constructivism.

The defining trait, according to the primordialists, is usually an ascriptive attribute, such as race, gender, or sexual orientation, or occasionally a deep, underlying psychological or personality inclination. Pierre van den Berghe presumes biological markers such as kinship and genetic pools as determining the nation. He also argues that genetically related individuals can be linked through cultural matters such as language, religion, and customs (van den Berghe, 1978). Clifford Geertz shifted biological primordialism to cultural but nevertheless it is a quasi kin-ship with premises to cultural realities such as language, custom, race, and religion that explain ethnicity as collective belonging (Geertz, 1993).

A significant characteristic from a structuralist perspective constructs a social category implying structural commonalities, such as socioeconomic class, race, or country; a set of relational linkages or networks implying structural connectedness or even a combination of both. Individuals who are structurally similar, such as those who hold comparable jobs, work in similar businesses, are connected to the same social networks or belong to the same socioeconomic class, religion, or ethnic group, are assumed to share a collective identity or at the very least be candidates for one. One of the most prominent representatives of the structuralists is Karl and his followers, who developed the idea of class consciousness. They believed that working-class identification or awareness would triumph over other sorts of (primordial) identities in the struggle to overturn capitalism (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). Interestingly, that identity formation included two aspects that were shared: the working exploitation, their shared feelings of the same fate, and instruments of oppression (race, gender, caste, etc.) that essentially lead to democratic rights fighting (Das, 2020).

In general, the viewpoint of social constructivists rejects both primordialism and social structuralism, believing that the putative link between identities and their ascriptive or structural moorings is more indeterminate than assumed. The focus is instead on the creation and preservation of shared identities. Rather than being biologically predetermined, structurally or culturally established, collective identities are considered as produced, created, reconstituted, or cobbled together. Eric Hobsbawm's and Terence Ranger's theory suggests that all traditions are invented in order to indicate certain values and norms that unite people over the past and create a shared present with the national traditions, sentiments, and institutions (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Benedict Anderson adds cultural and subjective elements, which were neglected in Hobsbawm's theory. He defines the nation as an imagined political community that further adds linguistic nationalism that assures the immortality of a state (Anderson, 1998). Anderson emphasizes national language and print capitalism, which can unite a nation far beyond the country's physical borders (Anderson, 1998).

Hopf (1998), discussing the problem of identity in international politics, suggests that identity plays a fundamental role in society: it serves to not only establish one's own sense of self but also as a marker to identify others. Therefore, he considers a world without identity to be chaotic and highly uncertain (Hopf, 1998). Identities are shaped by a combination of social interactions, institutions, governing societal norms, and cultures. These factors all play a role in determining who we are as individuals and how others perceive us.

The search for Russian identity has been and continues to be a very complex and historically conditioned process. Throughout history, Russians have easily identified with the dominant cultures such as Russian Orthodox, Russian Imperial, or Russian Soviet (Ponarin, 1999). Meanwhile, as it will be discussed later in this chapter, other people living in the Empire, the Soviet Union, or the Russian Federation had problems, particularly ethnic minorities and minority religious groups like Muslims and Western Christians. This identification with the dominant culture and being a melting pot for many ethnicities is one reason why Russians did not have a solid ethnic identity. At the same time, neighbouring countries - those that were a part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union - did. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about some changes (Ponarin, 1999). In her influential work, *Terregnum: Russia Between Past and Future*, Lilia Shevtsova highlights the persistent issue of identity during Putin's presidency, particularly during times of economic, social, and political crises. Shevtsova argues that the authorities often prioritise discussing "Who are we?" over addressing the tangible challenges confronting Russia, viewing the former as less contentious than engaging with real issues.

As will be shown later in this chapter, the debate on Russian identity has revolved around two main issues: church and religion and the relationship with the West. Interestingly, these two questions were actively debated in the 19th century and are emphasised in many public debates and policies in the 21st century. Within this debate, two concepts are often used to explain the difference between the sides. The Russian language distinguishes between *russkij* and *rossijskij*, where the former refers to ethnic Russians, and the latter relates to Russian nationals, including both ethnic and non-ethnic Russians. Throughout history, these concepts have had different meanings. Thus, during the Russian Empire time, there was little doubt that *russkij* and *rossijskij* were the same entities, meaning the ethnic Orthodox majority. During the Soviet time, there was almost no debate over this division as the nation was aiming at constructing a new Soviet personality and identity; simultaneously, there was the cultural dominance of the Russian ethnic group and sometimes forced assimilation of ethnic minorities. Therefore, the division between the concepts has become more evident only in recent Russian history, when it was officially recognised. On the other hand, Vera Tolz (1998) suggests that the state-building process in Russia weakened both the civic and ethnic components of nationhood. She argues that the development of a distinct Russian ethnic identity was impeded by the Russian Empire's multi-ethnic nature, which still substantially impacts identity. Additionally, the authoritarian nature of the Soviet government hindered the formation of a unifying civic identity within the

state. Consequently, during the territorial disintegration of the USSR, the majority of citizens in the Russian Federation did not view the former Union republic as their legitimate national homeland.

The first part of this chapter starts with a brief overview of the historical debate surrounding identity in Russia, dating back to the 19th century and ending with modern times. It proceeds with a discussion of the issue of identity among ethnic minorities in Russia throughout history. Therefore, the first part will provide context for understanding the intricacies of Russian identity, particularly about Russian immigrants, which is the focus of the second part of the chapter.

4.2 The historical overview of the debate on Russian identity

4.2.1 Westernisers and Slavophiles in the 19th century

Russia’s unique geographical and political position could be one of the reasons for the intellectual debates on Russian identity in the 19th century. The Russian Eagle - the symbol of the country for centuries - could be a symbolic image of this debate as its one head is watching the West and another on the East. In the early 19th century, Western Europe was commonly regarded as a source of intellectual and directional influence for the advancement of the Russian political, economic and social systems. The debate on Russia's identity was predominantly shaped by the perspectives of two influential personalities: the conservative historian and writer Nikolay Karamzin and the liberal reformist Mikhail Speranskiy. According to Neumann (1996, p. 15), while Speranskiy sought insights from Europe, Karamzin contended that such endeavours undermined Russia, as they posed a risk of tampering with age-old political and social foundations. The two formed two schools of thought on identity - the Westernisers and the Slavophiles, accordingly.

Within the Westernising school of thought, there was a division. One group focused solely on modernising and strengthening Russia's economy based on the Western example. They tended to be more sceptical of Western political and cultural values and viewed Western ideas as tools to enhance Russia's power during periods of economic and technological backwardness or following military defeats. On the other hand, the more liberal Westernizers saw the West as a source of social and democratic ideals that could benefit and modernise Russia while also

bringing Europe and Russia closer together (Tsygankov, 2010). More specifically, the Westernisers considered Western Europe “civilised”, appreciating such traits as enlightenment, economic independence of the people and entrepreneurship, individualism, and the weakening influence of the Church.

While the Westernisers sought inspiration from Europe for political and economic models, the Slavophiles looked to Russian history and culture for guidance (Neumann, 1996). According to Slavophiles, Russia's vast territory across the Eurasian continent meant it was influenced by and interacted with diverse cultures and civilisations. The Slavophiles believed that this geographical positioning endowed Russia with a unique cultural and spiritual synthesis that neither purely European nor purely Asian nations possessed. Romantic nationalists believed that Russia needed protection from European influence. Aleksey Khomyakov, a Romantic nationalist, explained in his historical writing that before the Florence Church meeting in 1439, Russian national traits coexisted peacefully with European influences but eventually clashed with the European mainstream. Thus, Slavopiles highlights that Russians had such inherited traits as communality, morality, strong faith in God, and obedience to power.

Additionally, Khomyakov argued that Europe's spiritual outlook was superficial and unquestionably inferior to the Orthodoxy of Russia, which he believed was the only true Christendom (Neumann, 1996). The Slavophiles emphasised the detrimental influence of European ideas, underscoring the need to establish a distinctly Russian foundation. This emphasis on Russian distinctiveness was seen as crucial for preserving the integrity of Russian nationality (Riasanovsky, 2005).

Throughout the 19th century, one side prevailed over the other interchangeably. After a defeat, Russia recognised the necessity for modernisation and the adoption of Western ideas. However, this sentiment was soon met with a reactionary response, as Western ideas came to be perceived as a threat to Russian identity. This oscillation between aversion and attraction can be understood as a function of the West serving as Russia's “other” throughout history, both as something to aspire to and as something to avoid (Riasanovsky, 2005).

Later on, the theories of the Slavophiles evolved into two significant schools of thought: Eurasianism and modern geopolitical strategy. The Eurasianism school was built on Slavophile ideas, advocating that Russia is neither entirely European nor Asian but a distinct Eurasian

civilisation with its unique cultural and historical trajectory (Laurelle, 2008). Meanwhile, modern Russian geopolitics often reflect this duality, seeking to balance influences and alliances between East and West, thereby leveraging its unique position to enhance its strategic and diplomatic flexibility (Lewkowicz, 2018).

It is also worth briefly outlining the ideas of Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954), a nationalistic philosopher whose works Putin frequently cites when discussing Russian identity. Following the Slavophiles, Ilyin prioritised religious and spiritual concerns over material ones, believing that the revival of the correct spirit was crucial to "saving" Russia. Furthermore, Ilyin opposed the assimilation of ethnic minorities. According to him, true Russians should love God and Russia, respect the law, have a sense of duty and honour, and be devoted to the state and the common good rather than personal or party interests. He emphasised the importance of love for one's country and encouraged Russians to prioritise the state's interests above all else.

In summary, the heated debate between Westernisers and Slavophiles during the 19th and early 20th centuries played a pivotal role in shaping Russia's trajectory. How Russians viewed their historical origins and identity at a given time was often influenced by their inclination towards Western or Slavophilic thought (Winchester, 2008). Russia's continued quest to define its identity is a longstanding and complex aspect of the nation and its history.

4.2.3 Identity in the Soviet era

The abrupt and unforeseen conclusion of the era of Russian imperialism has not only dismantled the social hierarchy and the reign of the royal family but has also left behind a complex legacy of centuries of history and cultural identity. This sudden transition has precipitated a profound sense of uncertainty regarding the identity of the Russian people and the future trajectory of their ethnic and societal development. The complex imperial legacy also affected the Soviet approach to ethnic minorities, sometimes leading to drastic approaches in the form of deportation and refusing access to common goods, as will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

With the rise of the Bolsheviks to power, the ethnic issue of identity got in the spotlight. However, the various ethnic groups within the USSR were not granted complete cultural autonomy and lacked political sovereignty. The Russians, as *russkij*, held the most significant

cultural influence over all other population groups within the society (Slezkine, 1994). Additionally, the Soviet Union can be characterised as a "hybrid of an ethnic and civic state" (Kolstø, 2000, p. 26). It functioned as a multinational state rooted in a nonethnic ideology (Soviet Marxism) while simultaneously operating as an ethnic empire under the dominance of the largest nation, the Russians (*russkij*).

The matter of non-ethnic identity built on social classes as defined by Marxism was tested during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). Despite the dominance of communism as an ideology, Stalin acknowledged the necessity for additional sources of unity during times of national conflict. In response, he appealed to nationalism and eased restrictions on religion to bolster Russian patriotism. This exemplified the crucial role of cultural depth and emotional appeal in shaping identity during crises. By leveraging religion and nationalist sentiment, Stalin effectively mobilised ethnic-Russian awareness, emphasising Russian folklore, language, education, and the historical significance of ancient Rus' and Russian heroes. However, it is essential to note that these tactics had a manipulative rather than substantive value, as argued by Riasanovsky (2005).

During the Khrushchev years (1955-1964), religious persecution increased, leading to one of the weakest periods in Russian history for the Orthodox Church (Riasanovsky, 2005). The absence of religion during this time was filled with the concept of the 'ideal' Soviet individual — a selfless, healthy, and intellectually driven figure dedicated to spreading the socialist revolution. Religion remained subdued until the fall of the Soviet Union, after which it experienced a resurgence, benefiting from the collapse of Communism.

During the era of Mikhail Gorbachev, there was a noticeable shift towards Westernisation in response to economic challenges and the imperative for modernisation. Upon assuming the role of general secretary in 1985, Gorbachev cultivated a new relationship with the West. Despite his socialist background, Gorbachev's interpretation of Russia's socialist identity diverged significantly from that of his predecessors (Tsygankov, 2010). Rather than viewing the West as inherently malevolent, he regarded it as a model for reform and modernisation. Gorbachev emphasised that *perestroika*, reconstruction/rebuilding, could only succeed with "New Thinking" or, as Tsygankov (2010) describes it, a "radical transformation of the traditional outlook on world affairs," which impacted the issue of identity.

Thus, the period is characterised by the complex processes around the matter of identity because the political and economic crisis led to the crisis of identity since the ideals of the Soviet citizens were left behind, creating a gap. Thus, Gorbachev and his supporters highlighted such values as individualism and entrepreneurship. In contrast, conservatives rejected this "New Thinking", arguing that the West had nothing to offer Soviet Russia due to a lack of moral authority. This follows Slavophiles, who also contended that Western Christianity should not corrupt their Orthodox religion. Tsygankov (2010) explains that conservatives recommended that the Soviet Union stay firm and preserve its historical and cultural traditions.

4.2.4 Modern Russia: Debates over identity

When Gorbachev was ousted and the Soviet Union disintegrated, a new Russia emerged. The new Russian political project could not merely be a product of the material residue inherited from the Soviet Union. As Jacub Godzimirski (2008, p. 15) articulates, it also necessitated a "political software" to effectuate the transformation of Russia. The development of a new system of values could not be contrived artificially; instead, it required the pursuit of a unifying Russian ethos through a comprehensive analysis of its history and culture.

As this was a period during which Russia experienced a so-called pro-Western wave, the new political and social systems were heavily influenced and inspired by a Western vision. The new state required the political elite to formulate solid answers to fundamental questions to garner support from Russian voters for their various proposals (Winchester, 2008). These questions included the nature of Russia at the time, what it should aspire to become, and which historical periods the new Russian state should either reject or identify with. The 1990s marked a period when redefining Russian identity was at the forefront of the attention of the elite and Russian society. Nonetheless, as observed, identity must be grounded in specific factors or concepts, as Smith (1991) elaborated in his definition, which includes a shared historical memory and culture. Therefore, one cannot simply devise a new national identity; it must have a strong foundation in history.

The prevailing pro-western outlook in Russia at the time significantly influenced the approach to these inquiries. Beyond the West's robust economic and political growth, there existed a more profound impetus propelling the new Russian leadership towards the West. This impetus stemmed from the new leaders' conception of Russia as an integral component of Western

civilisation. They contended that the Bolsheviks and the Soviet regime had appropriated the authentic Western Russian identity (Tsygankov, 2010). This perspective was not novel; it had developed from Russia's longstanding tradition of Westernizers during the 19th century.

In the early to mid-1990s, President Boris Yeltsin made efforts to promote a civic (*rossijskij*) identity by asserting that the Soviet successor states were best positioned to care for their resident Russian-speaking populations. However, Yeltsin's initiative faced challenges from radical national groups, as well as the electorally popular Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the far-right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. These groups advocated for a more assertive policy toward ethnic Russians and largely opposed Yeltsin's pursuit of a new, civic Russian idea, which they instead associated with the detrimental effects of Western liberalism.

The late 1990s were a period of significant turmoil for Russia, characterised by the 1998 financial crisis and the pervasive societal divisions and lack of confidence that ensued. Bobo (2008) identifies four key factors contributing to Russia's lack of confidence: the search for a post-Soviet identity, a dysfunctional political system, widespread corruption, and the handling of concrete policy priorities. The issue of identity was particularly intricate, presenting both opportunities and confusion. Regrettably, the diverse and conflicting perspectives on the future of Russian identity hindered the attainment of the required consensus. This lack of consensus greatly impacted the formation of Russian identity in the 2000s and 2010s.

Godzimirski (2008, p. 15) argues that Putin's emphasis on the Russian identity began during his first presidential term. The new president viewed it as a distinct historical trajectory leading to a unique national and political culture. One recurring theme in Putin's discourse on Russian society is the urgent need for shared values across all segments of the population in Russia (Evans, 2008). Since assuming office in 2000, he has consistently emphasised the significance of societal consensus and harmony. In his inaugural address to the Russian Parliament in July 2000, Putin stressed that "a consensus on goals should stem from the distinct cultural traditions and shared historical memory of the Russian nation."

Putin's approach to the question of identity and self-perception was not merely a matter of societal development but rather an issue related to Russia's position in the post-Cold War international environment. The need for Russia to establish collective self-confidence in its

foreign relations became a significant concern. Surprisingly, Putin was able to swiftly establish a more 'orderly' and confident foreign policy, along with a cooperative and more stable political climate. Consequently, at the onset of his presidency, Putin succeeded in reinstating greater coherence and providing a much-needed boost to the collective self-confidence of Russia as a nation (Bobo, 2008). Putin's primary challenge was transforming the conversation about identity into a unifying force in society while ensuring a plausible concordance between self-perceptions and challenging realities.

The significance of religion and Russia's relationship with the West appears to be crucial factors for Putin. Throughout his years in office, there has been a noticeable emphasis on national identity, which has grown stronger. In his later terms, the focus on factors related to Russian national identity reflects the 19th and early 20th-century concept of identity to a much greater extent than his first term in office. During Putin's second term, he frequently referred to Russian values as distinctive from those of the West, representing a unique aspect of Russia's identity. Values such as autocracy, nationality, and orthodoxy, significant during the 19th century, were often highlighted by Putin as obedience and respect for the law, patriotism, and religious principles. Additionally, Putin started to refer to Ivan Ilyin's philosophy. During his later terms, Putin frequently invoked Ilyin's belief that religious and spiritual matters should supersede material concerns and that the state's interests must take precedence over everything else. Apparently, the president did it to assert Russia's moral superiority over the West, positioning Russia as a moral leader and suggesting that the West is morally corrupted by secularism, thus placing Russia in a position of exceptionalism reminiscent of the late 1800s.

Religion, particularly Orthodoxy, played a significant role in late 19th-century Russia and has once again emerged as a central component of the country's national identity during Putin's presidency. Putin perceives the Orthodox religion as the cohesive force historically, culturally, and morally binding the nation together. During his third term as president, Putin emphasised the Orthodox religion as a fundamental element of Russia's identity, distinguishing it from Western secular values. This emphasis on religious identity became particularly evident during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which Putin framed the action as a defence of Russia's Orthodox heritage.

The survey data suggests that Putin's efforts to shape the identity of the Russian people through Orthodoxy and the opposition to the West are strongly echoed in public sentiment. For example,

in 2014, 80% of the population did not identify with Western values, and 42% actively disapproved of the Western lifestyle[25]. Regarding religious beliefs, approximately 50% of the population considered themselves to be somewhat or very religious in 2021[26]. Furthermore, 46% of the Russian population supported the idea that the Orthodox Church should serve as a moral compass, while 39% advocated for the Church to uphold and promote traditional values.

Putin's presidency has reflected a pattern wherein Russia reevaluates its identity during times of challenge or conflict, with religion and the West serving as central points of this identity debate. Western pressure on Russia's actions has prompted a resurgence of anti-Western sentiment, reviving 19th-century concepts of autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality to counter Western secular values. This phenomenon signifies a renewed emphasis on religious and national identity in response to perceived Western influence.

4.2.5. Ethnic minorities in the territory of modern Russia throughout history

Based on data from Rosstat, the Federal State Statistics Office in Russia, it is documented that there are over 190 distinct ethnic groups residing in present-day Russia. The population censuses in Russia facilitate individuals to express their ethnic identity by considering their lineage and self-identification. As per the most recent census conducted in 2021, the primary ethnic groups in Russia include Russians, Tatars, Chechens, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Avars, Armenians, Ukrainians, Dargins, and Kazakhs. Graph ## presents the fluctuation in the sizes of these ethnic groups as per the census findings.

Graph ##. Ethnic groups in Russia, percentage, 1926 - 2021 (census data).

[25] Levada Center: *Zapadnye obestsennosti* [Western devalues]. - https://www.levada.ru/2014/10/28/zapadnye-obestsennosti/ [last accessed June 5, 2024].
[26] Levada Center: *Tserkov i gosudarstvo* [Church and state]. - https://www.levada.ru/2022/01/19/tserkov-i-gosudarstvo-3/ [last accessed June 5, 2024].



Note: The data is reported in percentages, given that the country's size changed several times throughout 1926 - 2021. Only the ethnic groups from the 2021 census top ten that comprised 1% or more of the population at least once throughout the period are reported.

The graph reflects trends discussed earlier in this chapter. At the onset of the Soviet Union, Russian ethnicity and culture held dominance, as evidenced by the graph's depiction of an increase in the percentage of individuals identifying as ethnically Russian. Simultaneously, there was a decline in other ethnic identities, particularly noticeable in the case of Ukrainians. Following the end of Stalin's rule and adopting more lenient attitudes toward other ethnicities, there was a gradual decrease in the identification with the dominant Russian ethnicity, reaching its lowest point in 2010. This trend mirrors the circumstances of the 1990s, during which individuals experienced a sense of loss regarding their prior identity, and the state struggled to provide clear answers to the question "Who are we?" However, the graph also demonstrates a gradual increase in the percentage of people identifying as Russians since 2010, potentially indicating a general perception and growing acceptance of identity politics under Putin.

The diverse composition of modern Russia, encompassing over 190 ethnic groups, is symbolic of the nation's historical trajectory, encompassing its treatment of various ethnic groups amid periods of territorial expansion and subsequent strategies for governing diversity. This ethnocultural mosaic traces back to as early as the 12th century when Russia's expansion into the territories of the indigenous peoples of northern and eastern regions necessitated interaction

with and incorporation of various ethnic minority groups. Non-Orthodox ethnic practices faced persistent persecution by the governing authorities, compelling their retreat into the fringes of society (Geraci, 2009). Moreover, Russia's northern and far eastern territories were construed as frontier areas during the eras of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, prompting state-initiated migration initiatives to bolster the presence of ethnic Russians in these regions.

Graph ## demonstrates that Tatars currently constitute the second-largest ethnic group in Russia. In the 16th century, Ivan the Fourth triumphed over the Muslim Tatar Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, thereby consolidating the domain of the Tsardom of Russia. The Tatar ruling class maintained their language and faith on the condition that they served the Tsar (Lazzerini, 1994). Moreover, the conquest of the Tatar Khanates facilitated the expansion into Siberia and, subsequently, in the 19th century, the annexation of the Caucasus region. The nineteenth century's conquest of the Caucasus region, coupled with the integration of diverse Central Asian populations, further altered the ethnic makeup of the empire (Nation, 2015).

The incorporation of conquered peoples into Russia signified the end of their independence, yet initially, little effort was made to diminish their distinct identity. In fact, as long as these groups were willing to acknowledge the authority of the Tsar, individuals from minority communities could rise to prominent positions within the imperial hierarchy (Geraci, 2009). However, starting in the mid-nineteenth century, the processes of urbanisation, industrialisation, and the influx of Russians into the new “Russian lands” accelerated. For the first time, local identities and traditional ways of life were confronted with a substantial challenge. The process of Russification and conversion to Orthodoxy gained momentum in the 1830s, mainly targeting Muslim Tatars and Caucasian ethnic groups. This initiative initially sparked civil unrest, leading to a moderation of the policy. However, Russification was reinvigorated towards the late nineteenth century, shifting towards balancing the idea of establishing an ethnically Russian order to construct a powerful Empire (Geraci, 2009).

During the 18th century, subsequent to the annexation of Polish and Lithuanian territories into the Russian Empire, a significant influx of Jews migrated to Russia. Throughout the 19th century, Jews encountered severe repression and were prohibited from assimilating into Russian society. The implementation of the Pale of Settlement confined Jews to the western regions of the empire, and in the latter part of the 19th century, there were officially sanctioned pogroms against Jews (Safran, 2002).

The collapse of the tsarist regime in 1917 precipitated a surge in national consciousness among minority groups within the Russian Empire. During the subsequent civil war, the Bolsheviks forged alliances with prominent ethnic groups, offering them territorial concessions in exchange for their support. This practice was institutionalised as a fundamental tenet of the Soviet state. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was established in 1918, and diverse groups were granted varying degrees of territorial autonomy, representing a significant departure from the previous imperial administrative framework. The administrative system underwent a restructuring that centred on ethnic-based asymmetry, elevating ethnicity to a core organising principle of the Russian administrative order. By the 1980s, the RSFSR comprised 88 administrative units consisting of ethno-territorial entities and territorial formations. Despite its designation as a federation in the Soviet Constitution, regional and minority concerns were largely subordinated to the priorities of the central government, and measures were implemented to discourage the ethno-territorial units from evolving into hubs of nationalism (Beissenger, 2002).

The Stalin rule targeted a wide range of minority populations for deportations, particularly the people of the North Caucasus, Volga Germans, and Jews, and subjected them to forced assimilation into the dominant Soviet culture, based primarily on Russian ethnic culture. The Jews were never formally recognised as a nation due to their lack of compact settlement. In 1928, the Soviet authorities allocated a territory in the Russian Far East for Jews, which later became the Jewish autonomous oblast in Khabarovsk Krai in 1934, facilitating the deportation of Jews to the Far East from the European part of Russia (Gitelman, 2001). However, only a small percentage of Jews settled in the region, with the 1989 population of the oblast consisting of roughly 9,000 Jews out of a bit higher than 200,000 total population of the oblast.

During the reign of Catherine the Great in 1763, the Volga Germans were granted land in Russia along the Volga River. Initially, they were granted some autonomy within the Soviet Union. Thus, in 1924, the Soviet regime established the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic with German as its official language (Koch, 2010). However, the republic was dissolved during the Great Patriotic War, and its German population, numbering almost 900,000 people, was forcibly deported to Siberia and Central Asia. Despite their rehabilitation in 1965, the German population was not permitted to resettle in the Volga region; instead, they relocated to Siberia, the Ural mountains, and the republics of Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan (Koch, 2010).

The policies of Russification were also facilitated by Soviet governance through the resettlement of ethnic Russians into regions previously not Russified (usually along the southern border of RSFSR and the Soviet Union in general). Furthermore, starting in the 1930s, teaching Russian became mandatory, leading to the disappearance of many native languages from educational institutions. Despite these efforts, from the 1960s, a growing ethnic and national consciousness began to characterise numerous minority groups in the RSFSR. During Leonid Brezhnev's time, the rise of indigenous political and cultural leadership within many minority territories hastened these developments (Tuminez, 2003).

In the 1980s, a combination of increasing nationalist sentiments, the ascension of a reformist General Secretary (Mikhail Gorbachev), and the ethno-territorial structure of the Russian Federation created the conditions for minority issues to take on significant importance within the RSFSR. In particular, ethnic republics like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) sought increased autonomy. This was evident in their declarations of sovereignty in 1990, with varying levels of powers claimed. For example, Karelia acknowledged the delegation of some powers to the centre, while Tatarstan's declaration didn't mention the RSFSR at all (Tuminez, 2003).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent reforms in Russia in the late 1980s and onwards exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions, highlighting the intricate ethno-political legacy and the challenges associated with establishing a new multiethnic, multicultural Russia (Tuminez, 2003). This period often resulted in outbreaks of violence. Chechnya-Ingushetia and Tatarstan emerged as the first republics to challenge Moscow. In November 1991, the leadership of Chechnya-Ingushetia declared independence from Russia and promptly sought international support. The pursuit of sovereignty in the early 1990s facilitated the provision of legal status and advocacy for indigenous cultures and languages for minority groups (Beissenger, 2002). However, ethnic autonomy remained largely notional in regions where ethnic Russians predominated, leading to assimilation pressures.

During the power struggle between the ethnic republics and Moscow, there was a significant resurgence of linguistic, cultural, and ethnic practices among minority populations in the Russian Federation. This revival also extended to the emergence of religious organisations within the main minority groups (Beissenger, 2002). Notably, a phenomenon of "confessional coexistence" developed between the Russian Orthodox Church and various other faiths. It is

worth noting, however, that certain factions within the Orthodox movement advocated for the prohibition of "non-traditional religions," such as Mormons, Hare Krishna, and Protestant groups, and actively promoted anti-Semitism during this period (Beissenger, 2002).

Following President Putin's ascension in 2000, the Russian Federal Government has shifted its focus to promoting equality over supporting ethnic minorities. Even though ethnic minorities continue to hold certain positions of authority in local governments, President Putin has been resistant to implementing special measures for ethnic minorities and ethnic regions (Prina, 2015). These actions are part of a broader strategy to consolidate power within a centralised federal structure, with federal districts overseen by presidential representatives.

4.2.6 Russian diaspora identity

Russia holds a distinct position within Europe due to its historical context of internal colonisation and control over regions in the global south, such as the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia. Compared to its European counterparts, Russia had limited exposure to international migration until the mid-19th century, focusing mainly on internal migration to facilitate the Russification process. The uniqueness of Russian emigration lies in the fact that it started relatively late, in 1910 - 1920s (or in 1881 as suggested by Williams (see Fialkoff, 1973)), after the main emigration waves in Western European countries ended. As discussed in *Chapter ##. The Problems of Russian Emigration Stages Identification and Study*, this thesis suggests identifying five main waves of Russian emigration: between 1918 and 1923, in the second half of the 1940s, between the late 1960s and early 1980s, between the late 1980s and 2000, and the ongoing one starting in the early 2000s. The reasons for these waves varied, from political upheaval and instability to economic reasons.

In this work, diaspora is defined as “a people with a common origin, who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland—real or symbolic” (Shain & Barth, 2003). This definition is helpful as it encompasses the ideational, cultural, and symbolic components of the Russian diaspora identity that are important for the discussion in this thesis.

The first major and documented wave of Russian immigration occurred during the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the Russian Civil War from 1918 to 1920, significantly impacting

emigration in the early 20th century. While Europe was the primary destination for most emigrants, approximately 30 000 Russians relocated to the United States (Maydell & Wilson, 2009). The majority of these immigrants, whom the Bolshevik Revolution displaced, belonged to the Russian aristocracy. Fleeing their homeland to evade prosecution by the newly established Soviet regime, they were forced to take low-paying jobs to survive in their new country (Isurin, 2011). Despite their aristocratic background, these immigrants faced economic and cultural barriers in their new home, which impacted their identity. So, failing to integrate into the new society, they preferred to form and live in a diaspora, preserving their Russian identity and hoping to return back one day.

Following this, emigration from the Soviet Union declined in the late 1920s. For almost four decades, from the 1930s to the 1970s, a totalitarian political regime prevented Soviet citizens from leaving the country, requiring special permission from the state to travel overseas as tourists (Isurin, 2011).

The 1970s and 1980s marked a gradual change in the mobility regulations for Soviet citizens, leading to a new generation of Russian immigrants seeking a better life abroad. This group primarily consisted of Russian Jews who were accepted as refugees. While the communist revolution brought some improvements to the lives of the Russian Jewish community, including access to education and the opportunity to settle in major cities, they continued to face discrimination in the Soviet republics (Isurin, 2011); therefore, they used this opportunity to leave the country when possible.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 intensified emigration from the former Soviet republics (Ryazantsev & Pismennaya, 2016). During that time, the Russian Federation experienced a significant brain drain, losing some of its most qualified professionals (Ryazantsev & Pismennaya, 2016). Post-Soviet Russian immigrants entered various countries in different statuses, including asylum-seekers, international students, professional immigrants, and spouses of host countries' citizens. These immigrants were generally well-educated and worked in diverse fields such as science, politics, medicine, finance, education, technology, social work, and development.

In the early 1990s, the Russian diaspora outside the CIS countries and the Baltic States was estimated to be around 2 million people. The majority of this diaspora was located in the USA,

comprising approximately half of the total diaspora population, with significant communities also found in Israel and Germany, various Latin American countries, and Canada. The formation of this diaspora can be traced back to a series of migrations that occurred before and after the 1917 revolution and during the Soviet period. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent era of economic and political uncertainty, combined with the relaxation of border controls, precipitated large-scale emigrations from Russia and other former Soviet states (Siegel & Bovenkerk, 2000). It is estimated that approximately ten million Russian-speaking immigrants established themselves in various countries globally during the first fifteen years following the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Elias & Shorer-Zeltzer, 2006). Additionally, since the emergence of the new Russian state in late 1991, there has been a notable focus on the "new Russian diaspora" in research (Shlapentokh et al., 1994). This refers to the 25 million ethnic Russians who became "beached" (Laitin, 1998, p. 29) following the abrupt reconfiguration of the Soviet borders. Subsequently, these individuals became residents in 14 newly formed national states outside Russia.

The literature indicates that immigrants from specific regions of the former Soviet Union, who emigrated during differing historical and political periods, may possess diverse resources for their identity construction. These resources are contingent upon the political, economic, and social circumstances in both their countries of origin and their new places of residence (Kopnina, 2005; Siegel & Bovenkerk, 2000). Thus, those who migrated during the Revolution could not fully adapt to the receiving countries because, despite having cultural and social capital, they frequently experienced economic hardship and, consequently, a lack of validation of their status and identity. In the meantime, Soviet Jews often sought to leave behind their past experiences and were willing to internalise new cultures and identities, mainly when they referred to their ethnic background. The issue of identity is more complex for immigrants from the late Soviet Union and after its dissolution due to the complexity of identity policies throughout almost 80 years of the Union's existence.

So, when considering the two concepts of Russianness - national and ethnic - it is crucial to recognise the profound influence of the Soviet Union's legacy on the self-identification of migrants. The Soviet Union's policies actively promoted the forced assimilation of ethnic minorities and emphasised the dominance of the Russian language and culture among its populace (Kononenko & Holowinsky, 2001). Consequently, individuals who migrated from and were born in the Soviet Union may still identify themselves as Russian or through their

native language (Russian-speaking) rather than by their ethnicity. The immigrants from the former Soviet Union collectively experienced and internalised comparable political and cultural frameworks for over three generations, utilising similar cultural resources in the construction of their identities (Melvin, 1995). Despite its obsolescence in political and economic terms, the socialist ideology continues to serve as a foundational element for identity formation among immigrants who were born and raised in the USSR, often operating as an implicit and unacknowledged frame of reference (Melvin, 1995). At the same time, some studies show that for some groups of immigrants (for example, Russian Jews, Russian Germans, and others), their ethnic self-awareness plays a crucial role in their identity, especially on the background that their host society labels them as "Russian" (Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2001).

David Laitin's influential work *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (1998) has significantly influenced scholarly inquiry into the Russian-speaking populations, which emerged as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Laitin's conceptualisation of a new conglomerate identity of 'Russian-speaking populations' as a "diaspora without a homeland, non-titular, Russian-speaking, and Soviet peoples" (Laitin, 1995, p. 284) is frequently used for the analysis of Russian migrants. While these populations did not possess a claim to nationality in the 1990s, their existence has undergone ideological transformation over the years, particularly by the Russian state, to facilitate the formation of nationalist claims. The Kremlin has strategically constructed and leveraged the notion of Russian 'compatriots' to advance Russian interests abroad. What initially began as the Russian-speaking populations has been officially codified as an ethnic diaspora in the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Subsequently, this 'ethnic' diaspora has encompassed more cultural elements, leading to the formation of the concept of 'Russian compatriots'. As of 2010, being a 'Russian Compatriot' merely requires ethnic ancestry to one of the 185 nationalities present in the former Russian Empire, along with a 'spiritual connection' to the Russian homeland, according to Rossotrudnichestvo.

The concept of 'Compatriots' pertains to individuals who serve as "transmitters of Russian culture, values, language, and intermediaries of relations between Russia and foreign countries", as stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. During Putin's third term in office, the ideological framework of the Russian World has become deeply embedded within Russian diaspora policies. This Russian World is underpinned by three key

elements: the Russian language, historical Soviet memory, and the Russian Orthodox Church (Kallas, 2016).

These ongoing developments need to be comprehended within the framework of Russia's bordering practices. The Russian state has unilaterally endeavoured to redefine the physical and symbolic boundaries of Russianness and the Russian nation. These bordering practices aim to reconcile cultural, ethnic, territorial, and social diversity by integrating the civic (*rossijskij*) and ethnic (*russkij*) conceptions of Russianness. These conceptions are delineated by politico-territorial and ethno-cultural borders, respectively (Kosmarskaya, 2005, p. 268).

The previous research on Russian immigrants shows several issues in relation to identity and adaptation in a host country. One of the profound challenges faced by individuals is the loss of identity, particularly prevalent among refugees and asylum seekers who may find themselves stripped of their social identity, reduced to a mere embodiment of their physical selves (Colic-Peisker & Walker, 2003, p. 341). While this phenomenon is commonly associated with the nature of refugee status, it is essential to note that such traumatic experiences are not exclusive to this group. Even voluntary immigrants may encounter a similar loss of identity if the new socio-cultural environment fails to validate the aspects of their identity built upon their previous professional, cultural, and social experiences. The study conducted by Gang and Stuart (2000) on the economic implications of immigration from the former Soviet Union to the USA clearly demonstrated that a majority of professionals perceived a significant loss of human capital following their immigration. This was primarily due to a mismatch between their expectations of how their identity would be recognised in the new country and the actual response they received. As a consequence, they experience a severe crisis of identity, feeling they do not belong to their country of origin or the host country.

Another challenge for immigrants in general and Russian ones in particular is being labelled as inferior. The use of labels to categorise people can lead to social marginalisation and discrimination (Matheson, 2005). Immigrants, in particular, often face negative labelling by the host population, which contributes to the construction of an inferior identity. This labelling can be based on factors such as language fluency, accent, and cultural differences, leading to the perception of intellectual inadequacy and social exclusion. Host societies may use the abnormal or deviant construction of cultural identity to assert power and discriminate against immigrant groups (Cottle, 2000; Yurdakul & Bodemann, 2006). Language fluency, in particular, is a

salient issue for immigrants, as it can impact their employment and professional identity. The presence of a strong "alien" accent and linguistic mistakes can lead to the perception of intellectual inadequacy and social disadvantage, leading to marginalisation and identification as outsiders (Rapoport et al., 2002). This issue was identified by Maydell and Wilson (2009) in a study of Russian immigrants to New Zealand.

To cope with the experience of identity loss and the associated negative societal perceptions, certain immigrants may choose to normalise their adverse encounters. Rapoport et al. (2002) proposed that engaging in the normalisation process involves the negotiation of unfavourable identity attributions by internalising the responsibility for such perceptions. This approach may be adopted by immigrants as a means of reclaiming their sense of identity, rejecting the imposition of societal norms for identity construction. Immigrants may reframe inferior identity attributions as 'normal', drawing upon the perceived inherent disparities between immigrants and the population of a host country.

Alternatively, some Russian immigrants might choose to refuse the negative constructions imposed by the host society by being creative about their identity and communicating it to others. As shown by Maydell and Wilson (2009), some Russian immigrants, when answering the question “Where are you from?”— the question already implying some exclusion from the host society — opted for such answers as naming their current city of residence, naming their city of birth, or other local identities rather than national ones.

Russian immigrants can also aim to obtain the identity of the host society. This is possible through social integration, learning new cultural norms, and gaining some insider information about the cultural environment. This feature of blending in and becoming “invisible” among Russian immigrants was highlighted by Helen Kopnina in *East to West Migration* (2005). She studied Russian immigrants in two European cities - Amsterdam and London - who moved there in the 1990s and early 2000s. In particular, her research shows that Russian immigrants did not seek to form any form of community or diaspora but rather aimed at blending with the host populations.

Alternatively, it is possible for immigrants to learn about and internalise new norms while maintaining the norms of their culture of origin (Madison, 2006). For example, research has shown that some of the Russian-speaking population in Finland resist the pressure to align with

nationalist sentiments, opting instead to leverage their flexibility in renegotiating their identities and affiliations across various domains. In an examination of adolescent Russian-speaking immigrants, Jasinskaja-Lahti (2000, p. 47) documented a diverse range of ethnic and linguistic self-identifications, identifying two distinct dimensions: one characterising their Russian identity and the other their Finnish identity.

This last point of getting a new identity while maintaining the original one could also be considered from the point of view of transnational identity formation, as this perspective allows for accounting for an immigrant's desire to live in and identify with more than one culture simultaneously (Vertovec, 2001). However, it should be noted that this transnational identity is mainly spotted among recent immigrants from Russia - children and adolescents leaving the country after the collapse of the Soviet Union and later generations.

Furthermore, some studies show that those migrating after the year 2000 seek to maintain their original norms and identity by forming communities, engaging in diaspora activities, using modes of self-organisation, and so on (Byford, 2014). This could be attributed to the recent compatriot politics developed by the Russian state, which seeks to promote Russian cultures and values among immigrants and diasporic groups.

CHAPTER 5: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MIGRATION PERCEPTION IN HUNGARY

Introduction

Migration is a significant phenomenon that has occurred globally throughout human history. Currently, intense social and political discourse surrounds the advantages and disadvantages of migration on the backdrop of long-lasting and emerging local and global conflicts. In receiving societies, there are concerns among specific segments of the population regarding the capacity and willingness of immigrants and their descendants to assimilate into the prevailing cultural milieu. Conversely, many immigrants are focused on preserving their cultural identity and resisting the pressures of assimilation for themselves and future generations. Similar fears are evident in various nations, particularly in Europe, where there are apprehensions about the integration of newly arrived immigrants into local cultures. This dynamic is also applicable to Hungarian immigrants and other new arrivals, whose ability to assimilate and integrate into their host societies has been and is scrutinised since their arrival in their new homelands. The situation is similar for immigrants to Hungary, including those from Russia, who need to balance integrating into Hungarian society and preserving their original identity. The interplay between integration and cultural retention poses significant questions for scholars and policymakers alike, requiring a nuanced understanding of both individual and societal factors influencing these processes.

This chapter is devoted to the discussion of this interplay from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Hence, applying the general-to-specific logic, theoretical overview starts with a complicated and ongoing debate around such concepts as nation and nationalism and proceeds to an individual level by considering the concepts of and theories around social and national identities. The overview focuses on not only the main ideas of each theoretical approach but also the dialogue between them, which has moved forward the development of thought in this area. So, the author of this thesis traces the roots of the debate around national identity to 18th-century European thought and follows its development up until current times. As this chapter demonstrates, one of the reasons for the diversity of theories in the field is due to the complexity and vast variety of nation-building processes and nationalisms. So, throughout the debate, theorists focusing on specific regions have drawn their distinct theories. For instance, the debate around nation, nationalism, and national identity flourished in the 20th century when some scholars attempted to comprehend the dramatic events of the two world wars, while others focused on decolonization processes, leading to competing theories. The discussion pays special attention to the issue of national identity in the context of migration, thus connecting this theoretical debate with the general topic of the current thesis.

From the empirical perspective, the chapter summarises the main empirical studies of the national identity of Hungarians living in and outside the country. Given the country's complex history, changing borders, participation in military conflicts, and other factors, the formation of the Hungarian national identity has not been a straightforward process. Furthermore, as the theoretical overview demonstrates, national identity formation is always ongoing, subject to social, political, and economic needs. So, applied to the Hungarian case, as this part of the thesis demonstrates, there have been changes in the constructs associated with being a Hungarian that are based on both in- and out-group comparisons, even in a relatively short period since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The connection between identity and context is even more pronounced when considering that Hungarians live outside their homeland. For example, as previous empirical studies show, Hungarians from different migration waves and, hence, moving outside the country under various circumstances have different opinions on whether to retain their original identity. Additionally, the thesis pays attention to the issue of identity in the second and third generations of Hungarian immigrants who have been studied, especially in the USA.

Lastly, the chapter overviews the perception of Russian immigrants in Hungary. Despite a limited number of empirical studies on the issue, it is possible to draw a preliminary conclusion that the general attitude is relatively neutral, meaning that Russian immigrants do not evoke any strong emotions in the host society. It seems that even the Russian full-scale evasion of Ukraine has not produced any long-term negative impact on Hungarian public opinion, as by 2023, Hungarians started to demonstrate quite a positive view of Russia and Russians. Despite this, Russians may still struggle to assimilate into society, which can be attributed to cultural and linguistic differences, among other factors. The chapter concludes with a discussion of current policies aimed at immigrants in Hungary, including those coming from Russia, and suggests some policy recommendations.

5.1 Nation, Nationalism and National Identity: Theoretical Approaches

In the scholarly discourse surrounding nationalism and its associated concepts, such as nation and ethnic group, a significant lack of consensus exists regarding their definitions. This ambiguity can be attributed to a complex historical trajectory concerning their philosophical, political and legal uses. For instance, in several European nations, including Hungary, contemporary legal documents frequently avoid using terms such as nation, nationalism, etc. Furthermore, the debate surrounding these concepts can be traced back to the 18th century.

Throughout the debate, various social, political, and economic factors have impacted the definitions proposed by theorists.

Numerous researchers and theorists have highlighted the terminological chaos surrounding key concepts such as nation, nationalism, state, and ethnic group (Connor, 1994). To illustrate this complexity, it is proposed that several definitions be examined. Acknowledging the prevalent terminological chaos, Conner defines a nation as a collective of individuals who perceive themselves as ancestrally related. This perspective states that the national bond is fundamentally psychological rather than rational, deriving from a deep-seated sense of kinship and an intangible essence. Consequently, this definition prioritises the emotional dimensions of nationhood over economic, political, and instrumental considerations. Simultaneously, Conner distinguishes between the emotional connection to a nation and the more conventional sense of loyalty often associated with nationalism. He further differentiates a nation from an ethnic group by asserting that a nation is characterised by self-identification – defined by the individuals who recognise their belonging to it – while an ethnic group may be defined externally. Thus, if a nation is inherently self-defined and its bond is rooted in emotional rather than rational terms, the application of the concept cannot be appropriately extended to inhabitants of a country, that is, citizens.

Conversely, Karl Deutsch (1966) suggests a definition of nation-building, particularly in the context of decolonised state-nations in Africa and Asia. He posits that nations are constructed by nationalist leaders who establish institutions that embody the principles of a civic nation, thereby aggregating the interests of citizens and translating them into effective political action. This perspective underscores the inherently political nature of nations, wherein the state functions as a reflexive institution that monitors and facilitates the formation of a cohesive political community. In contrast, Anthony Smith (1998) offers an alternative conceptualisation of a nation, defining it as a collective of individuals who share common and distinctive cultural elements, a unified economic system, and citizenship rights that extend to all members. Furthermore, he emphasises the emergence of solidarity, which arises from shared experiences and a collective sharing of a specified territory. Smith's approach highlights the interrelated cultural, legal, political, and economic dimensions that contribute to the identity and cohesion of a nation. So, these definitions illustrate complexities in understanding the concepts of nation, nation-building, and nationalism.

Given the inherent complexities surrounding the concepts of nationalism and nations, it is pertinent to undertake a comprehensive overview of the main theoretical approaches. Historically, the emergence of nationalism theories can be traced back to the 18th century, with

significant theoretical developments occurring during the interwar period of the 20th century, and the discussion continues to evolve to this day.

The initial debate on nationhood and nationalism found its roots in the 18th century in various contexts across Europe. A notable contribution to this debate came from the Anglo-Saxon context, particularly through John Stuart Mill, who suggested a connection between the existence of nations and the establishment of free institutions. He argued that the presence of diverse nationalities within a single state poses a challenge to the sustainability of those institutions. Contrarily, Lord Acton countered this viewpoint by asserting that the coexistence of multiple nations within one state serves as a vital test of freedom and a safeguard for it.

The contributions of German Romantic thinkers further enriched the discussion of nationalism, particularly through their theorisation of the concept of community (Gemeinschaft) as a foundational element that binds individuals. Johann Gottfried Herder, a prominent figure within this intellectual movement, rejected the universalist implications of Enlightenment thought by emphasising the significance of language in fostering communal identity. Herder argued that language distinguishes humans from other species, positing that it can only be acquired within communities that possess unique modes of thought. Consequently, he claimed that language reflects the communal and, by extension, the national essence. Furthermore, Immanuel Kant highlighted the importance of individualism and self-determination, deeming these principles central to nationalism.

In the French context, Ernest Renan offered a different interpretation of nationhood. He stated that a nation embodies a "soul." He argued that this soul comprises both a rich legacy of shared memories and a contemporary desire for collective living. Renan placed particular emphasis on the significance of a heroic past and historical glory, positioning these elements as crucial components of the social capital necessary to form a cohesive national identity.

In the 19th century, Marxism, alongside various other theoretical frameworks, significantly influenced the nation and nationalism debate, exhibiting an ambivalent stance towards these concepts. On one hand, the process of nation-building directly contradicts the principle of proletarian internationalism, which is a fundamental objective of Marxist ideology. Conversely, Marxism recognises the potential benefits of nation-building and nationalism when these processes serve to advance the struggle against capitalist systems. Consequently, Marxists perceived the emergence of modern nations as a necessary stage in the progression toward internationalism while simultaneously positing that both nations and nationalism would ultimately disappear in the future.

In the aftermath of World War I and, particularly, World War II, historians increasingly drew their attention to the phenomenon of nationalism in their efforts to understand the underlying causes of these conflicts, their unfolding, and the resulting human and material losses. While the author of this thesis recognises that numerous typological frameworks of nationalism have been proposed, this research will emphasise only a select few that are particularly relevant to its focus (for further typology discussion, see, for example, Hobsbawm (1992) and Hutchinson and Smith (1994)). Hans Kohn (1944) offers a typology that distinguishes between two types of nationalism based on the developmental disparities observed between Western and Eastern contexts:

- Western nationalism: Characterized as modern, rational, and voluntaristic, this form of nationalism underlines the virtues of individual liberty and self-determination.
- Eastern nationalism: Conversely, this type is portrayed as less developed and inferior, manifesting organic and deterministic traits. It is often marked by a lack of self-assurance, which may be compensated for by an excessive emphasis on collective identity.

Hugh Seton-Watson (1964), a historian specialising in Russian studies, proposed the following typology of nationalism that distinguishes between:

- Old, continuous nations: These nations existed before 1789, characterised by continuous nationalist ideologies and movements. In these countries, the formation of national identity was a gradual, slow, and obscure process, influenced by multiple actors and contributions over time and reflecting complex socio-political dynamics.
- New nations: These nations emerged due to nationalist efforts within a relatively brief timeframe. The emergence of national identity in these contexts is often marked by leveraging linguistic and cultural politics, thereby facilitating a rapid consolidation of national consciousness among diverse populations.

The evolution of thought surrounding nations and nationalism provided a substantial foundation for subsequent theorisation and debate, particularly since the 1950s. The theories can be categorised into two principal schools: essentialism and modernism, with each school further subdivided into distinct lines of thought. Thus, the overview of the main ideas starts with the former group, within which there are three lines of thought: primordialism, perennialism, and ethno-symbolism.

Pierre van den Berghe (1981) is part of a school of thought known as biological primordialism, believing that nations emerge as extensions of kinship groups. He asserts that races can be understood as outcomes of individual reproductive drives and emphasises the

significance of culture in defining group identity among individuals of the same nation and race. In this context, van den Berghe proposes that genetically related individuals can be identified through various cultural markers, including language, religion, customs, dress, and social manners. In parallel, cultural primordialists, notably Clifford Geertz, underscore the importance of cultural factors in shaping ethnic identity. Geertz (1963) articulates the concept of primordial attachments, asserting that these deep-seated connections arise from the fundamental aspects of social existence. He contends that such ethnic affiliations are not predicated on rational choice; instead, they are ingrained in the cultural fabric of a community. Unlike van den Berghe, Geertz perceives ethnicity as a quasi-kinship relationship rooted in cultural expressions such as language, customs, and religion.

Anthony Smith (1998) challenges de Berghe's assertion that cultural markers serve as reliable indicators of nationality and race, arguing that such markers are fundamentally non-biological in nature. He contends that historical processes such as conquest, migration, and intermarriage compromise the notion of biological purity, thereby complicating the use of cultural markers for the identification of racial affiliation. In light of broader critiques of primordialism, instrumentalist theorists suggest that primordial attachments are not static; instead, they are subject to change throughout an individual's life. For instance, the emotional ties associated with one's place of birth or kinship can diminish over time (Brass, 1991). Consequently, from an instrumentalist perspective, ethnic identities may be adopted or transformed, particularly in migration contexts or driven by rational considerations.

Perennialism – another school within the broader framework of essentialism – emphasises the historical continuity and enduring characteristics of nations, stating that there is no significant distinction between the concepts of nation and ethnicity. While it acknowledges that nationalism, as both a political movement and an ideological construct, emerged in modernity, perennialists assert that the notion of nationhood possesses deep historical roots. For instance, Adrian Hastings (1997), a Roman Catholic priest and historian, finds the emergence of national sentiment in late Medieval England, highlighting the role of vernacular translations of the Bible and the impact of Protestantism in shaping a cohesive national identity. Hastings argues that the nationalism that manifested in the wake of the French Revolution represents a secondary expression of nationalism, suggesting that the essence of nationhood predates these developments. Additionally, other scholars within the perennialist tradition have identified early manifestations of national identity in ancient Israel and the pre-Columbian Americas, where religions served as unifying forces for populations (Grosby, 1991), as well as in 16th-century England (Greenfield, 1992). So, their findings underscore the argument that the

concept of nation is not a novel phenomenon but rather a continuation of historical processes that span centuries.

Ethnosymbolist theories propose that the formation of nations is rooted in historical developments rather than modernity. Armstrong (1982), adopting an "extended temporal" perspective, traces the historical underpinnings of group identities, suggesting that ethnicity and nationhood are continuous phenomena. This approach distinguishes ethnosymbolism from perennialism by emphasising the significance of symbols, communication, and myth; Armstrong states that mental attitudes regarding identity have proven to be more enduring than the material aspects of existence. Contrastingly, Smith (1998) approaches the concept of nations from a modern perspective, seeking to understand the nature of nationhood by examining its historical context. He defines ethnic communities as "a named human population with shared ancestry, myths, histories, and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity" (Smith, 1998, p. 125). By focusing on cultural affiliations rather than mere kinship ties, Smith distinguishes his theory from that of primordialists. Notably, Smith acknowledges that ethnic identities are susceptible to transformation due to external influences, such as war and conquests; however, he maintains that these identities tend to remain relatively durable over time. Regarding the definition of a nation, Smith formulates it as "a group of human beings, possessing common and distinctive elements of culture, a unified economic system, citizenship rights for all members, a sentiment of solidarity arising out of common experiences, and occupying a common territory" (Smith, 1998, p. 14). So, he highlights the legal, political, and economic dimensions of a nation and national identity, emphasising their integral role.

The critique of ethnosymbolism has been articulated by one of its proponents, Anthony Smith, who states that an emphasis on historical narratives constitutes a form of retrospective nationalism. Furthermore, several scholars, including Breuilly (1993), have argued that ethnosymbolism underestimates the significance of institutional frameworks – such as education and religion – that play a crucial role in shaping and reinforcing ethnic and national identities. Özkirimli (2000) further challenges the ethnosymbolist perspective by suggesting that it fails to distinguish between modern nations and pre-modern ethnic communities, contending that it is problematic to discuss the concepts of nation and nationalism within the pre-modern context.

Modernism represents another main school for examining issues related to nation, nationalism, and ethnicity. Within the modernist framework, it is possible to identify four distinct lines of thought: the theories proposed by Ernest Gellner and his followers, theories of

uneven development, constructivist approaches, and theories addressing the coexistence of state and nation.

Gellner (1983) believes that nations are instrumental in the process of industrialisation. He defines nationalism as a political principle wherein ethnic and political boundaries are aligned. Consequently, he argues that nationalism cannot emerge without a state. According to Gellner, nationalism arose historically as humanity reached a plateau of industrialisation. Thus, it was largely absent during the agrarian phase, characterised by highly stratified societies lacking a standardised culture. During industrialisation, the increasing complexity of labour divisions necessitated a mobile and educated population. This, in turn, fostered a demand for a high standardised culture, which was primarily possible through the institution of mass education, a central component of modern society. The state assumes a pivotal role in this educational paradigm, as it has unique resources and power to provide standardised education on a large scale. As a result, the state acquires the authority to impose a new cultural framework upon its population. Gellner (1983) further asserts that the state selectively utilises the pre-existing and historically inherited diversity of cultures, often transforming them significantly. This includes reviving dead languages, inventing traditions, and reconstructing fictitious notions of pristine cultural purity. In this context, nationalism emerges as a form of social organisation fundamentally rooted in culture, which is internalised through the mechanisms of education.

Gellner's theory of nationalism has been subject to criticism from scholars such as Smith (1998), who argue that Gellner's framework is limited by its reliance on the German Romantic interpretation of nationalism while neglecting the broader spectrum of nationalist expressions. Smith emphasises that Gellner fails to adequately account for the origins and proliferation of nationalism, particularly in contexts where nationalist sentiments predated industrialisation. He cites examples from Serbia, Ireland, and Japan, where pronounced forms of nationalism emerged independently of industrial development. Conversely, in Denmark, the modernisation of agriculture catalysed the rise of nationalist sentiments. So, this evidence suggests that nationalism can manifest across diverse socio-economic contexts. This critique is echoed by Özkirimli (2000), who illustrates that nationalism may also arise within highly industrialised societies, as evidenced by the cases of the Basques and Catalans in Spain. Furthermore, Smith challenges Gellner's hypothesis that national identity is linked to identification with universal high culture, suggesting that the nation serves as an expression of this connection. Smith argues that high cultures do not invariably function as embodiments of

power, as demonstrated by the failures of communist regimes that struggled to achieve effective mass cultural indoctrination.

Theories built on uneven development, a strand of modernist thought, recognise the disparities in development between nations, particularly in the context of imperialism. These theories focus on the centre-periphery dynamics that emerge from capitalist systems, as scholars such as Nairn (1997) theorised. They frequently draw upon historical case studies from the 19th century, including Germany, Italy, Scotland, and Catalonia, among others. In this framework, the West, positioned as the centre, has historically exploited the peripheral regions' labour and resources, thereby maintaining distinct technical and economic advantages. In response to this exploitation, peripheral elites recognised the necessity for mobilisation among the masses, leveraging local languages and cultural identities to forge a nationalist agenda. This endeavour involved a reconstruction of local culture facilitated by the intelligentsia, who strived to establish a distinct identity separate from that of the centre. Hechter (1975) contributes to this theory by introducing the concept of internal colonialism, which he bases on the socio-political dynamics of the British Isles. He argues that nationalism arises as a reaction to the failings of regional development, suggesting that uneven modernisation has resulted in varying levels of advancement among different groups within state boundaries. In this internal colonial model, a "core" group exerts political and economic dominance over peripheral regions, leading to what Hechter describes as a "cultural division of labour." This paradigm implies that certain cultural and ethnic groups are systematically barred from accessing specific occupations—not due to a lack of skills or knowledge but rather as a consequence of cultural norms and values. Hechter posits that this oppression fosters the emergence of nationalism among marginalised cultural groups. However, he also emphasises the critical role of communication in facilitating the formation of a coherent nationalist movement within these oppressed communities, highlighting the connection between cultural identity and socio-political mobilisation.

In contrast, Smith (1998) contends that nationalism is a dependent variable shaped by the dynamics of uneven development, as it engenders the formation of a distinct identity and collective destiny in opposition to the economic and political "core." While Nairn's model elucidates the emergence of decolonising nationalism in regions such as Asia and Africa, it is less effective in accounting for the more ethnic and genealogical manifestations of nationalism. Moreover, Smith critiques Nairn's interpretation of the role of the intelligentsia as problematic: Nairn states that nationalism is essentially a populist movement initiated by the intelligentsia and transmitted to the masses in a top-down manner. Smith argues that this perspective is Eurocentric, as evidenced in contexts like Eritrea, where elite groups were mobilised even in

the absence of widespread mass involvement, leading to divisions among intellectuals into rival nationalist factions. Greenfield (1992) further asserts that the origins of nationalism were not confined to peripheral regions but instead emerged prominently from metropolitan centres, thereby underscoring a limitation in Nairn's framework that primarily addresses nationalism in former colonies.

Additionally, Greenfield critiques the simplification inherent in the core-periphery dichotomy, arguing that the relationship is far more complex, with the periphery simultaneously existing within core regions and featuring developed areas within what are traditionally viewed as peripheral zones. Likewise, Hechter's theoretical contributions have faced scrutiny, notably from Özkirimli (2000), who argues that Hechter's framework is reductionist. Specifically, Özkirimli posits that the theory overly simplifies the complexities of cultural cleavages and ethnic sentiments by attributing their emergence solely to economic and spatial factors.

Constructivism emphasises the significance of tradition in the understanding of nationalism. Proponents of this perspective introduce the concept of "invented tradition," which refers to a set of practices characterised by rules that may be explicitly stated or implicitly understood, often of a ritualistic or symbolic nature. These traditions are designed to instil specific values and norms of behaviour through repetitive engagement, thereby creating an illusion of continuity with the past (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). Invented traditions can be classified into two categories: those that reference historical precedents and those that establish a simulated past through quasi-obligatory repetition. The emergence of such traditions is particularly pronounced during periods of modernisation, which frequently precipitate rapid social transformations that undermine existing social frameworks. In such contexts, pre-existing traditions often fail to address the evolving needs of society, prompting the creation of new traditions. As Hobsbawm asserts, "existing customary traditional practices are modified, ritualised, and institutionalised for new national purposes" (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, p. 6). Notable examples of invented traditions include celebrating May Day, the Olympic Games, and alumni associations.

Hobsbawm highlights the inherent paradox of nationalism, whereby nations strive to project an image of antiquity despite being relatively recent constructs. He argues that nations must be understood as socially constructed entities closely associated with modern symbols and tailored discourses, such as "national history." In this context, he emphasises that the national phenomenon cannot be comprehensively analysed without an examination of the "invention of tradition" (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Hobsbawm identifies the period from 1870 to 1914 in Europe as a time characterised by the mass production of traditions and the rise of mass

politics. In response to the forces of mass democratisation, ruling elites employed strategies of inventing traditions to bolster their authority and legitimacy. This era also witnessed advancements in primary education, the invention of public ceremonies, and the establishment of public monuments, all of which were managed by the state. Consequently, nationalism emerged as a means of fostering social cohesion. Nevertheless, Hobsbawm claims that nations are constructed both from above, through elite-driven initiatives, and from below, through the active participation of the populace within democratic frameworks. So, this dual dynamic shows the complexity of nationalism as both a top-down and bottom-up phenomenon.

Smith (1998) identified several critical limitations in the constructivist approach to nationalism. First, constructivists struggle to formulate the reasons behind the emergence of specific nationalist constructs, the factors contributing to their resonance with the masses, and the variability in the success of different nationalisms. Second, there is a neglect of the complex interplay between established and emerging traditions within constructivist discourse. Third, the term "invention" suggests a fabrication process as in creating something from nothing; however, these traditions often maintain connections to historical contexts. Finally, Hobsbawm's framework does not adequately account for the intense passion that, in its most extreme manifestations, can result in individuals' willingness to sacrifice their lives for their country.

Benedict Anderson (1991), identifying as a constructivist, aims to address the limitations inherent in Eric Hobsbawm's approach to nationalism by highlighting the cultural and subjective dimensions of the phenomenon. Anderson defines the nation as "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 1991, pp. 6-7). He believes that a comprehensive understanding of nations and nationalism can be achieved through two key concepts: immortality and language. Anderson argues that the emergence of print capitalism was crucial to developing nationalism, as it facilitated the creation of print languages that laid the groundwork for national consciousness. The 18th century marked an era in which historical narratives became accessible to a broader audience through the proliferation of dictionaries, history books, and other literary forms. In the 19th century, producers within the print market not only unearthed ancient histories but also idealised "golden ages," making these narratives available to a diverse consumer base, including "the families of the reading classes - not merely the 'working father, ' but the servant-girded wife and the school-age children" (Anderson, 1991, p. 75). Regarding the concept of immortality in nations and nationalism, Anderson asserts that a shared linguistic heritage transcends time, creating a continuous language community. Engaging with a language in the

forms of historical novels or contemporary newspapers enables individuals to participate in the same community that spans over time.

Smith (1998) identified several shortcomings in Anderson's theory of nationalism. Specifically, he argued that the constructivist perspective implies that any social construct is subject to deconstruction; consequently, nations may ultimately be perceived as mere cultural representations. Moreover, Smith states that the notion of imagination alone is insufficient to explain the complexities of nationalism, which is fundamentally rooted in individual agency and voluntarism. Additionally, while Anderson emphasises the role of language in shaping national identities, Smith points out that other critical factors – such as ethnicity, religion, and race – are absent from Anderson's analysis.

Lastly, the modernist framework also encompasses theories that advocate for the coexistence of the concepts of "state" and "nation," considering that both emerged simultaneously, particularly in the context of Western Europe, where the phenomenon of the nation-state is prevalent. Scholars adhering to this paradigm draw upon Max Weber's definition of the state as a political entity characterised by its "administrative staff successfully upholding a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" (Weber, 1978, p. 54) within a specified territory. Anthony Giddens (1995), a leading figure in this line of thought, defines nationalism as a "primarily psychological phenomenon," while the nation is "a collectively existing entity within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored by both the internal state apparatus and those of other states" (Giddens, 1995, p. 116). Giddens believes that the formation of nations is intricately tied to processes of state centralisation. Hence, the development of nations is a direct consequence of "centralisation and administrative expansion." Within this approach, nations generate nationalism rather than the reverse; the former can shape the latter. Drawing upon the notion of European nation-states, Giddens outlines the multifaceted characteristics of nationalism as comprising political, ideological, and psychological dynamics alongside symbolic content. Furthermore, he states that nation-states possess resilience even amid the forces of globalisation. Giddens does not exclude the possibility of the emergence of a cosmopolitan nation in the future – one in which national identity will be reconstructed, characterised by diminished territoriality and a reexamination of historical narratives.

In contrast, Smith (1998) argues that not all forms of nationalism aspire to independent statehood, as evidenced by groups such as the Scots and Catalans, who may prefer varying degrees of autonomy instead. He emphasises the importance of cultural nationalism, asserting that it should not be overlooked; this type of nationalism can offer alternative frameworks when

political nationalism encounters obstacles. Furthermore, Smith critiques Giddens' definition of nationalism as overly reductionist. Thus, since nationalism and the concept of the nation are linked to the modern state, there is insufficient justification for a separate theoretical framework for nationalism. So, Smith appeals to historical examples, such as 19th-century Poland, where nationalism and national identity persisted despite the absence of an independent state.

John Breuilly is a theorist associated with the perspective that advocates for the coexistence of the state and the nation, and he has elaborated a significant political theory of nationalism. He defines nationalism as "an especially appropriate form of political behaviour in the context of the modern state and the modern state system" (Breuilly, 1993, p. 1). So, according to Breuilly, nationalism encompasses political movements that seek to acquire or exercise state power, justifying their efforts through the framework of nationalist arguments. The political doctrine articulated by Breuilly rests on three aspects:

- There exists a nation characterised by distinctive and explicit traits.
- The interests and values of this nation take precedence over all other interests and values.
- The nation should strive for as much independence as possible, which typically necessitates the achievement of political sovereignty.

In contrast to some other theorists discussed previously, Breuilly emphasises the role of sub-elites – such as mid-level bureaucrats, military officers, professionals, traders, and intellectuals – in shaping oppositional nationalisms, especially within colonial contexts. He acknowledges that nationalism has also been expressed among peasant and labour classes, notably during significant historical events like World War II. Thus, Breuilly believes that it is a misconception to perceive nationalism solely as a phenomenon driven by professionals or intellectuals; rather, he argues that these intellectuals are influenced by many social groups.

Smith (1998) points out that Breuilly dismisses the notion of nationalism as a language or ideology, aiming instead to offer a comprehensive historical and social analysis. Breuilly further critiques the concept of cultural identity, intentionally excluding primordial or irrational elements from his theoretical framework. In contrast, Smith states that any genuine discourse on nations must encompass cultural factors, as culture is integral to the notion of authentic national identity. Consequently, a significant weakness in Breuilly's approach lies in his failure to recognise that nationalism operates as a complex interplay of both political and cultural dimensions.

This overview illustrates that the debate on the concepts of nation and nationalism is both rich and contentious, often characterised by a lack of consensus. This complexity is

mirrored in the theorisation of national identity, which encompasses not only the "national" component but also the notion of "identity." So, the literature offers various approaches towards understanding national identity. For example, as stated by social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978), individuals are motivated to cultivate a positive social identity, a process that is fundamental to the cohesion and endurance of the community. Individuals typically forge such identities by aligning themselves with a "majority" group that shares common historical narratives, customs, and norms. This alignment is inherently driven by the pursuit of positive associations, as the significance of national affiliation becomes questionable when founded on less favourable feelings or values.

Furthermore, Deutsch (1966) asserts that the emergence of national consciousness needs a collective awareness among the members of an ethnic group, emphasising the shared experiences that contribute to this awareness. Concurrently, Brubaker (1996) contends that national identity is not fixed; rather, it is inherently fluid, capable of transformation in response to evolving political, social, and economic contexts. This fluidity underscores the dynamic nature of national identity and the various factors that contribute to its continual redefinition.

The social identity theory suggests that acknowledging one's group inherently necessitates the recognition of other groups, thereby allowing individuals to form opinions about these external groups. This theory articulates that "real-world ethnocentrism is in-group bias," signifying the propensity to preferentially evaluate and behave positively towards one's group (Turner et al., 1979, p.38). This in-group favouritism does not require an actual conflict of interest between groups, which reveals its pervasive nature. As individuals discern distinctions between their group and other groups, it is essential that these differences are critically analysed. Herein lies a pivotal challenge: individuals may inadvertently attribute negative characteristics to out-group members, leading to generalisations and the formation of stereotypes.

An example of this might be the stereotype that "Hungarians are gifted and highbrow, juxtaposed against the perception that other groups are "lazy and lowbrow," thereby positioning Hungarians as superior. Such assertions represent the initial emergence of ethnocentric sentiments, as Sumner (1906) discussed. The essence of ethnocentrism lies in an exaggerated valuation of one's in-group, accompanied by a corresponding devaluation of out-groups. However, it is critical to distinguish between ethnocentrism and nationalism. Nationalism arises when ethnocentric perspectives permeate the actions of an entire community, evolving into a system-building ideology. Under such circumstances, the national political orientation and behaviour are predominantly shaped by nationalist ideals, which influence economic, foreign,

and cultural policies. Further, Hogg and Williams (2000) propose that categorising individuals into groups is a necessary process for depersonalisation, facilitating a transition to a group-level identity. This transition significantly shapes behaviours and attitudes towards both in-groups and out-groups within social contexts.

Henk Dekker proposes a model of national identity as a structured repository of knowledge composed of cognitive and affective components (Hagendoorn et al., 2000). This identity is systematically developed and organised into a coherent framework that reflects a hierarchy of interrelated elements. Similarly, György Csepeli (1997) introduces a pyramid-shaped model illustrating different levels of these components, with their organisation signifying both prevalence and intensity within a societal context. At the foundational level of national affiliation lies spontaneous emotional identification, which fosters an individual's sense of belonging to a community defined by shared national characteristics. Building upon this emotional foundation, individuals construct a range of attitudes, motivations, values, and ideologies that further shape their identities. The concept of the nation as a social group evolves into a comprehensive construct that provides individuals with a psychological framework for identification. This process begins with instinctive feelings and progressively becomes more conscious through various mechanisms, such as categorization, attribution, and the use of stereotypes. Additionally, elements of ethnocentrism and nationalism may emerge as part of this identity formation. Cognitive and affective mechanisms include a wide range of themes – from engagement with the natural environment to the reconstruction of historical narratives – and extend to encompass significant cultural, political, economic, and moral questions.

Scholarly debate emphasizes the interaction between language and culture, particularly regarding its influence on national identity. For instance, Ákos Jarjabka (2012) adopts the cultural framework, which defines culture as a collection of deeply rooted values, in which language constitutes a fundamental component of explicit culture. Within this paradigm, language serves as a foundational element for national identity, anchored in a shared history, collective values, and symbolic narratives, such as common origin myths, great heroes, and significant tragedies and accomplishments. These components collectively form the symbolic institutions and spaces that underpin national consciousness, providing an ideological link between the population and their geographical homeland (Taylor and Flint, 2000). Thus, the interrelationship between culture, identity, and geography is pivotal; culture functions as a medium that connects the nation to its spatial context, thereby acquiring indirect significance. Conversely, specific geographic elements can actively shape and inform identity, emerging as crucial constituents in its formation (Nora, 2003). So, this interaction is bidirectional.

Geert Hofstede suggests that culture can be defined as "the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others" (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9). This definition suggests the existence of both in-groups and out-groups, closely mirroring concepts found in social identity theory. Hofstede's model of national culture is structured around six dimensions, each representing a distinct aspect of cultural variance:

1. Power Distance Index: This dimension measures the extent to which members of a collective expect power to be distributed equally. It does not indicate an objective difference in actual power distribution but rather reflects cultural perceptions of power dynamics within the society.
2. Individualism versus Collectivism: This dimension assesses the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. Cultures that lean towards individualism prioritize personal autonomy and self-reliance, while collectivist cultures emphasize group cohesion, loyalty, and interdependence among members.
3. Masculinity versus Femininity: This dimension concerns the distribution of emotional roles between genders within a culture. Masculine cultures tend to value attributes such as competitiveness, assertiveness, material success, ambition, and power. Conversely, feminine cultures prioritize relationships, quality of life, and nurturing values.
4. Uncertainty Avoidance Index: This dimension reflects a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. It indicates the extent to which members of a culture seek to mitigate anxiety through structured procedures and step-by-step planning. Societies with high uncertainty avoidance often display heightened emotional responses to uncertain situations.
5. Long Term Orientation versus Short Term Normative Orientation: This dimension contrasts societies that embody a pragmatic approach oriented towards future rewards – characterized by perseverance and adaptability – with those that value traditions and norms related to the past and present, such as national pride, respect for history, and the fulfillment of social obligations.
6. Indulgence versus Restraint: This dimension captures the degree to which individuals in a culture feel free to indulge in basic and natural human desires related to enjoyment and leisure. Indulgent societies facilitate the expression of such desires, while restrained societies impose stricter social norms that limit gratification.

Despite facing criticism – such as that articulated by McSweeney (2002), who argues that the model implies a simplistic causal relationship between national culture and individual

behavior – this framework remains extensively employed in the comparative analysis of cultures and the examination of national identities. This is particularly relevant when acknowledging that culture is a fundamental component of national identity, enriching the understanding of how these identities are constructed and experienced.

Given that this thesis addresses the phenomenon of migration, it is essential to examine how migration is theorized within the framework of cultural co-existence. While cultural pluralism can be viewed as a precursor to multiculturalism, it is crucial to distinguish between these two concepts (Salins, 1997). If one were to position these concepts along a continuum ranging from assimilation, characterized by amalgamation, to non-assimilation, cultural pluralism would occupy a space that lies between the melting-pot paradigm and that of multiculturalism. As Jane Barnes Mack articulates, "cultural pluralists stress what unites a culture rather than what divides it. They stress the 'unum' over the 'plura'" (Mack, 1994, p. 67).

The interrelationship between multiculturalism and national identities is a complex and significant area of social sciences thought. A multicultural society encourages its constituents to embrace multiple ethnic or national identities, potentially fostering stable dual identities. Sociologist Károly Nagy discusses the phenomenon of dual identity, highlighting that a person's identity is inherently shaped by culture. As individuals engage with the elements of more than one culture, they cultivate a multicultural identity through both primary and secondary socialization (Nagy, 2009). Nagy differentiates between passively multicultural individuals and those who are actively multicultural. The former adapt certain aspects of foreign cultures into their lives, often drawn from classical literature, music, or popular culture. Conversely, the latter integrate the languages, values, norms, customs, ethics, lifestyles, and modes of self-expression of two or more cultures into their identities, consistently practicing these integrations in their daily lives (Nagy, 2009). Despite some comparisons of multicultural identity phenomena to schizophrenia, Nagy states that possessing a dual identity is a natural phenomenon. However, he acknowledges that the coexistence of multiple cultural identities can sometimes lead to conflict, particularly when elements from different cultures oppose or significantly diverge from one another. Such conflicts may escalate, especially in scenarios where two cultures or ethnic groups engage in political or military confrontations, as exemplified by the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, which highlighted the potential for intercultural conflicts to subsequently trigger interpersonal disputes or identity crises (Nagy, 2009).

The straight-line theory suggests that the ultimate outcome of acculturation and assimilation may result in the total loss or attenuation of an individual's ethnic or national identity (Sandberg, 1974). This phenomenon has also been characterized as a unilinear or zero-sum trajectory, based on the premise that the degree of assimilation into the host culture inversely correlates with the strength of one's national identity. Thus, as individuals integrate into the dominant culture, their ethnic identity diminishes; conversely, a strong adherence to one's original identity may impede successful integration into the host society (Isajiw, 1993). Milton Gordon (1964) conceptualized the assimilation process as comprising seven distinct dimensions. The first four dimensions – cultural or behavioral assimilation (often referred to as acculturation), structural assimilation (the attainment of access to elite social networks within the host society), marital assimilation, and identificational assimilation (the degree to which individuals identify with members of the host society) – play crucial roles in this framework. Gordon explains that behavioral assimilation does not necessarily occur prior to structural assimilation; rather, he believes that structural assimilation serves as a foundational requirement for all other forms of assimilation. Once structural assimilation is achieved, individuals are positioned to be absorbed into the broader host society, facilitating their integration process.

One of the early critics of the straight-line assimilation theory was Marcus Lee Hansen. In his analysis of third-generation immigrants, Hansen challenged the notion of linear acculturation by claiming that "what the son wishes to forget, the grandson wishes to remember" (Hansen, 1938, p. 9). He illustrated this argument by examining various immigrant groups, including the Scotch-Irish, Germans, and Scandinavians, highlighting the phenomenon where third-generation individuals exhibited a resurgence of interest in the ethnic identities and cultural heritage of their grandparents. This phenomenon has been termed the "law of the third generation return" (Bakalian, 1993, p. 42), reflecting a complex dynamic of cultural revival and patriotism among descendants of immigrants.

In contrast to Hansen's perspectives, Herbert J. Gans (1979) argues that there has not been a genuine revival of ethnic identity among immigrant populations. According to Gans' approach, acculturation and assimilation are not only transient phases that cease with the arrival of the third generation. He suggests that the transformations observed in the third and fourth generations do not inherently challenge the straight-line assimilation theory, as he interprets this renewed interest in ethnic heritage as a form of symbolic ethnicity. So, this phenomenon may manifest within the immigrant generation itself and can persist across subsequent generations. Richard Alba (1990) elaborates on the concept of symbolic ethnicity by framing it as akin to a hobby or leisure activity. This form of ethnicity does not necessitate a profound

commitment to one's ethnic group or an extensive understanding of ancestral cultural practices. For example, participation in a Saint Patrick's Day parade can serve as an illustration of symbolic ethnicity for Irish Americans, showcasing how ethnic identity can be expressed in a selective and often superficial manner.

Beginning in the 1990s, a number of scholars began to critically re-evaluate the zero-sum assimilation model, theorising that the retention of ethnic or national identity can coexist with the process of assimilation (Aghanian, 2007; Bakalian, 1993; Jendian, 2008). Anny Bakalian's (1993) research shows that assimilation may progress without significantly diminishing individuals' ethnic identities, sense of peoplehood, or familism, at least for a limited period. Similarly, Isajiw (2003) and Jendian (2008) arrive at comparable conclusions regarding the complex relationship between assimilation and ethnic identity. Thus, Isajiw (2003) conceptualizes assimilation as a form of integration into mainstream society, stating that the maintenance of one's ethnic identity does not inherently obstruct social mobility. Through his research involving four distinct immigrant groups – Germans, Italians, Jews, and Ukrainians – in Canada, he discovered that individuals across different generational cohorts actively engage in selecting cultural elements from both their immigrant heritage and the prevailing mainstream culture. Furthermore, Isajiw (2003) illustrates that second and third-generation individuals often construct their identities by weaving together aspects of both cultures. Jendian (2008) similarly addresses this phenomenon, referring to it as the bi-cultural model of assimilation. He conceptualizes the two cultures as coexisting harmoniously across various dimensions. Jendian critiques the traditional dichotomy of assimilation versus ethnicity, characterizing it as a misleading "either-or" fallacy (Jendian, 2008, p. 37). This perspective underscores the complexity of identity formation in the context of multi-ethnic societies, suggesting that assimilation and ethnic identity retention are not mutually exclusive, but rather, can be viewed as interdependent processes.

A further framework for examining national and ethnic identity within the context of migration is articulated through the concept of long-distance nationalism, as proposed by Anderson (1992). This approach highlights the active engagement of certain immigrant communities in the political affairs of their countries of origin without necessitating their physical presence there. Anderson notably illustrates this phenomenon in relation to the Khalistan movement, which sought independence for a region in India and was primarily mobilized by diaspora nationals who communicated via electronic means, thereby circumventing the potential risks associated with activism in their homeland. Nina Glick Schiller expands on this notion, claimimg that the spectrum of activities undertaken by long-

distance nationalists – ranging from voting, demonstrating, and lobbying to financial contributions, artistic expressions, and even more extreme actions such as violence – are inherently directed toward an imagined geographic territory representative of their ancestral homeland. These individuals, often coalescing into an exile community, endeavor to exert substantial influence over the political landscape of their homeland. Glick Schiller (2005) delineates four primary modalities through which long-distance nationalism manifests:

- Supporting anti-colonial struggles, exemplified by Mahatma Gandhi's activism from South Africa;
- Advocating for separatism, as seen in the efforts of nationals residing abroad who were committed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia;
- Attempting to instigate regime change, as illustrated by the actions of Cubans in exile who sought to overthrow the Castro government;
- Engaging in homeland politics from abroad, which includes financially backing certain political factions or lobbying efforts on behalf of the homeland.

This framework shows the ways in which diasporic populations maintain ties to their countries of origin and participate in shaping their political trajectories despite geographical dislocation.

5.2 Hungarian National Identity: Inside the Country

The historical progression of national concepts in Hungary illustrates both between ethno-cultural and political dimensions of national identity (Gyurgyák, 2007). During the medieval era, the term *natio Hungarica* primarily described the Hungarian nobility, encompassing not only ethnic Hungarians but also various other nationalities. This framework underscored the primacy of political allegiance over ethnic affiliation, reflecting a broader understanding of community (Egedy, 2016; Halász, 2009). This political conception remained salient during Hungary's integration into the Habsburg Monarchy, a period characterized by reliance on Vienna for the maintenance of law and order. As the Hungarian elite increasingly aspired to autonomy from Habsburg hegemony, they adopted liberalism as their guiding philosophical framework. The ethno-cultural notion of the nation gained prominence following the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty, which resulted in significant territorial losses and left a considerable portion of the Hungarian population as minorities beyond national borders (Halász, 2009). In the wake of these geopolitical changes, Hungary pivoted towards an ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood, wherein shared cultural heritage and common identity

became the primary determinants of national membership. The dynamics of national identity were further complicated in the context of the Second World War, during which certain territories previously part of Hungary within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were temporarily reinstated. This brief restoration highlighted the tensions between historical claims, national identity, and territorial integrity, thus enriching the debate on the evolving nature of Hungarian nationality in both historical and contemporary contexts.

Following the conclusion of the Second World War, Hungary found itself behind the Iron Curtain, ultimately falling under the dominance of the Soviet Union. A significant aspect of Hungary's resistance to Soviet influence was the preservation of a distinct Hungarian identity. This theme was particularly evident during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, a popular uprising against the communist government. John Matthews, a correspondent for Radio Free Europe who was in Budapest during the tumultuous period of the revolution, noted that the uprising was largely fueled by an energetic cohort of youth who had grown up under a repressive regime. Within the educational system, these young people were exposed predominantly to narratives that emphasised the superiority of the Soviet Union while receiving scant information about their national history. Matthews observed that these revolutionary participants took immense pride in their identity as "Hungarians," actively encouraging their peers to join the movement by suggesting that the ruling communist authorities were not "true Hungarians." Furthermore, the symbolism of the revolution was underlined by the fighters' use of flags that bore deliberate alterations, specifically featuring holes cut from the area where the crest of Saint Stephen – an emblem of considerable cultural significance that had previously adorned Hungary's national flag – once resided. While multiple factors influenced the revolution, the sentiment of national identity and the conviction that this identity was worthy of defence played a pivotal role in mobilising the population during this period of profound socio-political upheaval.

This 1956 movement can be analysed through the lens of the theory of uneven development, especially as formulated by Nairn. So, once Hungary became part of the Soviet Bloc, it took a somewhat peripheral role, as the centre was in the Russian Soviet Republic. Furthermore, the Soviet Union sought to enforce its dominant culture and identity on the countries of the Soviet Bloc. This led to a situation when local elites and intellectuals started to leverage local cultural identity to mobilise the population to revolt against the centre. Even though the revolt was put down, it left its mark in the formation of the Hungarian national identity during the period when the country was Soviet.

So, the contemporary Hungarian controversy surrounding the definition of the nation has deep historical roots. This ongoing debate remains pivotal in shaping the conflicts among various Hungarian political camps. The attitudes of Hungarian intellectuals towards their ethnic compatriots were significantly influenced by the Communist period, particularly under the Kádár regime (1956–1988), which promulgated an "antinational" or "anti-ethnicist" stance. This regime condemned symbolic politics and nationalistic rhetoric. In the late 1980s, coinciding with the parliamentary elections of 1990, the question of national belonging resurfaced. By the early 1990s, diverse interpretations regarding the concept of the nation began to emerge, leading to a contest over its legitimate definition. The conservatives adopted a "national" perspective, considering ethnicity as the most essential part of the nation. Thus, according to them, ethnic kin residing beyond Hungary's borders are integral to the national identity. These conservatives articulated a pressing need for the kin-state to actively support its ethnic kin against the assimilative pressures imposed by majority cultures. Their advocacy included the promotion of collective rights for minorities, which entailed a form of autonomy, and a push for the unification of Hungarians through integration within the European Union (Bárdi, 2013).

The phenomenon of an "anti-national" attitude persists among the Hungarian left-liberal political elite in the post-Communist era. Within this political camp, individual rights and the right to association are believed to be sufficient for minorities to articulate their interests effectively. The dichotomy between national and anti-national approaches proves to be mutually exclusive, resulting in a significant communication barrier between the two political camps. This dynamic engenders a substantial "deficit in political identity," particularly when considered in the context of the Kádár regime's policies (Bárdi, 2013). The juxtaposition of these contrasting "anti-national" and "national" attitudes has not only prevailed but has also actively influenced the kin-state policies of various Hungarian governments since the democratic transition. The parallel existence of these frameworks fosters a sense of cohesion within their respective political groups, thereby shaping the broader political landscape in Hungary (Bárdi, 2013).

This political debate reflects the scientific one around the issues of nationalism and national identity, as discussed in the previous section of the current chapter. Hence, the "anti-national" stance can be considered through the approach of Gidden that underlines the state's role as administration and the nation is mainly defined as a collection of people living on the same territory. Simultaneously, primordialism can be applied to analyse "national" ideas that highlight the importance of ethnic kin and ties.

In his analysis of the subject, historian Gábor Egry articulates the central controversy regarding membership in the Hungarian community with the critical questions: "Who, how, and why are individuals members of this community?" Egry argues that the citizens residing in Hungary constitute a "republic," which he suggests has evolved historically. Shared concerns and collective decision-making processes predominantly delineate the "borders" of this republic. Thus, theoretically, this "republic" differentiates between individuals who inhabit the state's territory and possess the rights to participate in the governance of communal affairs and those who reside outside its borders and are excluded from such rights (Egry, 2010).

After undergoing numerous geographical and political transformations throughout the 20th century, Hungary has emerged as one of the most ethnically homogeneous nations in Europe, with over 95% of its population identifying as ethnic Hungarians. This demographic composition is considered by some scholars to contribute to the prevalent attitudes among Hungarian adults toward minority groups and "outgroups" within the country, such as immigrants, Jews, and the Roma population (Vukovich et al., 2012). So, as social identity argues, positive in-group evaluations in combination with negative out-group perceptions can lead to the development of nationalism. Thus, large-scale survey data indicate that levels of prejudice in Hungary rank among the highest in Europe, particularly within older demographic segments, of lower socioeconomic status, and possessing less formal education (Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011). Earlier research conducted by Csepeli and the co-authors (2004) suggests that national identity and a sense of pride among Hungarian adults surpass those observed in Western European countries, a phenomenon closely tied to prevalent ethnocentrism and xenophobia within the nation. Furthermore, sociological investigations indicate that nationalism constitutes a significant psychological and political force within Hungarian society (Örkény, 2006).

Several empirical studies have sought to understand the evolution of national identity in Hungary following its exit from the Soviet Bloc. For example, Örkény's (2006) study starts from a hypothesis that one of the most significant indicators of national identity is the degree of attraction individuals demonstrate towards their immediate micro- and macro-environments. His analysis draws upon survey data collected in 1995 and 2003. The survey depicts potential physical environments within the sociocultural landscape as concentric circles in the questionnaire. The innermost circle represents the respondent's place of residence, followed by the subregion (county), the nation-state encompassing all Hungarian citizens, and finally, the continent, serving as a broader political, cultural, and historical reference point. Theoretically, it can be suggested that local and macro-level identities manifest in distinct ways within

everyday sentiments. The micro-environment – which encompasses one's residence and its immediate surroundings, whether a city or a village – fosters personal identification. In contrast, the macro-environment, which includes the nation and the larger region, plays a crucial role in either facilitating or impeding the development of a collective identity. Furthermore, from the study, it can be inferred that broader mechanisms of identification or detachment significantly influence the cognitive and emotional relationships individuals maintain with their sociocultural spaces.

The research findings indicate that a substantial majority of Hungarian respondents expressed a sense of national closeness in both 1995 and 2003, with only a marginal 4% exhibiting any negative emotions toward their country. The degree of national identification is particularly pronounced: nearly 80% of respondents in 1995 and 75% in 2003 reported feeling close to their homeland. Notably, this strong national identification suggests an accompanying connection to both local and global contexts; individuals who express a strong affinity for their nation tend to be more attracted to Europe and feel a greater sense of belonging within their immediate environments.

Overall, the responses from Hungarian participants reveal a pervasive sentiment of national closeness, with 50% indicating positive identification across various dimensions, a trend that remained relatively stable from 1995 to 2003. Furthermore, almost half of the respondents in the mid-1990s expressed an unwillingness to relocate, whether at the local or macro level, with 85% dismissing the idea of emigrating for better opportunities. This positions Hungary at the forefront globally regarding a reluctance to settle abroad under any circumstances. However, by 2003, a shift occurred in migration potential, as the proportion of immobile individuals decreased to one-third, while those expressing openness to the world rose up to 20%.

Consequently, Örkény's findings suggest that Hungarian public opinion is deeply infused with a robust sense of spontaneous national identity. This is reflected not only in the pronounced feelings of closeness to the country but also in the low propensity for migration. A significant negative correlation exists between spontaneous national identity and the likelihood of migrating beyond national borders. This indicates that individuals who feel a strong connection to their homeland are also less inclined to consider living elsewhere.

The delineation of national identity extends beyond physical parameters to include the definition of group boundaries based on national identification. This process serves as both a formal (political and legal) mechanism for determining national affiliation and a symbolic affirmation of the nation as a community, functioning as a vital psychological resource for

national identity. Örkény (2006) delineates seven criteria for being Hungarian, which encompass both cultural and political dimensions. Culturally, criteria include proficiency in the national language, self-identification as a member of the nation, and adherence to its dominant religion. Politically, the criteria encompass citizenship, birthplace, residency, and respect for national laws. The analysis of survey data reveals that cultural identification – comprising shared language, culture, and history – prevails over political criteria within Hungarian society.

National pride emerges as a significant psychological source of national identification, providing substantive content to the emotional attachment individuals feel towards their country and rationalising this attachment through strong emotional affirmation. Örkény's research indicates a temporal evolution in Hungarian national pride. In 1995, participants considered European values associated with modernisation – such as economic performance, democratisation, establishing an effective welfare system, and enforcing human rights – as having limited relevance to national pride. Conversely, respondents expressed considerable pride in national symbols, particularly Hungarian arts and history. By 2003, a shift occurred as European values gained more popularity among the survey participants, yet there was no corresponding decline in the significance of Hungarian symbols in fostering national pride.

As previously discussed, the concepts of closeness and ethnocentrism are interrelated, potentially acting as a ground for nationalism. A pronounced sense of closeness to one's nation may coexist with a strong national identity – whether grounded in political or symbolic terms – which is often characterised by ethnocentrism and could ultimately culminate in a nationalist form of national consciousness. This attachment may coincide with a high degree of physical rootedness, reflecting a reluctance to migrate, reinforcing ethnocentric sentiments and paving the way towards nationalism.

According to Örkény's research, Hungarian national identity is further characterised by relatively negative attitudes toward out-groups. This phenomenon can be attributed to the prevalent political ideology of nationalism, which often incorporates antipathy towards foreigners and immigrants. This intolerance increased over the period passed between the surveys. It is paradoxical that, despite this rising hostility towards external groups, there appears to be a trend toward greater tolerance for the country's ethnic minorities. Nationalism seems to favour a form of coexistence that prioritises inclusivity over complete assimilation into the dominant national identity.

So, during the survey, participants were asked about their perceptions of minorities within Hungary, particularly regarding whether they preferred these groups to assimilate or to preserve their cultural diversity. The results reveal a correlation between attitudes toward

immigrants and sentiments regarding internal minorities. While xenophobic views toward immigrants have diminished over time, there has been a notable increase in adverse attitudes toward internal minorities, especially the Roma community. This could be explained by the fact that ethnocentrism plays a significant role in constructing nationalist sentiment. Despite the observed decline in aversion toward external immigrants, ethnocentric tendencies appear to be on the rise, fuelled by a belief in cultural superiority that promotes assimilation efforts concerning internal minorities while fostering aversion to newcomers.

From Örkény's (2006) analysis, it follows that a Hungarian respondent with a rightist political orientation is more likely to embrace nationalist ideologies, which can exacerbate xenophobia and promote ethnocentrism. While it would be inaccurate to suggest that rightist politics are solely responsible for fostering xenophobic sentiment, they do play a role in indirectly reinforcing intolerance towards diversity and external groups through a political and economic nationalism stance. Nonetheless, various indicators suggest that Hungarian society is gradually progressing towards a more tolerant stance than a radical nationalist outlook.

These nationalistic sentiments can be attributed to the political environment of the country during the period. The political climate during the 1998–2002 governmental term illustrates how right-leaning political forces sought to bolster the sense of community and their popularity by invoking nationalist concepts and constructing traditional values. This was evidenced by actions such as the relocation of the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen from the National Museum to the House of Parliament – a decision viewed by many as controversial – and the enactment of the Status Law, which provided special support for ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries. This created diplomatic tensions in the international sphere.

Another attempt to comprehend Hungary's national identity was undertaken in 2004 when the country was included in the GLOBE study, which utilised Hofstede's six dimensions of culture. The findings revealed that Hungary's Power Distance Index falls below the median level, suggesting a cultural inclination towards independence, limited hierarchical structures for convenience, and enhanced accessibility of superiors, accompanied by direct and participative communication styles (Holicza, 2016). Additionally, Hungary demonstrates an individualistic cultural orientation, characterised by loosely-knit social frameworks where individuals primarily focus on their welfare and that of their immediate families. In terms of gender roles, Hungary is classified as a masculine society, wherein work is often prioritised over personal life. Leadership is expected to be assertive and decisive, emphasising competition, performance, and resolving conflicts through direct confrontation.

According to Holicza's study, Hungary exhibits a pronounced preference for avoiding uncertainty, reflecting a cultural inclination where security serves as a critical element in individual motivation. The nation's high score in uncertainty avoidance indicates a reliance on rigid codes of belief and behaviour. In such cultures, there exists a palpable emotional need for established rules, fostering an intrinsic drive among individuals to be industrious, while precision and punctuality are generally upheld as normative values. Regarding temporal orientation, Hungarian culture demonstrates a pragmatic approach. In societies characterised by this dimension, individuals tend to believe that truth is contingent upon situational context and temporal variables. This perspective allows for a notable adaptability of traditions in response to changing conditions, alongside a pronounced propensity for saving and investing, underpinned by a sense of thriftiness and a commitment to perseverance in achieving tangible results. Furthermore, the GLOBE survey shows that Hungary has a low score of 31 on the indulgence-restraint scale, signifying a tendency towards cynicism and pessimism. In contrast to indulgent societies, restrained cultures like Hungary place limited emphasis on leisure time and exercise control over the gratification of desires. Individuals within this framework often perceive their actions as constrained by social norms, leading to a belief that self-indulgence is somewhat morally objectionable.

Summing up the aforementioned national and international data sources, it is evident that Hungarian culture encompasses slightly collectivist traits, although the younger generation displays a more individualistic orientation. Additionally, it embodies masculine values alongside a robust tendency for uncertainty avoidance. There is a distinct demarcation between "insiders" and "outsiders" within this cultural context.

To understand the current trend in Hungarian national identity construction, it is possible to refer to the political discourses around it since it has been shown that the political environment affects individual perceptions. Thus, the discourse surrounding immigration in Hungary, particularly since 2015, has underscored the importance of an official national identity as constructed by the political elites. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been vocal in opposing the influx of migrants, framing immigration as a fundamental threat to Hungary's national identity. For instance, on October 2, 2016, Hungary conducted a referendum in response to the European Union's proposal to resettle 160000 asylum seekers across Europe, of which 1294 were designated for resettlement within Hungary. The referendum posed a straightforward question: "Should the European Parliament be permitted to exercise its authority over the Hungarian government without the consent of the Hungarian government?" Orbán characterised the referendum as a matter of sovereignty; however, the rhetorical and

cultural undercurrents that accompanied the vote suggested a more profound significance. Leading up to the referendum, Orbán referred to refugees as "poison" to Hungarian society, a sentiment that has resonated widely within mainstream Hungarian discourse. Many citizens cited preserving their "national character" as their primary motivation for voting "No" in the referendum.

Additionally, Orbán has presented a vision of an "illiberal democracy" for Hungary. In a notable 2014 address, he articulated that "[The] Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organised, strengthened, and developed. In this sense, the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not deny the foundational values of liberalism, such as freedom; however, it does not prioritise this ideology as the central element of state organisation. Instead, it applies a specific, national approach in its stead." So, the current political elite seeks to construct a distinct identity for Hungarians that would distinguish them from other ethnic (for example, ethnic minorities in the country) and political (e.g., the EU) groups.

5.3 Hungarian National Identity: Outside the Country

The national identity debate in Hungary is characterised by a complex interaction of migration cycles and territorial changes, particularly following the Treaty of Trianon. This interplay resulted in the fragmentation of the Hungarian nation, leading to distinct majority-minority dynamics within Hungary and the various states where Hungarians reside as a minority. Consequently, the complex nature of Hungarian identity – both within national borders and in diaspora – is linked to historical processes. For instance, during the 19th century, the Hungarian population lived under the domination of a German-speaking elite, which cultivated a leading class of a different ethnicity than that of the majority. The aftermath of the First World War exacerbated this situation, as a substantial portion of Hungarians became national minorities, bearing a state-forming majority national consciousness that remained confined beyond the borders of their homeland, a condition further reinforced by the territorial adjustments following the Second World War. After the Second World War, Hungary became part of the Soviet Bloc, cultivating a specific identity trying to break with the past. In 1989, Hungary formed as a state in its current borders.

The study of Hungarian migration reveals several distinct periods, as Gazsó (2016) outlined. The initial migration wave occurred before 1849, characterised by individuals departing primarily for adventure and opportunities for wealth accumulation. The second wave, spanning from 1849 to the Compromise of 1867, was marked by political instability, prompting

many to flee due to fears of persecution. The third period, which lasted until the end of the First World War, saw migration driven by economic hardship, starting mainly with dispossessed peasants and subsequently including those seeking economic advancement, particularly in North America (Kuncz, 1997; Gazsó, 2016). Post-World War I, the fourth migration period extended until the conclusion of World War II, including continued economic-driven migration and the relocation of individuals from annexed regions seeking new opportunities in the West or Australia. The 1930s political oppression further catalysed migration, with many Hungarians resettling primarily in North America, the United Kingdom, and Australia (Kuncz, 1997; Gazsó, 2016). The fifth period, beginning after World War II and continuing until the 1956 Revolution, was characterised by those fleeing potential wartime retribution, alongside a significant Jewish migration to Israel following its establishment in 1948. This migration was influenced by the shifting political landscape in Hungary post-war, which encouraged further emigration towards Western nations. The sixth migration wave commenced after the 1956 Revolution, marked by political refugees seeking improved living conditions, lasting until 1989. The seventh phase, beginning with the regime change in 1989 and persisting to the present day, exhibits migration trends reminiscent of earlier periods, significantly driven by the pursuit of better economic opportunities (Kuncz, 1997; Gazsó, 2016).

Given the historical context of these migration periods and the shifting geographical borders, it is germane for this thesis to examine the identity of Hungarians living in concentrated communities, sporadically and in diaspora. The experience of cultural existence in a minority context is characterised by duality as individuals navigate the competing influences of two intertwined cultural spheres. The transborder Hungarian culture constitutes an essential component of the broader Hungarian national identity; concurrently, it functions as a coexisting culture that perpetually interacts with local cultures (Pogonyi, 2017). This dual existence often manifests through the phenomena of dual citizenship, diverse cultural interactions, multiple identities, divided loyalties, and community life organised through complex network structures, thereby enhancing the relevance of stable organisations, particularly churches and religious institutions (Keményfi, 2011).

Sociolinguist Annamária Ulla Szabó-Törpényi conducted research examining the identity of French-Hungarian bilinguals residing in Paris. Her findings suggest that her second-generation interview subjects, born in France, experience a singular but complex identity rather than a dual identity (Szabó-Törpényi, 2012). The author finds that the interview subjects underwent their secondary socialisation primarily within the French educational system, while their Hungarian cultural influences largely stemmed from their family environment,

characterised by the observance of Hungarian festivities and the use of Hungarian in domestic settings, rather than a direct cultural transmission from Hungary.

Additionally, in her study, Szabó-Törpényi (2012) categorises the names chosen by her interview subjects for their children into three distinct groups:

1. Hungarian names (or names perceived as Hungarian)
2. French names
3. Neutral (international) names

The author illustrates the historical variations contingent upon the birth periods of the subject's children. The second generation is categorised into two subgroups: individuals born between 1970 and 1995 and those born from 1995 to 2010. In the 1970s and 1980s, political migrants prominently favoured traditional French names for their children, such as Cédric and Claire-Anne, reflecting a strong desire to assimilate into French society. Conversely, following the end of communism and particularly after the turn of the millennium, there has been a marked increase in the popularity of neutral names among Hungarians residing in France. These neutral names bear similarities in both French and Hungarian, exemplified by names such as Sara/Sára, Liza, Victor/Viktor, and Daniel/Dániel. This shift in naming conventions signifies parents' intentions to instil a dual cultural identity in their offspring. Other prevalent practices during this period included the adoption of the French variants of international names used outside the home while retaining their Hungarian counterparts within the household, such as Alexandre (Sándor), Christian (Krisztián), and Sophie (Zsófia). Notably, the author also identifies cases where families exhibited anti-assimilationist tendencies by giving children distinctive and often untranslatable Hungarian names, such as Jenő (Eugene) and Attila.

In addition, the author examines the interplay between the observance of Hungarian feast days and national holidays. The study reveals that despite the participants belonging to the second generation receiving their formal education in France without any formal instruction in the Hungarian language, their adherence to Hungarian traditions and use of the language at home facilitated the integration of both French and Hungarian cultural elements into their identities. The Hungarian celebrations attended by the informants primarily included national holidays such as March 15 and October 23 (observed in France during the academic year) and August 20 (celebrated in Hungary during vacation periods). Moreover, family gatherings referred to as Hungarian feasts included the feast of St. Nicholas (Mikulás) and name days, which are not customary among the French and yet have been maintained by the interviewed families.

The author also explores how Hungarians residing in Paris and the Île-de-France region commemorate major international holidays, such as Christmas and Easter. Notably, the findings indicate that the majority of respondents celebrated Christmas according to Hungarian traditions, specifically exchanging gifts on Christmas Eve (December 24) instead of the French practice of December 25. Furthermore, many informants prepared traditional Hungarian desserts for Christmas, including beigli, which at times substituted the French bûche de Noël. A similar pattern emerged concerning Easter observances. Participants who opted to adopt French traditions and abandon Hungarian customs expressed concerns regarding potential "disadvantages" and discrimination their children might face in educational settings.

Zoltán Fejős's research on first and second-generation Hungarian immigrants in Chicago deals with the significance of ethnic and cultural symbols. Fejős believes that the process of transforming cultural phenomena into symbols requires time, as evidenced by the case of Chicago Hungarians who have strategically selected symbols to represent their identity (Fejős, 1993). Certain symbols, such as the bridal dress traditionally worn in Kalotaszeg, have been removed from their original contexts, morphing from representations of local identity to becoming national or ethnic symbols for Hungarians in the United States. The study also highlights that the fragmented understanding of Hungarian history and culture among second-generation Hungarian Americans contributed to the consolidation of ethnic symbols. These symbols, often drawn from Hungary's historical narratives, prominent figures, folklore, or even pseudo-folklore, as well as the contributions of Hungarians to American culture, have been subject to processes of typification and simplification in the American context.

For the second generation of immigrants, the evolution of cultural identity was not grounded in direct empirical life experiences as observed in the first generation. Instead, it involved the formulation of a new, mythical cultural tradition constructed from a specific set of symbols (Fejős, 1993). According to Fejős, the ethnic movement that emerged in the mid-1930s, subsequently interrupted by the onset of World War II, cannot be solely interpreted as an anti-assimilationist response. Rather, it must be contextualized within the broader assimilation process. As immigrants attained relative financial stability, they began to embrace their ethnic heritage without shame, expressing pride through, for example, participation in multicultural festivals.

Fejős further explores the relationship between cultural pluralism and the sociopolitical and economic conditions of the host society. During the unstable period of World War I, for example, Hungarian immigrants were significantly restricted in their ability to openly express a dual allegiance to both their native and adopted homelands. They were largely expected to

demonstrate loyalty solely to their new country (Fejős, 1993). The latter half of the 1930s, however, marked a period of ethnic renaissance in the United States, characterized by a brief revival that coincided with the economic recovery following the Great Depression in 1934-1935, only to be curtailed by the beginning of the Second World War. Notably, ethnic festivals flourished during this time, with nearly every Hungarian American community hosting its own event (Fejős, 1993).

Anita Máté highlights a significant generational shift among Hungarian-American youth between the 1920s and 1930s regarding their attitudes toward their heritage. By the latter decade, the third generation became sufficiently integrated into American society that feelings of shame regarding their ethnic origins diminished. This change was also reflective of a broader transformation in the sociopolitical climate of the United States, discussed in the previous paragraph. This shift can be attributed, in part, to the increased visibility of ethnic cultures through organized festivals and the popularization of radio, which facilitated the integration of immigrant cultural elements into the American mainstream (Fejős, 1993; Máté, 2011).

Éva Huseby-Darvas applies Benedict Anderson's concept of long-distance nationalism in her exploration of Hungarian return migrants who repatriated following the collapse of communism. She underscores that many Hungarian émigrés had had intentions to return should a regime change occur. However, when such a change happened in 1989, many of these individuals found that they could not return home and believed their contributions would be more beneficial from abroad (Huseby-Darvas, 2012). A notable challenge for these returnees was the skepticism from native Hungarians regarding the value of the knowledge acquired by those who had lived in the West, which they hoped to share to improve the conditions in their home country. Huseby-Darvas' research reveals that some Hungarians abroad perceived their inability to return permanently as rooted in the unique insights they possess, which are often absent among those residing in the homeland. This phenomenon can be viewed as a kind of "virtual homecoming," wherein the act of remaining abroad serves as an ideological platform from which they can engage with and influence contemporary political developments in Hungary (Huseby-Darvas, 2012).

The work of Anna Borbély represents the first longitudinal study of language shift within a bilingual community in Hungary. As a sociolinguist, Borbély conducted multiple return visits to her hometown of Kétegyháza to examine the transition from Romanian to Hungarian. Her field research spanned three decades, with studies conducted in 1990 (T1), 2000/2001 (T2), and 2010/2011 (T3). Employing a panel research methodology, she aimed to re-interview the same cohort of respondents from T1 during each successive fieldwork period.

Borbély's findings indicated that the observed language shift was more accurately characterized as an "oscillatory movement" rather than a linear or gradual transition. In over 50% of the language use contexts analyzed, the use of Romanian increased, contrary to expectations regarding the majority language, due to various sociocultural dynamics within the community (Borbély, 2014). She acknowledged, however, that this trend was context-specific while concurrently recognizing a generationally-driven gradual language shift.

Csilla Bartha (2002) critically examined various models of Hungarian language use among immigrants, particularly focusing on the intergenerational communication between first and second-generation Hungarian emigrants in the United States. Her findings discern three predominant models:

1. The Authoritative Model: Families adhere to the exclusive use of Hungarian in all contexts, often reinforcing this expectation through constant reminders to children and other community members. This approach is particularly prevalent among families from deported populations, who apply a purist ideology regarding the use of the Hungarian language. The norms surrounding language within the Hungarian community further support this model, thus affording these families a relatively high social prestige.
2. The Interactional Model: This model is often enacted unconsciously by the speakers, who fluidly alternate between Hungarian and English based on conversational context, the topic at hand, and the interlocutor's language preference. Parents employing this model typically communicate with their children in both languages, often adapting to the children's language choices. Bartha notes that this strategy is more frequently observed among families stemming from the 1956 wave of migration, characterized by parents who possess high proficiency in both Hungarian and English, frequently minimizing their accent in English.
3. The Integrative Model: This strategy is rooted in the misconception that bilingualism can hinder a child's integration into society. Parents belonging to this model often believe that proficiency in two languages may adversely affect their child's cognitive development and impede their English language acquisition, thereby restricting their social mobility. This approach is prevalent among parents with a strong Hungarian accent in English and within ethnically mixed families.

Furthermore, Bartha (2002) demonstrates that the concept of Hungarian identity varies significantly across different Hungarian-American communities. For instance, in Detroit, she discovered that proficiency in Hungarian is not deemed a prerequisite for identifying as Hungarian. Conversely, in New Brunswick, a knowledge of the Hungarian language serves as

a crucial marker of ethnic identity; members of the second generation actively seek to enhance their vocabulary while avoiding discussions on topics they cannot address without resorting to English. The prevailing purist ideology within New Brunswick's community – illustrated by the stigmatization of incorrect Hungarian language use – contributes to a notably slower process of language shift compared to other Hungarian-American communities established by the "Old Hungarians," who emigrated around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While the latter communities often experience a shift within three generations, this process in New Brunswick unfolds at a markedly more gradual pace (Bartha, 2002).

Additional studies highlight variations in language preservation strategies among diasporas in different nations. Generally, education serves as one of the ways to construct and sustain national identities, as argued by constructists and, especially, Hobsbawm. Thus, in Australia, the Hungarian diaspora numbers between 67000 and 68000 individuals, predominantly residing in Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide (Gazsó, 2016). The migration influx to Australia began later than that to the USA, peaking in the mid-1950s (Kuncz, 1997). Following World War II, Hungarian refugees established opportunities for educating their children in their mother tongue, exemplified by the founding of the Hungarian Community School in Adelaide in 1958. This institution aimed to maintain Hungarian cultural identity by teaching Hungarian culture, folk dance, and language to the children of 1956 refugee families (Palotai et al., 2019).

In North America, particularly within the Hungarian diaspora in Cleveland, a notable approach to the preservation of Hungarian identity has emerged. The establishment of the first Hungarian school in Cleveland in 1893, operated by the Szent Erzsébet (Saint Elizabeth) Hungarian Catholic Church – founded in 1892 – marked a significant step in this endeavor. Initially, the school consisted of a single class taught by one teacher. However, by 1900, the institution had expanded to educate over 350 students primarily in English, with Hungarian language and Bible classes taught by the parish priest, supported by two nuns from the Orsolya Order (Fejős, 1993). The education efforts among the local Hungarian community continued to grow with the opening of the Szent Imre (Saint Emeric) Catholic Church in 1905 in the western part of the city, which contributed to the instruction of around 150 students in Hungarian language, history, and geography. This instruction was provided by both the parish priest and nuns sent from Hungary (Palotai et al., 2019). Furthermore, the establishment of a Calvinistic church in 1894 on the East side added to the educational landscape. By 1919, educational initiatives for Hungarian language and Bible studies, primarily offered on Saturdays and during summer holidays, attracted the participation of approximately 600 students. Several other

congregations, including Greek Catholic, Hungarian Evangelical, and Jewish communities, also contributed to the provision of Hungarian language education (Palotai et al., 2019). Hungarian immigrants expressed the need for schools that equaled state institutions while remaining independent of religious affiliations; so, a pragmatic solution was devised. Weekend and holiday educational programs were organized by diaspora members with support from various churches (Fejős, 1991; Palotai et al., 2019).

In a different context, the Hungarian Alliance of South Africa, established in 1957, has aimed to preserve and propagate the Hungarian identity by emphasizing the learning of Hungarian language, literature, and culture. The organization conducts reading events focused on Hungarian folk tales for children and classic and modern literature for older generations, alongside various celebrations of Hungarian holidays and culinary traditions (Palotai et al., 2019).

The discussion of Hungarian identity in regions beyond the homeland is incomplete without addressing the issue of Hungarians residing in neighboring countries. Many states within Central and Eastern Europe are relatively new nation-states in search of the definition of their national identities and their relationship with ethnic minorities. With the exception of Romania, these states, which host Hungarian minorities, emerged as newly independent nations. The respective majority populations in these states often view themselves as the legitimate bearers of national identity and engage in nationalistic practices aimed at the assimilation of minorities. For instance, ethnic Hungarians constitute the largest national minority in Slovakia, making up 8.5% of the population as of 2011. The prevailing narrative among majority groups often frames their cultural, economic, and demographic challenges as justifications for resisting minority influence (Brubaker et al., 2011).

The concept of nationhood holds unique significance for ethnic Hungarians residing in neighboring countries, as they navigate their identity as members of both the ethno-cultural Hungarian nation and the political entities of their home states. The Treaty of Trianon in 1920 resulted in the displacement of over three million ethnic Hungarians, who transitioned from citizens of the Hungarian kingdom to minorities in newly established states. Consequently, these individuals formed “coerced communities,” facing immense pressures to assimilate into dominant cultures that sought to impose their identities upon national minorities. This historical context profoundly influenced the identity formation and national aspirations of these communities. Hungarian minorities often exhibit limited loyalty to the countries they inhabit; their histories are characterized by a persistent struggle to retain their ethnic identities (Bárdi et

al., 2011). Despite their separation from the kin-state, ethnic Hungarians have continued to maintain their linguistic and cultural practices, preserving a robust sense of national identity.

The work of Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox and Grancea critically examines the dynamics between the ethnic majority and minority communities in Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár) in Romania. The authors find that, in everyday interactions, Hungarians and Romanians coexist amicably; however, it is the ethnic entrepreneurs within the political elite who exacerbate tensions between these groups. The text delineates the majority nation as the "mainstream," or unmarked category, which aligns with normative societal expectations, while the minority is framed as the marked category, diverging from this mainstream narrative. As articulated by the authors, "The normative cultural homogeneity that everywhere accompanies the rise of the nation state marks as minorities those that do not share the dominant culture; at the same time, it 'unmarks' and de-ethnicizes the dominant culture" (Brubaker et al., 2008, p. 19). Within this framework, the majority is deemed "mainstream," as it is situated within the expected norms, contrasting with the minority, which is identified by its differentiation from these norms.

The book illustrates examples of cooperation across various domains between the two groups. Nonetheless, the competitive pursuit of political power often highlights the ethnic character and the inherent asymmetry of power dynamics between the majority and minority populations. For ethnic Hungarians, who navigate life as a minority, their "marked" cultural identity has been pivotal in the preservation and continuation of their cultural heritage (Brubaker et al., 2008). The majority ethnicity is frequently portrayed as civic, even while pursuing assimilationist policies towards minorities. In contrast, the minority is pathologized as ethnic and regressive, while the majority is often valorized for adopting an ethnic identity, characterized as a stabilizing force rooted in civic virtues (Schöpflin, 2004). Demonstrative actions by minorities, such as protests against limitations on the use of their language, serve to remind the majority that the ostensibly "unmarked" dominant Romanian culture operates in an ethnic manner (Kiss, 2013).

Ethnic Hungarians struggle to fit within the political construct of the nation, which conflates citizenship with national identity as defined by the inhabitants of a specific territorial state. A definition of ethnic Hungarian identity that hinges exclusively on citizenship risks negating their cultural heritage and ancestral ties – rendering them unable to claim their identity based on cultural lineage. The states where significant populations of ethnic Hungarians reside do not typically adhere to principles of "civic nationalism" that advocate for a neutral stance toward minorities. Instead, these states embody ethnic nationalism, engaging in assimilationist practices aimed at cultivating a homogeneous national identity (Kiss, 2015).

In the context of ethnic Hungarians residing within the Carpathian Basin, three primary communities are often referenced: the collective of all ethnic Hungarians, those remaining in the territories of Hungary (following the Treaty of Trianon), and Hungarians living as national minorities in surrounding countries. Within this framework, the Hungarians of Székelyland are recognized as a distinct social group, posited as a "conceivable community" (Anderson, 1991). This enforced community, geographically detached from the motherland, shares a collective experience of minority status and nourishes aspirations toward minority nation-building (Bárdi and Szarka, 2007). The construction of this imagined community is due to the transformation of collective memory into a cohesive historical narrative, underpinned by an institutional framework that legitimizes and commemorates this reinterpreted past through holidays, anniversaries, ceremonies, monuments, and cultural productions. Through such mechanisms, the conception of nationhood becomes institutionalized, and national identity is solidified. Three critical factors underpinning this process include: a collective remembrance of shared fate, cultural and linguistic ties that comprise the fundamental basis of social communication, and the promotion of equality among group members asserting their national identity – the foundation for civil society (Hroch, 2000). In the case of Székelyness, these elements are palpably present; however, the context remains fluid, with continuous efforts undertaken to articulate signs of differentiation and self-identification, as illustrated by, for example, the symbolic representation of the Székely gate (Gagyi, 2004).

5.4 Perception of Russian Immigrants in Hungary: Perception, Policies and Issues

The Russian minority in Hungary is not officially recognized, and its demographic presence is estimated to comprise approximately 22,000 individuals. Prior to the 2016 micro-census, there was a notable lack of available data regarding the demographic characteristics of Russians in Hungary. This census was pivotal as it was the first to include non-official minorities – Chinese, Korean, Arabic, and Russian populations – within Hungary's demographic assessments. The survey provided information concerning nationality, mother tongue, and language usage among these minorities. The findings revealed that Russians, as a national group, account for 0,2% of Hungary's total population, while 1,6% of individuals reported proficiency in the Russian language. It is noteworthy that a substantial portion of the Russian-speaking demographic does not identify as ethnically Russian. The diversity in this population is characterized by varying lengths of residence, citizenship status, and familial use of the Russian language.

According to Sergei Gnitiev's 2021 study, the integration of Russians into Hungarian society is incomplete. All participants in his research identified themselves as bilingual, often linking their bilingualism to distinct personality traits associated with each language. Some respondents reported a successful amalgamation of cultural identities, feeling a sense of belonging to both their Russian heritage and Hungarian society. Therefore, these participants strive to integrate into Hungarian society while concurrently preserving their Russian cultural identity and linguistic heritage. However, they collectively acknowledged that the necessity of navigating different languages in various settings – such as workplaces or public spheres – leads to a transformation of their personal identity, influenced by the environmental context. In contrast, other study participants expressed a reluctance to abandon their Russian roots, thus finding it challenging to embrace foreign cultural norms, despite their bilingual status.

As previously discussed, Hungarian society exhibits a tendency toward insularity regarding immigrants, a phenomenon that can be partly ascribed to prevailing political discourses surrounding migration. During the migration crisis of 2015, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán characterized migrants as a legitimate security threat, framing this threat in cultural and, to some extent, religious terms. He portrayed the influx of migrants as a potential danger to Hungarian national identity and social cohesion. The ramifications of his populist rhetoric have resonated not only within Hungary but across the European Union. This construction of social identity, in conjunction with the securitization narrative surrounding the migrant crisis, has engendered a pervasive climate of anti-immigrant sentiment among the Hungarian population, reigniting previously taboo discussions concerning immigration, multiculturalism, demographic shifts, national sovereignty, and ethno-centric politics. Public opinion polling underscores these sentiments; for instance, in 2016, 76% of Hungarians expressed concerns that an increase in refugees would elevate terrorism risks, and 82% believed that refugees exacerbate social conditions by competing for welfare resources and job opportunities. So, this construction of national identity can be interpreted applying the social identity theory that highlights the negative labelling of out groups may result in the spread of nationalistic views.

Despite Orbán's having "no migration" stance, evidence of a more situated approach emerged following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. While he continues to depict immigrants as a threat, he has begun to differentiate between migrants from Eastern European regions and those arriving from other areas, particularly the Middle East and North Africa. Cultural references within his discourse suggest a specific antagonism towards Muslim immigrants.

In the context of this thesis, it is germane to examine Hungarian public attitudes toward Russians, particularly in light of recent geopolitical developments. Following the onset of the

Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, initial sentiments among Hungarians towards both Russia and Ukraine were predominantly negative[27]. This response can be attributed to a social inclination to remain neutral in the conflict and concerns regarding potential increases in immigration due to Hungary's geographic proximity to the warzone. By 2023, however, these attitudes revealed a shift: while 23% of Hungarians expressed favorable views toward Russia, nearly half of the population advocated for a reduction in sanctions against the country. Furthermore, the willingness to accept refugees from military conflicts decreased; in 2022, 63% of Hungarians supported taking in refugees, a figure that reduced to 49% by 2023[28]. This decline reflects a broader change in public perception regarding the ongoing conflict. Notably, a subsequent opinion poll indicated that the percentage of Hungarians favoring closer ties with Russia doubled, growing from 13% in 2022 to 26% in 2023 (Bíró-Nagy et al., 2023). This suggests a gradual, albeit subtle, increase in favorable attitudes toward Russia, particularly in indirect contexts.

Regarding Russian immigrants , data from 2023 suggests a moderate perception, with approximately 40% of Hungarians expressing positive sentiments toward this group. For context, ethnic Hungarian immigrants enjoyed positive perceptions from nearly 80% of the population, whereas merely over 20% of respondents viewed Arab immigrants favorably (Pepinsky et al., 2024). So, while Hungarians outside the country, especially if living in the neighbouring countries, may experience some pressure from the local political elites, Russians in Hungary enjoy both social and political acceptance, without evoking strong negative associations. This relatively neutral stance toward Russian immigrants, coupled with an overall improvement in attitudes toward Russia, may be linked to Hungary's evolving migration policies aimed at Russian nationals and political discourses around Russians.

As outlined in Chapter ##, "The Problems of Russian Emigration Stages Identification and Study," Hungary has implemented several immigration initiatives that may appeal to Russians considering emigration. These include programs that offer residence permits to entrepreneurs establishing businesses in Hungary, accompanied by various tax incentives that have been in place since 2016. Additionally, educational initiatives facilitated by the Balassi

[27]HORVÁTH KÁVAI, Andrea: *Opposition voters do not share their parties' pro-Ukraine stance.* - https://telex.hu/english/2022/05/27/opposition-voters-do-not-share-their-parties-pro-ukraine-stance [Last accessed January 13, 2025]

[28] FAGAN, M., CLANCY, L., GUBBALA, S., AUSTIN, S.: *Poles and Hungarians Differ Over Views of Russia and the U.S.: Two-thirds in Poland want increased sanctions on Russia; fewer than one-in-ten Hungarians agree.* - https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/10/02/poles-and-hungarians-differ-over-views-of-russia-and-the-us/ [Last accessed January 13, 2025]

Institute and the Tempus Public Foundation have been developed to attract Russian students to Hungarian higher education institutions. Since 2022, Hungary has also introduced a digital nomad program designed to draw talented IT professionals and digital workers to the country. In 2024, a startup visa was launched, specifically targeting foreign entrepreneurs interested in launching innovative businesses in Hungary. Notably, in 2024, Hungary announced that the National Card initiative, which allows "guest workers" from eight countries to enter the country without undergoing security screenings, extends to Russia and Belarus nationals. Holders of this National Card may qualify for permanent residency after maintaining their status for a minimum of three years.

Analyzing these immigration policies within a framework of potential "gains" and "losses" (as discussed in Chapter 3), it becomes evident that Hungary stands to benefit from these initiatives, particularly as they are designed to attract economically active population groups. The arrival of skilled businesspeople and professionals seeking to advance their careers in Hungary represents an opportunity for economic enrichment and human capital development within the country. Consequently, it is advisable for Hungary to implement policies that foster a welcoming environment for these new immigrants, encouraging them to view Hungary as a viable long-term residence rather than a transit point. This is particularly critical for the digital nomad program, which currently has a limited one-year duration with a possibility to extend it for one more year. Moreover, Hungary could reevaluate its policies concerning the families of immigrants, as many current regulations impose significant limitations. For instance, spouses may enter the country but are not permitted to work, and the digital nomad program does not provide provisions for the relocation of family members. Such restrictions may deter potential immigrants, particularly those of economically active age, the period of life frequently coinciding with family building. Policies that accommodate family relocation have a potential to enhance Hungary's attractiveness as a destination for skilled migrants and mitigate the risks of brain drain and human capital loss in cases when Russian immigrants move to other countries.

CHAPTER 6: CONCEPTS OF IDENTITY AND INTEGRATION APPROACHES

International migration has been and remains an essential issue in the world. Various economic, political and social factors impact it. Castles et al., (2014) note people have always been mobile as they have permanently looked for new opportunities and better lifestyles. Migrants are motivated by various factors, from an opportunity to find a better job to living in a better climate, from being more socially protected to running away from persecution in their home country. In the last 50 years, the migration flows have intensified due to technological advances but also political and social processes happening in various parts of the world; therefore, the problem of migration got into the spotlight of the research agenda (Hooghe et al., 2008).

This chapter focuses on integrating immigrants from Russia and Ukraine (Russian speaking) into Hungary. Hungary is an interesting country to consider in terms of migration. Firstly, its location right in the heart of Europe makes it a vantage point for immigrants that consider the country as a transition point in their routes or a destination in Europe. Secondly, Hungary only recently opened for migration routes with the fall of the Soviet bloc; therefore, the society is still adapting to the new situation in the country, and the political system is still looking for ways of integrating immigrants. Thirdly, Hungary is a monoethnic country that, however, recognises the existence of ethnic minority groups in its territory. The last point also explains the choice of Russian and Ukrainian immigrants as although they might come from a similar background; they might undergo various integration paths in Hungary. It is due to the status of Ukrainians as a recognised ethnic minority in the country.

Therefore, this paper aims to reconstruct the main ways of integrating regular immigrants from Russia and Ukraine into Hungary as comparative study of different integration models. To achieve it, firstly, the author performs the literature review to understand the main practices of integration described in the literature and how the various political regimes impact them (*Literature review*). Then, to contextualise better the Hungarian experience, the experiences of different developed countries are described in the following section (*Approaches to immigrants' integration in various countries*) and the current situation in Hungary in terms

of statistics, legislation and research outcomes in the field of migration (*Hungary and immigration: current state of affairs*). Based on all the previous sections of the paper, the reconstruction of possible integration ways is performed in *Possibilities for integration of Russian and Ukrainian immigrants in Hungary.* Lastly, the chapter concludes with a brief overview of the Hungarian situation, possible policy outcomes and directions for the policy-making towards immigrants' integration.

5.1. Literature Review on Identity and Integration

Migration is a complex social, economic, political and cultural phenomenon studied from many perspectives. However, the literature agrees that immigrants' integration is an important process that plays one of the crucial roles in understanding the phenomenon of migration (Papp et al., 2019). Park (1928) was among the first authors who proposed a theoretical assimilation model. Park considered the assimilation of immigrants and ethnic minorities into majority society to be straightforward and inconvertible. Therefore, according to this model, immigrants should assimilate into the culture of the receiving society by internalising its language and cultural customs.

Gordon (1964) further developed the assimilation model highlighting the complexity of the process and its different phases. In particular, he suggested the following ones:

- Cultural assimilation means the internalisation of the cultural practices of the receiving society;
- Structural assimilation implies the integration into the institutions and main social structures of the receiving society;
- Identification assimilation during which an immigrant identifies themselves with the majority of the receiving society.

With the development and spread of such ideas as multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism, the integration model has become more pronounced in academic literature. Although integration also implies that immigrants become members of the receiving society, unlike the assimilation model, it suggests that they might preserve their ethnic and cultural identity (Papp et al., 2019). Therefore, integration leads to a combination of identities: on the one hand, preserving one's culture of origin; on the other hand, internalising some cultural and behavioural features of a new culture.

Just like assimilation, integration is a multidimensional process that entails (Papp et al., 2019):

- Cognitive integration which means that an immigrant learns the language, norms, habits and behavioural patterns of the receiving society;
- Structural integration which implies that an immigrant learns and internalises institutional norms of the receiving society;
- Social integration during which an immigrant develops social networks with other immigrants, local residents and accumulates social capital;
- Emotional integration which means that an immigrant develops an emotional connection with the identity of a receiving society.

Therefore, integration is a complex process that has multiple dimensions. In the course of integration, immigrants seek to integrate into the receiving society's economic, social, and political structures. Additionally, they seek to adapt to and internalise the culture, values, and behavioural standards of the receiving society (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003).

Segregation and social exclusion are processes that are opposite to that of integration. However, they might happen due to the existence of economic, social and ethnic hierarchies in the receiving society. These hierarchies impact the ability of an immigrant to have access to such resources as job opportunities, accommodation, and education in society (Balcerzak, 2016; Simionescu et al., 2017).

Therefore, integration leads to establishing a complex relationship between immigrants and the receiving society. Additionally, integration is highly dependent on the latter's level of openness and prejudice (Bijl et al., 2009). The research also indicates the existence of a close link between, on the one hand, the established process of integration and, on the other hand, the history and the type of political system in a country. Walzer (1997) identified five regimes of toleration differing in their approaches to the management of cultural, linguistic and religious diversity:

- *Multinational empires* consist of autonomous and semiautonomous communities which might have their political, legal, cultural, and religious independence. At the same time, the groups do not have a choice in leaving the empire as they are forced to coexist by an imperial bureaucracy that, however, does not interfere in the internal affairs of each group as long as taxes are paid and peace is maintained;
- *The international society* also consists of autonomous communities, but there is no bureaucracy that governs the communities. Therefore, communities or states that are a part of the global society should find an acceptable equilibrium of power. As a consequence, toleration is an integral part of sovereignty;

- *Consociations* are the concurrence of several communities that can negotiate on a constitutional arrangement, main institutions, division of offices, etc. Usually, communities have lived together for an extended period before the negotiations;
- *Nation-States* are characterised by a single dominant group's cultural and linguistic monopoly. Although the minorities could enjoy their freedom of religious expression, culture and language, it is allowed only in their private sphere. In such a way, the monopoly is not challenged.
- *Immigrant societies* consist of people who left their homelands and come to a new place. They usually arrive individually or with their families but not in formed groups; consequently, they mix with others. The state is neutral in its attitudes towards all the groups.

The Nation-States are spread the most. Given that the nation can be defined as a group with a common culture and beliefs, integration plays a crucial role in shaping the nation and constructing its identity. At the same time, the Nation-States might take a more assimilating approach toward immigrants and various groups residing in its territory as it aims at political, cultural, and linguistic unification. Hence, although the notion of assimilation is not officially used anymore, the notion of integration still reflects some of its features. Specifically, Nation-States anticipate that immigrants would learn the official language, respect and follow their culture and values, and comply with the State's accepted and common way of life.

The literature also suggests the following two main integration models: republican and multiculturalist models (Bertossi, 2011). Although these models have the same aim of ensuring the equality of citizens, they differ in the modes of its promotion and ensuring. While the first one rejects all the differences, the latter promotes them. Thus, the republican model is based on the principle of blindness to cultural and religious differences; therefore, such societies seek to promote the same rights to all, despite possible differences. In contrast, the multiculturalist model is based on accepting cultural and religious differences, and such societies seek to promote the equality of individual opportunities. Therefore, there is the right to live according to one’s culture and religion within the multiculturalist model. France was an example of the republican model in the European context, while the United Kingdom and the Netherlands illustrated the multiculturalist one. However, since the end of the 1990s, there has been a tendency to mix the two models of integration, as will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this paper.

While republican or multiculturalist models mainly focus on the policies and actions undertaken by governments, the current body of academic literature also highlights the role of

social networks and social capital in the immigrants' integration. More specifically, immigrants' ability to find and establish social networks and accumulate social capital plays a crucial part in their integration into the receiving society. Social networks and capital can be helpful in finding social ties, work and accommodation, dealing with bureaucratic issues, etc. (Cartwright et al., 2008). Depending on the country of origin and destination, some minority groups have better established social networks than others. Social capital might facilitate integration in two major ways (Papp et al., 2019):

- Values similarity: immigrants and members of the receiving society share similar values, which facilitate social cohesion;
- The similarity of interests: immigrants and members of the receiving society share similar interests in such areas as power, economy, labour division.

Stone and Hughes (2002) suggest that there are two types of social networks: formal and informal. The former refers to the relationships formed within institutions, voluntary groups, etc. The latter refers to the relationships formed within families, friendship networks, neighbourhoods, etc. It is essential to develop both for an immigrant as formal and informal networks facilitate their integration. Furthermore, these two types of social networks are closely intertwined. Thus, an informal relationship might expand and transform into a formal one. The presence of immigrants' ethnic community in the receiving society might offer additional integration opportunities; especially it concerns labour market and socio-cultural integration. Moreover, this integration might be even independent of the majority of the receiving society.

5.2 Approaches to immigrants' integration in various countries

France is an example of the Nation-State from Walzer's (1997) classification with an inclination toward the republican model. Thus, in 2004, wearing a veil was banned in schools as it challenged the majority's norms of behaviour. Therefore, the government seeks to promote an official "blindness" towards differences in religion, culture, traditions, etc. Simultaneously, the French government aims to promote policies combatting social inequalities. For example, to encourage social diversity, there should be a particular share of social housing in each urban community, as the urban guideline bill (July 13, 1991) states. Therefore, there is a slight drift towards the multiculturalist model.

Canada is an example of a softer Nation-State regime with the dominance of the multiculturalist model as it promotes integration that "does not imply the loss of an individual's identity and original characteristics or his original language and culture" (Davisdon Dunton et

al., 1969). Therefore, the Canadian approach implies that an immigrant can preserve their culture of origin and doing it does not hamper their participation in Canadian society. In such a way, the Canadian state seeks to treat equally the cultures already existing in the territory and those brought by the immigrants. Consequently, the Canadian perspective suggests that integration is a mutual process that involves both the immigrants and the host society. Even though Canada fosters cultural and religious differences, it still requires a person applying for citizenship to demonstrate the knowledge of at least one of the two official languages (French or English), the main Canadian institutions, the country's main laws and citizens' responsibilities.

Switzerland can be regarded as a consociation as it is characterised by the cohabitation of communities together. Each community has its own clear territory, schools, culture, language, etc. At the same time, Switzerland's approach towards immigrants is more of assimilation that requires immigrants to internalise the norms of the hosting community.

The examples of Switzerland and Canada illustrate the difference between commonly confused notions of "integration" and "multiculturalism." While the first concept might accept the cohabitation of various communities that are indigenous in the state and, simultaneously, might incline towards the assimilation of immigrants, the latter treats indigenous and newcomers' cultures equally.

The Netherland is an example of a consociation that has experienced a transition from the multiculturalist to republican model. In 1983, the Paper of Minorities was published that fostered respect for cultural and religious identity, individual opportunities for them and fought discrimination. The Paper also contributed to the extension of the "pillarisation" of Dutch society. Initially, there were four pillars: protestant, catholic, social-democrat and liberal, while after the Paper, it extended to Muslim. Each pillar has its own schools, universities, political parties, media, unions, and hospitals. However, since the 1990s, the Dutch system has been criticised frequently. The main criticism has been aimed at the situation in which the groups could live alongside each other without interacting. Therefore, there is no integration into society as there are no shared or common values. Moreover, at the beginning of the 2000s, there were racist incidents against the Muslim communities and, simultaneously, assassinations made by Islamists. As a result of these processes, in 2004, the government adopted a new integration policy. Thus, the policy introduced the integration test. Additionally, the promotion of the culture and language of origin was abolished. For example, the Law of May 24, 2004, abolished the opportunity to learn the mother tongues of immigrants in primary schools, and public institutions are recommended not to distribute documents in immigrants' language of origin.

The example of the United Kingdom is another interesting illustration of a shift from the multiculturalist model to the republican one. Additionally, it shows how the historical and political contexts might define the dominance of one of them. As a result of the independence of several British colonies, the UK government granted all of the citizens in the Commonwealth the right to settle, work and vote. Following it, immigrants originating from Africa, the Caribbean, Asia and the Indian subcontinent came to settle in the UK. However, they faced a wave of racism, which pushed the government to respond and create the integration policy (the Race Relations Act, 1965). The legislation promotes the multiculturalist integration model, fostering equal opportunities in relation to culture and religion. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the UK's political discourse towards immigrants has changed. Thus, The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act was adopted in 2002, which established citizens' test for people applying for citizenship. The test checks the level of English, knowledge of the main institutions, history and legislation of the country. Therefore, it contributes to fostering a common identity and shared values.

Germany could be an illustration of an opposite trend as it moved from a republican to a multicultural approach. For a long time, Germany has been an example of a country in which citizenship was based on the right of blood and common linguistic and cultural traits. However, the legislation became more relaxed and aimed at integration with time. Thus, there is an opportunity to obtain German citizenship after living legally for eight years in the country. However, there is still a demand to pass the citizenship test.

5.3 Hungary and immigration: current state of affairs

Hungary could be considered a relatively mono-ethnic country (Cartwright et al., 2008). Partially, it might be attributed to the history of the country. Hungary became open to migratory routes relatively recently. More specifically, it happened with the societal transformation that Hungary experienced in the 1990s during its transition from communist rule to an open market (Drbohlav, 2012). In that period, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries became an important destination for immigrants coming from less developed countries in Eastern Europe (primarily Ukraine and Romania) and the Far East (Vietnam and China). Hungary quickly became both a transit and destination country for immigrants from these two regions.

Drawing on the statistical data, it is possible to conclude that the proportion of foreigners and ethnic minorities present in the country is relatively low. Thus, for example, one of the biggest groups is ethnic minorities. According to the Act CLXXIX of 2011 on the Rights of

Nationalities, nationalities are groups residing in Hungary for at least one century, distinguished by their language, culture and traditions and manifesting a sense of cohesion with the aim of preservation of these. The Annex to the Act recognises thirteen national minorities in Hungary: Armenian, Bulgarian, Croatian, German, Greek, Polish, Roma, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovakian, Slovenian, and Ukrainian. According to the census of 2011, around 6% of the Hungarian population considered themselves ethnic minorities. The largest ethnic minority group is that of the Roma, accounting for approximately 3% of the Hungarian people.

According to the data provided by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, foreigners residing in Hungary are the second biggest group of non-Hungarian origins living in the country. Thus, the official statistics demonstrate that the share of foreigners has been fluctuating between one and two per cent of the entire country's population. It reached its peaks in 2011, 2020 and 2021 when the share of foreigners was just over 2%. However, as Graph 1 shows, there have been some changes in the composition of countries of origin of the foreigners. For example, while the share of Romanians has been shrinking, people coming from Asia have been contributing more prominently since 2011. Additionally, Graph 1 illustrates that the proportion of Ukrainians has risen rapidly since 2017, when a visa-free regime for short-stay travel was established between Ukraine and the European Union.

Other groups of foreigners living in Hungary are relatively low. For example, in 2020, the share of immigrating foreign citizens was around 0.45% (or 43785 people), the percentage of naturalised people was 0.02% of the total Hungarian population, and the number of asylum seekers and people granted international protection status was 247 people. Certainly, there have been some variations in the last years due to different global and local processes; however, the contribution of these groups of foreigners and immigrants has been relatively modest.

Graph 1 – Foreign citizens residing in Hungary by country of citizenship (in %% from total foreign citizens residing in Hungary)



Data source: the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. The Office provides the absolute numbers of foreign citizens residing in Hungary; therefore, the author calculated percentages from the total number of foreign citizens residing in the country.

To better understand the current situation with immigration and ethnic minorities, it is worth also briefly analysing the current legislation in the field. Although there is no self-standing integration legislation, several legal documents are pertinent to the studied topic. Thus, the Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011) grants ethnic minorities some rights. According to Article XXIX, every Hungarian citizen, considering themselves belonging to an ethnic minority, has the right to preserve their identity. Additionally, the Article grants the following rights to the ethnic minorities: the right to collective participation in public life, to foster minority culture, to use their mother language, to have education in their mother language, to use their names in their mother language and to set up local and national minority self-governments. The analysis of the self-governments shows that there are two significant ways of using it. On the one hand, self-governance might encourage further social and economic integration into the majority society, as in the case of the self-governments of the Roma minorities. The other minority groups mainly exploit self-governance to preserve their cultural and linguistic identities (Cartwright et al., 2008).

Act CLXXIX of 2011 on the Right of Nationalities states individual and collective rights to people belonging to nationalities living in Hungary. Among the individual rights are the right to honour the nationality traditions relating to the family, foster their family relations, conduct their family celebrations and church ceremonies in their mother language, freely use their mother tongue verbally and in writing, to acquaint themselves with, foster, enrich and pass on their history, culture and traditions, and others. The collective rights include preserving, fostering, reinforcing and passing on their identity, establishing and operating institutions and

taking over institutions from other agencies within the statutory boundaries, setting up associations, local and national self-governments, and others.

The Act also protects ethnic minorities from assimilation. In particular, Article 9 of the Act forbids any policies or practices that:

- Aim at or lead to the assimilation of nationalities into the majority nation or the exclusion and segregation of nationalities from the majority nation;
- Persecute or intimidate a nationality or individuals belonging to them due to their affiliation, make their living conditions more cumbersome or prevent them from the exercise of their rights;
- Aim at the forced removal or relocation of a nationality.

Although the documents promote equality and aim to eliminate any discrimination, there are some problems with discrimination against some ethnic minorities in Hungary. Mainly, it concerns the Roma people who are consistently discriminated against in such fields as employment, housing, and others (Kóczé, 2015). In Budapest, the housing problem is acute for the Roma people as they are frequently concentrated in dilapidated areas, which leads to the formation of physical and symbolical 'ghettos' (Keresztély et al., 2017). Furthermore, as it appears from the study by Keresztély et al. (2017), there is a division within Roma society itself as there are 'desirable' and 'undesirable' Roma. The political discourse also encourages discrimination as it creates an image of Roma as unable to integrate into the Hungarian society due to their culture and morality (Kóczé, 2015).

As to the integration of various groups of immigrants, the following legislation is key for understanding the current situation in Hungary. Act LV on Hungarian Citizenship (1993) promotes the unification of citizenship within a family and aims at reducing the causes of statelessness. The Act provides for the acquisition (and termination) of Hungarian citizenship by right, naturalisation or other legal grounds. In 2010, amendments were introduced to the Act, making it possible for non-Hungarians who have Hungarian ascendants or can prove their Hungarian origin to be naturalised on preferential terms (even if they have never been legal residents of the country). Additionally, the Act requires people applying for Hungarian citizenship to pass the exam in basic constitutional studies in the Hungarian language. Therefore, it means that an applicant should know the main institutions of the country and the Hungarian language.

In 2003, the Hungarian government adopted Act CXXV on Equal Treatment and the Promotion of Equal Opportunities. According to the Act, the government is responsible for promoting equal opportunities. The Act also denotes possible grounds for discrimination that include

national or ethnic origin and areas where discrimination might occur (education, employment, social security and health care, housing, education and training, services, etc.). The Act highlights the importance of prevention of discrimination based on these grounds and in the areas.

The research shows that although the Act states that there should be equality in education, there are some signs of discrimination in the Hungarian educational system. Primarily, it happens as the educational system, especially that from primary to high school, is not well-prepared to receive immigrant children. For instance, one of the criteria for determining the choice of school or class is the level of knowledge of the Hungarian language of an immigrant child (Cartwright et al., 2008). As a result, children with poor language knowledge might attend classes below their age range.

After Hungary became a member of the European Union in 2004, the government adopted the White Paper in 2006, which states that all EU countries should undertake actions to promote social inclusion to tackle the possible marginalisation of immigrants. Besides, the document argues that integration brings about economic benefits due to immigrants' contribution to the economy and reducing reliance on public services. Therefore, the White Paper proposes the following steps for integrating immigrants: preparedness of public services (housing, health, and education) for receiving immigrants, combined language and vocational training, availability of specially and trained mentors who would guide and provide support at the local level.

The Hungarian government adopted several legal documents related to the matters of migration in 2007. Firstly, Act II on the Admission and Right for Residence of Third-Country Nationals. The Act provides for different types of short- and long-term (or permanent) residence permits along with various grounds for restricting or denying them. Section 86/F of the Act also states that there should be no discrimination based on the knowledge of the Hungarian language; therefore, an applicant might use any language they understand and could be provided with a translator's services (depending on their involvement, the cost is born by an applicant or the immigration office).

In 2007, the Hungarian government adopted the first Migration Strategy for seven years. In 2014, the new Migration Strategy was adopted with a duration till 2020. One of the main aims of the Strategy is to facilitate open-minded and receptive attitudes toward immigrants. The document considers migration to be a complex phenomenon that impacts a country's economy, social relations, security and public order. According to the strategy, Hungary should support all forms of legal migration, contribute to the integration of legal migrants and people granted

international protection, combat any form of illegal immigration and abuses regarding residency. The Migration Strategy also highlights that the immigrants should learn and respect such institutional norms as the European Union norms, the Fundamental Law, and other country legislation. Additionally, immigrants are expected to respect the norms and rules of social coexistence adopted in society.

Lastly, Act LXXX on Asylum (2007) is also an important document facilitating an understanding of the current framework in Hungary. The Act states that there is the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund that could be spent on the needs of asylum seekers in Hungary. The Act also allows that a person applying for asylum in the country can do so in their mother tongue as well as the results can be communicated in it. It should also be borne in mind that the Hungarian government introduced some amendments to the Act in 2015 on the background of the refugee crisis that affected Europe in general and Hungary in particular. For example, the government introduced lists of "safe" and "unsafe" third countries for asylum seekers. Also, the notion of a "mass migration crisis" was introduced that allows the police and the army to participate in the asylum process.

To comprehend better the current situation in Hungary, it is worth quickly overviewing the attitudes of the Hungarian society towards immigrants. As the analysis of the survey data in CEE countries shows, Hungarian society is relatively closed in its attitudes towards migrants. In particular, in comparison with other countries from the CEE region, Hungarians are less open toward immigrants with different from the Hungarian ethnic or racial background and those coming from less economically developed countries outside of Europe (Botrić, 2016). Additionally, Hungarian society is rather pessimistic in its perception of the impact of immigrants on their country and society.

Similar results might be found in other research on the attitudes of Hungarians towards immigrants. From the current body of literature, it appears that Hungarians have a high level of concern that immigrants might seize their employment opportunities. For example, Oláh et al. (2017) show that the youth, especially those having labour experience, express concern that immigrants might take their jobs. Moreover, even ethnic Hungarians born in neighbouring countries (especially Romania) might face some negative attitudes from the country's population (Fox, 2004). Mainly, such perception is formed due to the conviction that even these migrants pose a threat to the Hungarians in the labour market. As the study by Fox (2004) shows, one of the results of such attitudes is that immigrants and ethnic Hungarians born in other countries seek to avoid being placed physically or symbolically in the same group as the

Roma. Mostly, it happens due to the highly spread negative stigmatisation of Roma people in the country.

Before discussing possible ways of integrating Russian and Ukrainian immigrants, it is germane to account for existing integration models in the country. Based on the models of integration and regimes of toleration discussed in *Literature review*, it is possible to suggest that Hungary could be referred to as Nation-States in Waltzer's (1997) classification. Mainly, it is based on the presence of a Hungarian ethnic majority in the country that practically has a linguistic and cultural monopoly. Undoubtedly, there are some signs of consociation due to the presence of recognised national minorities. These minorities have the right to self-governance, use their language in private and public spheres, cultural and religious expression. Additionally, these minorities have coexisted with each other and the Hungarian majority for an extended period in the same territory. However, given a very moderate proportion of these nationalities in the Hungarian population and the specificity of exercising their right to self-government (as discussed previously in the case of the Roma minority), it is possible to conclude that Hungary has more prominent signs of the Nation-State.

The Hungarian legislation also shows a mixture of republican and multiculturalist integration models. On the one hand, there are more prominent signs of the multiculturalist model in relation to ethnic minorities (one of which is the Ukrainian minority) in Hungary. As shown in this section, ethnic minorities can enjoy their rights to use their language, culture, religion, etc. Therefore, the state officially promotes acceptance of cultural and religious differences and promotes individual and collective rights of national minorities. Furthermore, the legislation openly prohibits any assimilation attempts or discrimination against these national minorities. However, the research shows that there are some problems with the implementation of this legislation due to a high level of prejudice against some ethnic minorities (especially the Roma people) which affects both policies and practices (physical and symbolical segregation, attempts of assimilation through the education system, etc.).

On the other hand, the legislation seems to adopt a more republican approach towards immigrants. It could be concluded based on the requirement of passing a course in constitutional studies in the Hungarian language for obtaining citizenship. This requirement implies that immigrants should at least learn and respect the country's institutional arrangements and learn the country's language. However, there is no such requirement for other types of immigrants who do not wish to apply for citizenship but stay legally in the country. Furthermore, there are some situations in which the immigration office might bear translation services costs. It should also be noted that the research shows that the Hungarian institutions are ill-prepared to deal

with immigrants not knowing the language. As illustrated in the example of the school system, immigrants have little choice in finding a school or a class for students who do not speak Hungarian.

5.4 Possibilities for integration of Russian and Ukrainian immigrants in Hungary

Given that Ukrainians are a recognised ethnic minority in Hungary, it is possible to assume that there are different integration paths for immigrants from Russia and Ukraine. To make the analysis more complete, Hungary as both destination and transition country is considered. Thus, if a Russian immigrant considers Hungary as their destination country and wants to receive Hungarian citizenship, the following integration scenario is possible based on the current Hungarian legislation and referring to Papp et al. (2019). Such an immigrant needs to be integrated cognitively and structurally. Specifically, they should learn at least the language and institutional norms of the receiving society. Emotional and social integration depend heavily on an immigrant's ability to establish social networks and accumulate social capital. As Graph 1 shows, the proportion of Russians living in Hungary is relatively small; therefore, it might be difficult to establish social networks with a group of Russian immigrants in the country. One of the main ways for developing social networks seems to be through education, work, or specialised groups (hobby, interests, etc.). In such a way, a Russian immigrant might develop social networks with other immigrants and local inhabitants, facilitating their social and emotional integration.

Alternatively, suppose a Ukrainian immigrant wants to apply for Hungarian citizenship considering the country as their destination. In that case, they also have to be integrated cognitively and structurally due to the legal requirements. However, social and emotional integration might develop differently due to the recognition of Ukrainians as an ethnic minority group in Hungary. Therefore, a Ukrainian immigrant might find social networks and accumulate social capital more efficiently by reaching out to the Ukrainian communities established in the country. Besides, connecting to these communities can facilitate preserving their cultural, religious and linguistic identity, despite the need to integrate cognitively and structurally into the Hungarian majority. Consequently, it might be easier for a Ukrainian immigrant to be integrated emotionally into Hungary due to the existence of Ukrainian minority groups. Additionally, just like a Russian immigrant, a Ukrainian one might seek to expand their social networks and accumulate social capital through education, work or free-time activities.

If Hungary is considered a transition point for Russian immigrants, they might obtain a residence permit for various reasons (education, work, health, etc.). In such a case, an immigrant is required to be integrated neither cognitively nor structurally, as the requirements for residence permits are softer than those for citizenship. However, obviously, a Russian immigrant might successfully establish social ties and accumulate social capital by connecting to individuals and groups from their education, work, vocational activities, etc. Such social relations might be concentrated on immigrants only if they do not wish to study the country's language or the Hungarian society as well. Therefore, there might be at least social integration of Russian immigrants if they consider Hungary a transition point.

Suppose a Ukrainian immigrant considers Hungary as a transition country. In that case, they do not have to be cognitively or structurally integrated into society, too, if they apply for various types of residence permits. However, unlike Russian immigrants, they might find it easier to be socially and emotionally integrated into Hungarian society again due to the recognised status of Ukrainians as a nationality minority. Hence, a Ukrainian immigrant might turn to these minority groups and organisations to establish social networks and feel integrated while at the same time preserving their cultural identity.

Summing it up, it is possible to conclude that immigrants coming from both Russia and Ukraine wishing to obtain citizenship in Hungary should be integrated cognitively and structurally into the receiving society. If the immigrants from these countries consider Hungary as a transitional point in their migration routes, there are no formal requirements for them. The main difference between these two groups of immigrants is in the ways of obtaining social capital and establishing social networks. In particular, for an immigrant from Russia, it might be more complicated to establish both formal and informal social contacts. At the same time, a Ukrainian one might rely on the Ukrainian communities and organisations existing in Hungary due to the status of Ukrainians as a national minority. Additionally, this status of Ukrainians facilitates preserving the language, cultural and religious identity of the immigrants, while Russian immigrants do not have such an opportunity formally. Therefore, the main difference is in the mechanisms of social and emotional integration of Russian and Ukrainian immigrants.

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the main possible models of integration of Russian and Ukrainian immigrants into Hungarian society. The integration is considered depending on how immigrants consider Hungary: a country of destination or transition as it greatly affects the

integration. The paper contributes to the existing body of academic knowledge in two major ways. Firstly, it discusses the currently existing integration model in Hungary. Secondly, it suggests a reconstruction of possible integration models of immigrants coming from a relatively common cultural background – Russian and Ukrainian.

As the research results show, if immigrants from these countries wish to obtain citizenship in the country, they need to undergo cognitive and structural integration due to the legal requirements. Alternatively, if they consider Hungary a transition point, they do not need to do it. The main difference between an immigrant from Russia and Ukraine lies in social and emotional integration. While the former can struggle with establishing solid social networks in Hungarian society, the latter might find it easier due to the official recognition of Ukrainians as one of the ethnic minorities. Therefore, there might be some Ukrainian communities or organisations a migrant can reach out to. An important consequence of this difference is that Ukrainians might preserve their original identity formed in their homeland, while it might be more challenging for Russians. Therefore, it might be concluded that the Hungarian state applies a mixture of republican and multiculturalism models, as, on the one hand, it requires some people to adopt the new norms and respect the institutions of the country and, on the other hand, it facilitates the preservation of cultures of recognised ethnic minorities.

The research reflects one of the main policy problems of Hungary, which is a lack of a self-standing integration program or policy. Among the consequences of such policy absence is that some groups of immigrants might feel more discriminated against than others, as while some should internalise the new norms, others might preserve their identity. Therefore, it seems that the Hungarian government should undertake an attempt to develop a unified integration model aiming at combatting any form of discrimination and equal treatment of all the immigrants, be it within the republican or multiculturalist model.

Future research might investigate the difference outlined in the current paper in-depth by conducting qualitative research on Russian and Ukrainian immigrants in Hungary. Such research might reveal the main motivation for moving to Hungary (as both a transition or destination country) and whether the differences discussed in this paper have any influence on the immigrants' motivation. Besides, it is essential to understand the main mechanisms of establishing social networks and acquiring social capital that Russian and Ukrainian immigrants use, as they are vital for the process of integration. Another possible route for research is to study the Hungarian situation in a comparative context. For instance, the research could be undertaken in Hungary and another country that just recently became open to migration routes. In such a way, the study might contribute to understanding the main trends developing in such

countries. Alternatively, a comparison might be made between Hungary and a country that has been receiving immigrants for a long period. Such research might highlight the specificities of the Hungarian context.

CHAPTER 7: COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSES OF MIGRATION POLICY

Coming soon

BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCE

Aleksenko, A.D. (2020). Образы русского мира в лирике поэта-эмигранта Г.В. Голохвастова [Images of the Russian world in the lyrics of the poet-emigrant G.V. Golokhvastova]. Source: https://www.ncfu.ru/export/uploads/doc/Dissertaciya-Aleksenko-A.D.pdf

Allahar, A. L. (2001). The Politics of Ethnic Identity Construction. *Identity*, *1*(3), 197–208. https://doi.org/10.1207/s1532706xid0103_01

Amenta, E. (2003). What We Know about the Development of Social Policy. Mahoney, J. (ed.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, B. (1998). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Revised ed.). Verso.

Apetroe, A. (2016). The european migration crisis. Which consequences affecting the stability of the European Union? Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326925411_The_european_migration_crisis_Which_consequences_affecting_the_stability_of_the_European_Union

Atlantic Council. 2019. Purinsky Regime: novaya utechka mozgov. (in Russian). Accessed: https://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/putinskiy-iskhod/putinskiy-iskhod.pdf

Balcerzak, A. P. (2016). Multiple-criteria evaluation of quality of human capital in the European Union countries. *Economics and Sociology*, *9*(2), 11–26.

Bara, A., Di Bartolomeo, A., Brunarska, Z., Makaryan, S., Mananashvili, S., & Weinar, A. (2012). Циркулярная Миграция В Странах Восточного Партнерства [Circular Migration in the Eastern Partnership Countries]. European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for

Advanced Studies. https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/24877/CARIM-East_RR-2012-35.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

BBC News Русская служба. (2015, February 13). Россия объявила в розыск жену соратника Навального [Rossiya obiavila v rozisk zhenu soratnika Navalnogo]. https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2015/02/150213_russia_markvo_wanted

BBC News. (2012, December 26). Пять волн российской эмиграции [Five waves of Russian emigration]. https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2012/12/121128_russia_emigration_waves

Bertossi, C. (2011). National models of integration in Europe: A comparative and critical analysis. *American Behavioral Scientist, 55*(12), 1561–1580. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764211409560

Beyer, T. R. (2013). Third and Fourth Waves of Russophone Immigration to the USA. Academic Commons. https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8V69T1N

Bhagwati, J. & Hamada, K. (1974). The Brain Drain, International Integration of Markets for Professionals and Unemployment: A Theoretical Analysis. Journal of Development Economics, 1(1), 19–42.

Bijl, R. V., Zorlu, A., Jennissen, R. P. W., & Blom, M. (2009). The integration of migrants in the Netherlands monitored over time: Trend and cohort analyses. In C. Bonifazi, M. Okólski, & J. S. P. Schoorl (Eds.), *International Migration in Europe: New Trends and New Methods of Analysis*. Amsterdam University Press.

Borjas, G. (1994). The Economics of Immigration. Journal of Economic Literature, 32(4), 1667-1717. Retrieved November 11, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2728791

Botrić, V. (2016). Attitudes towards immigrants, immigration policies and labour market outcomes: Comparing Croatia with Hungary and Slovenia. *Croatian International Relations Review*, *22*(76), 5–28. https://doi.org/10.1515/cirr-2016-0004

Brubaker, R. (2002). Ethnicity without groups. European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie, 43(2), 163–189. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23999234

Bryant, Antony (2002) ‘Re-grounding grounded theory’, Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application, 4 (1): 25–42.

Bryant, Antony and Charmaz, Kathy (2007a) ‘Grounded theory in historical perspective: An epistemological account’, in Edited by: AntonyBryant and Kathy Charmaz, K. (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Grounded Theory. Los Angeles: Sage. pp. 31–57.

Bryant, Antony and Charmaz, Kathy (2007b) ‘Introduction: Grounded theory research: Methods and practices’, in Edited by: AntonyBryant and KathyCharmaz (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Grounded Theory. Los Angeles: Sage. pp. 1–28.

Bushuev, M. (2019, January 17). “Россию все чаще покидают образованные и молодые” [More and more educated and young people leave Russia]

Bustamante, J. A. (2002). Migración Internacional y Derechos Humanos. Serie Doctrina Juridica, No. 94. Instituto de Investigatciones Juridicas. Available from: http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/1/296/1.pdf

Calhoun, C. (2003). ‘Belonging’in the Cosmopolitan Imaginary. Ethnicities, 3(4), 531–553. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796803003004005

Calhoun, C. J. (2002). Dictionary of the social sciences. New York: Oxford University Press.

Camps in Germany for refugies from Baltic. (2000). Camps in Germany (1944–1951) for Refugees from Baltic Countries. http://www.archiv.org.lv/baltic_dp_germany/index.php?lang=en&id=214

Cartwright, A., Sik, E., & Svensson, S. (2008). *Social Capital and the Integration of Minorities and Immigrants in Hungary* (Social Capital Working Papers).

Castles, S., de Haas, H., & Miller, M. J. (2014). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World.* (5th ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.

Center for Strategic Research “Human Capital”. (2017). Демографические Вызовы России [Demographic Challenges of Russia]. Source: https://www.csr.ru/upload/iblock/704/704bb820549b28a50039d37b02efccd9.pdf

Charmaz, Kathy (1995) ‘Between positivism and postmodernism: Implications for methods’, Studies in Symbolic Interaction, 17: 43–72.

Charmaz, Kathy (1999) ‘Stories of suffering: Subjects' tales and research narratives’, Qualitative Health Research, 9: 369–82.

Charmaz, Kathy (2000) ‘Grounded theory: Objectivist and constructivist methods’, in Edited by: Norman K.Denzin and Yvonna S.Lincoln (eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. pp. 509–35.

Charmaz, Kathy (2003) ‘Grounded theory’, in Edited by: Jonathan A.Smith (ed.), Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Research Methods. London: Sage. pp. 81–110.

Charmaz, Kathy (2006) Constructing Grounded Theory. London: Sage.

Charmaz, Kathy (2009) ‘Shifting the grounds: Constructivist grounded theory methods’, in Edited by: Janice M.Morse et al. (eds.), Developing Grounded Theory: The Second Generation. Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press. pp. 127–154.

Clarke, Adele E. (2003) ‘Situational analyses: Grounded theory mapping after the postmodern turn’, Symbolic Interaction, 26 (4): 553–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/si.2003.26.4.553

Clarke, Adele E. (2005) Situational Analysis: Grounded Theory After the Postmodern Turn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Constitute Project. (2021, February). Russian Federation’s Constitution of 1993 with Amendments through 2008. constituteproject.org. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Russia_2008.pdf

Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, 3rd edition. Los Angeles: Sage.

Das, R. (2020). Identity Politics: A Marxist View. Class, Race, Corporate Power, 8(1). https://doi.org/10.25148/crcp.8.1.008921

Davidson Dunton, A., Gagnon, J.-L., Cormier, C., Frith, R., Lacoste, P., Laing, G. M., Raynauld, A., Rudnyckyj, J. B., Scott, F. R., Wyczynski, P., Findlay, P. C., Lalande, G., Oliver,

M., & Dion, L. (1969). Book IV: The cultural contribution of the other ethnic groups. In *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (Vol. 4). https://doi.org/10.2307/40200138

Dayton-Johnson, J. (2007, October). Circular Migration: What Gains for Development ? OECD Development Centre. https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops/global_labour_mobility_0809102007/presentations/presentation_daytonjohnson.pdf

Denisenko, M. (20122–07-04). Эмиграция из России в страны дальнего зарубежья [Emigration from Russia to the Far East Countries]. Institut Demografii Natsional'nogo Issledovatel'skogo Universiteta "Vysshaya Shkola Ekonomiki." http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2012/0513/tema04.php

DESTATIS Statistisches Bundesamt. (2020). Population with a migrant background up 2.1% in 2019: lowest increase since 2011. Press Release. Retrieved: https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2020/07/PE20_279_12511.html

Domingues Dos Santos, M. & Postel-Vinay, F. (2003). Migration as a source of growth: The perspective of a developing country. Journal of Population Economics, 16, 161-175. 10.1007/s001480100117.

Drbohlav, D. (2012). Patterns of immigration in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In M. Okólski (Ed.), *European Immigrations: Trends, Structures and Policy Implications* (pp. 179–210). Amsterdam University Press.

Dunn, R. G. (1997). Self, Identity, and Difference: Mead and the Poststructuralists. The Sociological Quarterly, 38(4), 687–705. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4121086

Dustmann, C. & Kirchkamp, O. (2001). The Optimal Migration Duration and Activity Choice After Re-migration. Journal of Development Economics, 67, 351-372. 10.1016/S0304-3878(01)00193-6.

DW.COM. https://www.dw.com/ru/эксперт-россию-все-чаще-покидают-образованные-и-молодые/a-47127456

Entzinger, H., & Biezeveld, R. (2003). *Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration*.

European Commission (2007): Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries. COM(2007) 248 final. Brussels. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52007DC0248

European Migration Network. (2011). Temporary and Circular Migration: empirical evidence, current policy practice and future options in EU Member States. Publications Office of the European Union: Luxembourg. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/circular-migration/0a_emn_synthesis_report_temporary__circular_migration_final_sept_2011_en.pdf

Fargues, P. (2008). Circular Migration: Is it relevant for the South and East of the Mediterranean?, [Migration Policy Centre], [CARIM-South], CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes, 2008/40 http://apps.eui.eu/Personal/fargues/Documents/CARIM_AS&N_2008_40.pdf

Fialkoff, L. D. (1973). ROBERT C. WILLIAMS. Culture in Exile: Russian Emigrés in Germany, 1881-1941. Pp. xviii, 404. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. $14.50. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 405(1), 236–244. https://doi.org/10.1177/000271627340500191

Flick, U. (2014). The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis. Analysing Interviews. Published. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243

Fox, J. E. (2004). *From National Inclusion to European Exclusion: State, National and Europe in Ethnic Hungarian Migration to Hungary* (No. 101; Working Paper Series).

Freedman, R. O. (1984). Soviet Jewry in the decisive decade, 1971-80. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press.

Frejka, T. (1996). International Migration in Central and Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States. New York and Geneva: United Nations.

Friedman, G. (2010). Germany and the failure of multiculturalism. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265235011_Germany_and_the_failure_of_multiculturalism

Geertz, C. (1993). The Interpretation of Cultures (New Ed). Fontana Press.

Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self Identity: Self And Society In The Late Modern Age. Polity Press.

Giglio, J. (n.a). Russian Communities Abroad. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russian-communities-abroad

Ginsburgs, G. (1957). The Soviet Union and the Problem of Refugees and Displaced Persons 1917- 1956. The American Journal of International Law, 51(2), 325-361. doi:10.2307/2195710

Glaser, Barney G. (1978). Theoretical Sensitivity. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.

Glaser, Barney G. (1998) Doing Grounded Theory: Issues and Discussions. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.

Glaser, Barney G. (2001) The Grounded Theory Perspective I: Conceptualization Contrasted with Description. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.

Glaser, Barney G. (2003) The Grounded Theory Perspective II: Description's Remodeling of Grounded

Glaser, Barney G. (2005) The Grounded Theory Perspective III: Theoretical Coding. Mill Valley, CA:

Glaser, Barney G. and Strauss, Anselm L. (1967) The discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago: Aldine.

Glaser, Barney, G. (1992). Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.

Glazer, N., Moynihan, D. P., & Schelling, C. S. (1975). Ethnicity: Theory and experience. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Gleason, P. (1983). Identifying Identity: A Semantic History. The Journal of American History, 69(4), 910–931. https://doi.org/10.2307/1901196

Goldkuhl, Göran and Cronholm, Stefan (2010) 'Adding theoretical grounding to grounded theory: Toward multi-grounded theory', International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 9 (2): 187–205.

Gordon, I. (1995). Migration in a Segmented Labour Market. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 20(2), 139-155. doi:10.2307/622428
Gordon, M. M. (1964). *Assimilation in American Life*. Oxford University Press.

Goulding, C. (2002). Grounded Theory. SAGE Publications.

Grinchenko, G., & Olynyk, M. (2012). The Ostarbeiter of Nazi Germany in Soviet and Post-Soviet Ukrainian Historical Memory. Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne Des Slavistes, 54(3/4), 401-426. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23617484

Grubel, H., & Scott, A. (1968). The International Flow of Human Capital: Reply. The American Economic Review, 58(3), 545-548. Retrieved April 14, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1813788

Haque, N.U. & Kim, S.-J. (1995). 'Human Capital Flight': Impact of Migration on Income and Growth. IMF Staff Papers, 42(3), 577–607. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

Harold, D. (2015). Russian Exiles in Britain, 1918–1926: The Politics and Culture of Russia Abroad. Northumbria University. https://www.northumbria.ac.uk/media/7245181/daniel-harold-russian-exiles-in-britain.pdf

Heitman, S. (1991). Soviet emigration in 1990: A new 'fourth wave'? Soviet Jewish Affairs, 21(2), 11–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501679108577694

Hermen, F. A. (1958). The "tyranny of the majority." Social Research, 25(1), 37–52. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40982538

Hesse-Biber, S. (2010). Qualitative Approaches to Mixed Methods Practice. Qualitative Inquiry, 16(6), 455–468. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800410364611

Hirsch, F. (2005). Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union. ITHACA; LONDON: Cornell University Press. Retrieved November 22, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1tm7j58

Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T. (Eds.). (1983). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hooghe, M., Trappers, A., Meuleman, B., & Reeskens, T. (2008). Migration to European countries. A structural explanation of patterns, 1980-2004. *International Migration Review*, *42*(2), 476–504.

Horowitz, B. J., Afanas'ev, A., Urnov, D., Maslin, M. A., & Raeff, M. (1993). The First Wave of Russian Emigration: New Perspectives following the Fall of the Berlin Wall. The Slavic and East European Journal, 37(3), 371. https://doi.org/10.2307/309283

https://www.csr.ru/upload/iblock/704/704bb820549b28a50039d37b02efccd9.pdf

Huntington, Samuel P. (1997). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York:Touchstone

Huntington, W. C. (1933). The Homesick Million. Stratford Company

International Labour Organization. (2020). Labour Migration. Retrieved from: https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm

International Organisation for Migration. (2011). Glossary on Migration (Richard Perruchoud and Jillyanne Redpath-Cross, eds. ed., Vol. 2). https://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/observaciones/11/anexo5.pdf

Iontsev, V. A., Lebedeva, N. M., Nazarov, M. V., & Okorokov, A. V. (2001). Эмиграция и репатриация в России [Emigration and Repatriation in Russia]. University of Michigan.

Iontsev, V., Ryazantsev, S., Iontseva, S. (2016). Новые тенденции и формы эмиграции из России [New trends and forms of emigration from Russia]. Ekonomika Regiona, 12 (2), pp. 499-509. Retrieved April 14, 2021, from https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/novye-tendentsii-i-formy-emigratsii-iz-rossii

Jaccard, J., & Jacoby, J. (2010). Theory Construction and Model-building Skills. Guilford Publications.

Johnson, H. (1967). Some Economic Aspects of the Brain Drain. Pakistan Development Review, 7(3), 379–411.

Keresztély, K., Scott, J. W., & Virág, T. (2017). Roma communities, urban development and social bordering in the inner city of Budapest. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *40*(7), 1077–1095. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1267376

Klabunde, A. & Willekens, F. (2016). Decision-Making in Agent-Based Models of Migration: State of the Art and Challenges. European Journal of Population. 32. 10.1007/s10680-015-9362-0.

Knudsen, A.J., Strand, A. and Paasche, E. (2013). War and migration. In The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration, I. Ness (Ed.). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444351071.wbeghm575

Kóczé, A. (2015). Political empowerment or political incarceration of Romani? The Hungarian version of the politics of dispossession. In P. Krasztev & J. van Til (Eds.), *The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democ* (pp. 91–110). Central European University Press. https://doi.org/10.1179/jme.2012.37.3.15

Koller, B. (2010). The Imagined Region. Prospects of the Danube Identity. In A.Agh, T.Kaiser & B.Koller (Eds.), Europeanization of the Danube Region: The Blue Ribbon Project (pp. 173-188). Blue Ribbon Research Center.

Kolontári, A. (2010). Hungarian-Soviet Relations, 1920-1941. East European Monograph (COUP)

Konsul'tant Plyus. Nadezhnaya pravovaya podderzhka. (2020, July). Федеральный закон от 31.05.2002 N 62-ФЗ (ред. от 13.07.2020) "О гражданстве Российской Федерации" [Federal Law of May 31, 2002 N 62-FZ (as amended on July 13, 2020) "On Citizenship of the Russian Federation"]. Consultant.ru. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_36927/85ccbff71854900d7c7a24c37ad43f0ab2fc3dfa/

Kozinets, R. (2010). Netnography: Doing Ethnographic Research Online.

Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. (2020). Foreign citizens residing in Hungary by continents, countries, sex, 1 January (1995–). Retrieved from: https://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_wnvn001b.html

Krechetnikov, A. (2012, July 13). В России говорят о новой волне политической эмиграции [Russia is talking about a new wave of political emigration]. BBC News Russkaya Sluzhba. https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2012/07/120713_russia_emigration

Kukathas, C. (1992). Are There Any Cultural Rights? Political Theory, 20(1), 105-139. Retrieved November 22, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/191781

Kymlicka, W. (1996). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online. Retrieved from: https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198290918.001.0001/acprof-9780198290919

Levada-Center. (2019). Emigrazionniyi nastroeniya. Accessed: (in Russian). Retrieved from: https://www.levada.ru/2019/11/26/emigratsionnye-nastroeniya-4/

Leedy, P. D., & Ormrod, J. E. (2015). Practical research. Planning and design (11th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Sociology Press.

Life News. (2014, November 6). Кремль тайно финансировал Навального [Kreml tayno finansiroval Navalnogo]. Life.ru. https://life.ru/p/144382

Litovskaya, E.V. & Litovskaya M.A. (2018). "The Fourth Wave of Emigration" vs "Global Russians": Self-Naming as an Actual Problem of Forming Identity. Interface – Journal of European Languages and Literatures, 7, pp. 5.21. DOI: 10.6667/interface.7.2018.69

Lundborg P. (2006) Growth Effects of the Brain Drain. In: Langhammer R.J., Foders F. (eds) Labor Mobility and the World Economy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31045-7_22

Malesevic, S. (2006). *Identity as Ideology*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Marrus, M. R. (1985). The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. Oxford University Press.

Martiniello, M. & Rath, J. (2010). Introduction: Migration and ethnic studies in Europe. In M. Martiniello, & J. Rath (Eds.), Selected studies in international migration and immigrant incorporation (pp. 7–18). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b62b/5c50be553782bcb11d4ddffda5def56126e8.pdf

Massey, D. (1999). International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State. Population and Development Review, 25(2), 303-322. Retrieved November 11, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/172427

Matveeva, U.V. (2017). Русская литература зарубежья: три волны эмиграции XX века [Russian Literature Abroad: Three Waves of Emigration of the 20th Century]. Ekaterinburg, Russia: Ural University Publishing House. Source: https://elar.urfu.ru/bitstream/10995/47008/1/978-5-7996-2048-6_2017.pdf

McMillin, A. (1989). Exiled Russian Writers of the Third Wave and the Émigré Press. The Modern Language Review, 84 (2), pp. 406-413. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3731572.pdf

McNeill, P. & Chapman, S. (1985). Research Methods (Third Edition). Routledge Taylor & Francis Group London and New York.

Medvedev, S. (2019, March 7). Пятая волна [The Fifth Way]. Радио Свобода. https://www.svoboda.org/a/29805879.html

Merolla, D. M., Serpe, R. T., Stryker, S., & Schultz, P. W. (2012). Structural Precursors to Identity Processes. Social Psychology Quarterly, 75(2), 149–172. https://doi.org/10.1177/0190272511436352

Migration Research Institute. (2016). Europe's migrant crisis - a comprehensive analysis.

Miyagiwa, K. (1991). Scale Economics in Education and the "Brain Drain" Problem. International Economics Review, 32(3), 743 – 759.

Moscow State University (MSU). (n.d.). Крымская конференция. 4–11 февраля 1945 г. Соглашения между союзными государствами по делам военнопленных и гражданских лиц этих государств [Crimean conference. February 4-11, 1945 Agreements between Allied

States on the Affairs of Prisoners of War and Civilians of These States]. http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/War_Conf/krim21.htm

Mukherjee, N. (2018). A methodological guide to using and reporting on interviews in conservation science research. Methods in Ecology and Evolution, 9(1), 10–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/2041-210x.12828

O'Neil, K. (2003). Discussion on migration and development: Using remittances and circular migration as drivers of development. Summary Report. Migration Policy Institute. Available from: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/discussion-migration-and-development-using-remittances-and- circular-migration-drivers

Oláh, J., Halasi, G., Szakály, Z., Popp, J., & Balogh, P. (2017). The impact of international migration on the labour market - A case study in Hungary. *Amfiteatru Econ., 19*, 790–805.
Palloni, Alberto et al. "Social Capital and International Migration: A Test Using Information on Family Networks." American Journal of Sociology, vol. 106, no. 5, 2001, pp. 1262–1298. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/320817. Accessed 13 Nov. 2020.

Palnikov, M. (2007, December 22). Четвертая волна эмиграции [Fourth Wave of Emigration]. Perspektivy. Setevoye Izdaniye Tsentra Issledovaniy i Analitiki Fonda Istoricheskoy Perspektivy. http://www.perspektivy.info/rus/demo/chetvertaja_volna_emigracii_2007-12-22.htm

Panagariya, A. (2006). Migration: Who Gains, Who Loses. Brookings Trade Forum, 229-244. Retrieved April 14, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25063210

Papp, I. C., Bilan, S., & Dajnoki, K. (2019). Globalisation of the labour market – circular migration in Hungary. *Journal of International Studies*, *12*(2), 182–200. https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2019/12-2/11
Park, R. E. (1928). Human migration and the marginal man. *American Journal of Sociology*, *33*(6), 881–893.

Peeling, S. (2014, October 8). Emigration (Russian Empire) | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1). International Encyclopaedia of the First World War. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/emigration_russian_empire

Popova, V.V. (2012). Русская эмиграция «первой волны»: причины, центры, дороги [Russian emigration of the “first wave”: reasons, centers, roads]. Gumanitarnyye nauki. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov. M.: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo gumanitarnogo universiteta. Source: https://publications.hse.ru/en/chapters/73567719

Posel, D. & Marx, C. (2013). Circular Migration: A View from Destination Households in Two Urban Informal Settlements in South Africa. Development Studies, Vol. 49, Issue 6.

Pronin, A. A. (2014). The Second Postoctober Wave of Emigration from Russia: Historiographic Aspect. World Applied Sciences Journal, 29(7), 842–851. https://doi.org/10.5829/idosi.wasj.2014.29.07.13938

Pushkarev, B. S. (2008). Две России XX века: обзор истории 1917-1993 [Two Russias of XX veka: history review of 1917–1993]. Posev.

Pushkareva, N.L. (1996). Возникновение и формирование российской диаспоры за рубежом [The emergence and formation of the Russian diaspora abroad]. Otechestvennaya istoriya, 1, 54-65.

Raeff, M., & ProQuest. (1990). Russia abroad: A cultural history of the Russian emigration, 1919-1939. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rakovskaya V.S., Soloveva N.N., Tumanova I.A. (2013). Trudovaya migratsiya: posledstviya dlya stran-donorov i stran-retsipientov [Labor migration: the consequences for donor countries and recipient countries]. Modern problems of science and education. (3). (in Russian).

Rehm M. (2012). Migration and remittances. An agent-based model PhD thesis. https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1022639574.html?FMT=ABS

Remennick, L. (2015). Immigrant Generations. 10.1002/9781118663202.wberen124. Retrieved from: https://www.migraciokutato.hu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Europes-Migrant-Crisis.pdf

Retrieved from Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository, at: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/8391

Ruspini, P. (2015). Russian transnational migrant communities as agents of cooperation and integration? Retrieved from:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274040592_Russian_transnational_migrant_communities_as_agents_of_cooperation_and_integration

Ryazantsev, S. & Pis'Mennaya, E. (2013). Emigration of scientists from Russia: “Circulation” or “brain-drain”. Sot͡siologicheskie issledovanii͡a. 24-35.

Rybakovsky, L. (2021). Миграция населения. Учебное пособие для вузов [Population migration. Textbook for universities]. LitRes. https://books.google.hu/books?id=TYCzDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA401&lpg=PA401&dq=эмиграция+1991-2000+росстат&source=bl&ots=UaC8VbO6Gn&sig=ACfU3U1QfFmzfqBF8dLbYTXOI49U9EuI_g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjE0IzUyZLwAhVGhRoKHWXzAu0Q6AEwB3oECBQQAw#v=onepage&q=эмиграция%201991-2000%20росстат&f=false

Sarashevsky, Y. (2000). Роль Лиги Наций в Формировании Права Беженцев [The League of Nation's Role in Forming Refuge Law]. Journal of International Law and International Relations, 1. Source: https://elib.bsu.by/bitstream/123456789/29856/1/2000_1_JILIR_sarashevsky_r.pdf

Schneider, J. & Parusel, B. (2015). Circular Migration between Fact and Fiction – Evidence from Germany. European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 17, Issue 2-3, 184-209.

Shughart, William F., II, Tollison, Robert D. and Kimenyi, Mwangi S., “The Political Economy of Immigration Restrictions,” Yale Journal on Immigration, 1986, 4, 79-97.

Simionescu, M., Bilan, Y., Smrčka, L., & Vincúrová, Z. (2017). The effects of European economic integration and the impact of Brexit on the UK immigrants from the CEE countries. *E+M Ekonomie a Management*, *XX*(1), 29–47.

Sinkevich, V. (2012). Вторая волна русской эмиграции — Журнальный зал [The second wave of Russian emigration - Magazine hall]. Portal ZhZ Russki Tolsti Journal kak Esteticheski Fenomen. https://magazines.gorky.media/nj/2012/267/vtoraya-volna-russkoj-emigraczii.html

Smith, A. (1996). Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 72(3), 445-458. doi:10.2307/2625550

Snow, D. A., & Corrigall-Brown, C. (2015). Collective Identity. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 174–180. https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.10403-9

Sotnikov, S. A. (2010). Русская Эмиграция XX века [Russian Emigration of XX century]. Vestnik Assotsiatsii Vuzov Turizma i Servisa, 3, 8–13. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/russkaya-emigratsiya-hh-veka/viewer

Stark, O., Helmenstein C., and Prskawetz A. (1997). A Brain Gain with a Brain Drain. Economics Letters, 55(2), 227–34.

Stone, N., & Glenny, M. (1991). The Other Russia: The Experience of Exile (1st American ed). Viking Adult.

Stone, W., & Hughes, J. (2002). Social capital: Empirical meaning and measurement validity. In *Australian Institute of Family Studies, Research Paper* (No. 27). http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/RP27.pdf

Strauss, Anselm (1987) Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511557842

Strauss, Anselm and Corbin, Juliet (1990) Basics of Qualitative Research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Strauss, Anselm and Corbin, Juliet (1998) Basics of Qualitative Research, 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Stryker, S., & Burke, P. J. (2000). The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory. Social Psychology Quarterly, 63(4), 284–297. https://doi.org/10.2307/2695840

Suslov, M. (2018). "Russian World" Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic of "Spheres of Influence". Geopolitics. 23. 1-24. 10.1080/14650045.2017.1407921.

Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (2002). Handbook of mixed methods: Social and behavioral research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.—A book of readings on mixed-methods approaches to the conduct of research.

TASS. (2017, November 8). Эксперт: волны эмиграции из России в США прошли [Expert: waves of emigration from Russia to the USA passed]. TASS. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/4712691

Thomas, D. R. (2006). A General Inductive Approach for Analyzing Qualitative Evaluation Data. American Journal of Evaluation, 27(2), 237–246. https://doi.org/10.1177/1098214005283748

Thomas, G. (2011). How to do Your Case Study: A guide for students and researchers. Sage Publication.

Thornberg, R. & Charmaz, K. (2014). Grounded theory and theoretical coding. In The SAGE handbook of qualitative data analysis (pp. 153-169). SAGE Publications Ltd, https://www.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243

Thornberg, Robert (2012) 'Informed grounded theory', Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 56 (3), 243–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00313831.2011.581686

Thornberg, Robert and Charmaz, Kathy (2012) 'Grounded theory', in Edited by: Stephen D.Lapan et al. (eds.), Qualitative Research: An Introduction to Methods and Designs. San Francisco: Wiley/Jossey-Bass. pp. 41–67.

Tyuryukanova, E. V., & Malysheva, M. M. (2001). Женщина. Миграция. Государство [Текст]: общественно-политическая литература [Female. Migration. State [Text]: socio-political literature]. RAN, Institut sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh problem narodonaseleniya, Moskovskiy tsentr gendernogo issledovaniya, Moskva: Academia. ISBN 5-87444-140-9

UN DESA. (2013). International Migration Policies Report. Retrieved from: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/j_Ch_4.pdf

UN DESA. (2019a). International Migration. Retrieved from: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/InternationalMigration2019_Report.pdf

UN DESA. (2019b). International Migrant Stock. Retrieved from: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp

UN Refugees and Migrants. (2020). Definitions. Retrived from: https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/definitions

UN. (2020). Migration. Retrieved from: https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/migration/

UNECE. (2011, November). Статистика международной миграции Практическое руководство для стран Восточной Европы и Центральной Азии [International Migration Statistics A Practical Guide for Eastern Europe and Central Asia]. https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/publications/RUS_International_Migration_Statistics_Practical_Guide.pdf

United Nations Economic Comission for Europe (UNECE). (2016, January). Defining and Measuring Circular Migration. Final report of the Task Force on Measuring Circular Migration. https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/documents/ece/ces/bur/2016/February/14-Add1_Circular_migration.pdf

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (1946, December 15). Refugees and Displaced Persons. UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/excom/bgares/3ae69ef14/refugees-displaced-persons.html

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (1951). The Refugee Convention. UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.pdf

van den Berghe, P. L. (1978). Race and ethnicity: A sociobiological perspective. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1(4), 401–411. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1978.9993241

Vathi Z. (2015) Introduction. In: Migrating and Settling in a Mobile World. IMISCOE Research Series. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13024-8_1

Vladimirov, V., Baranov, E., & Samus, E. (2018, September 10). Эмиграция из России - рекордная с советских времен. [Emigration from Russia - record-breaking since Soviet times]. GOLOS AMERIKI. https://www.golosameriki.com/a/russian-emigration-grows/4377299.html

Walzer, M. (1997). *On Toleration*. Yale University Press.

Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weintraub, E. (1985). Appraising General Equilibrium Analysis. Economics and Philosophy, 1(1), 23-37. doi:10.1017/S0266267100001875

Wong, K. & Yip C.K. (1999). Education, Economics and Brain Drain. Journal of Economics, Dynamics and Control, 23 (5-6), 699 -726

Yeoh SA Brenda et al. (2020). Emigration. 10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10256-2.

Young, J. C., Rose, D. C., Mumby, H. S., Benitez-Capistros, F., Derrick, C. J., Finch, T., Garcia, C., Home, C., Marwaha, E., Morgans, C., Parkinson, S., Shah, J., Wilson, K. A., &

Zelenin, A.A. & Leukhova, M.G. (2015). "Исход из России: Первая Волна Эмиграции" [The "Exodus" from Russia: The First Wave of Emigration]. Kemerovo, Russia: Vestnik Kemerovskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, 2015, 2 (62), T.6. Accessed: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/ishod-iz-rossii-pervaya-volna-emigratsii/viewer

Zharenova, O., Kechil, N., Pakhomov, Ye. (2012). Интеллектуальная миграция россиян Ближнее и дальнее зарубежье [Intellectual Migration of Russians Near and Far Abroad]. Tsentr politicheskikh issledovaniy, Moskva: Gnom I D. ISBN 5-296-00298-9

BEISSINGER, Mark R.: Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

BYFORD Andy: *Performing "community": Russian speakers in contemporary Britain.* - In. CAIRNS Lucille, FOUZ-HERNANDEZ Santiago (szerk.): Rethinking "identities": Cultural articulations of alterity and resistance in the new millennium. - Oxford: Peter Lang, 2014 - p. 115-139.

COLIC-PEISKER, V., WALKER, I.: *Human capital, acculturation and social identity: Bosnian refugees in Australia.* - In. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 2003. 13. évf. 5. sz. - p. 337-360.

COTTLE, Simon: Ethnic minorities and the media: Changing cultural boundaries. - Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000.

ELIAS, N., SHORER-ZELTSER, M.: *Immigrants of the world unite? A virtual community of Russian-speaking immigrants on the web.* - In. The Journal of International Communication, 2006. 12. évf. 2. sz. - p. 70-90.

EVANS, A.: *Putin's legacy and Russia's identity.* - In. Europe and Asia Studies, 2008. 60. évf. 6. sz. - p. 899-912.

GANG, I. N., STUART, R. C.: *Does background matter? The transmission of human capital from a planned to a market economy.* - In. International Migration Review, 2000. 34. évf. 2. sz. - p. 511-521.

GERACI, Robert: *Russia: Minorities and Empire.* - In. GLEASON Abbot (szerk.): A companion to Russian history. - Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009 - p. 243-260.

GITELMAN, Zvi Y.: A Century of ambivalence: The Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the present. - Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.

GODZIMIRSKI, J.: *Putin and post-Soviet identity: Building blocks and buzz words.* - In. Problems of Post-Communism, 2008. 55. évf. 5. sz. - p. 14-27.

HOPF, T.: *The promise of constructivism in international theory.* - In. International Security, 1998. 23. évf. 1. sz. - p. 171-200.

ISURIN, Ludmila: Russian diaspora: Culture, identity, and language change. - Göttingen: Walter de Gruyter, 2011.

JASINSKAJA-LAHTI, Inga: *Psychological acculturation and adaptation among Russian-speaking immigrant adolescents in Finland.* - PhD diss., Helsingin yliopisto, 2000.

KALLAS, K.: *Claiming the diaspora: Russia's compatriot policy and its reception by Estonian-Russian population.* - In. Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 2016. 15. évf. 3. sz. - p. 1-15.

KOCH, Fred C.: *The Volga Germans: In Russia and the Americas, from 1763 to the present.* - Philadelphia: Penn State Press, 2010.

KOLSTØ, Pål: *Political construction sites: Nation-building in Russia and the post-Soviet states*. - Oxford: Westview Press, 2000.

KONONENKO Petro P., HOLOWINSKY Ivan Z.: *Educational reform and language issue in Ukraine.* - In. SHIMAHARA N. Ken, HOLOWINSKY Ivan Z., TOMLINSON-CLARKE Saundra (szerk.): Ethnicity, race, and nationality in education: A global perspective. - New York: Routledge, 2001. - p. 213-232.

KOPNINA, Helen: *East to west migration: Russian migrants in Western Europe.* - Hants: Ashgate, 2005.

KOSMARSKAYA Natalya: *Post-Soviet Russian diaspora.* - In. EMBER Melvin, EMBER Carol R., SKOGGARD Ian (szerk.): Encyclopaedia of diasporas: Immigrant and refugee cultures around the world. Volume 2: Diaspora communities. - New York: Springer, 2005. - p. 264-272.

LAITIN, David D.: *Identity in formation: The Russian-speaking populations in the near abroad.* - London: Cornell University Press, 1998.

LAURELLE, Marlene: *Russian Eurasianism: An ideology of Empire.* - Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008.

LAZZERINI, Edward J.: *Volga Tatars in Central Asia, 18th–20th centuries: From diaspora to hegemony.* - In. MANZ Beatrice (szerk.): Central Asia In Historical Perspective. - New York: Routledge, 1994 - p. 81-100.

LEWKOWICZ, Nicolas: The United States, the Soviet Union and the geopolitical implications of the origins of the Cold War. - New York: Anthem Press, 2018.

LO, Bobo: *Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy*. - London: Blackwell Publishing, 2008.

MADISON, G.: *Existential migration.* - In. Existential Analysis, 2006. 17. évf. - p. 238-260.

MATHESON, Donald: Media discourses: Analysing media texts. - Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2005.

MAYDELL, E., WILSON, M.: *Identity issues and challenges faced by Russian immigrants in New Zealand.* - In. Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, 2009. 1. évf. 1. sz. - p. 103-127.

MELVIN, Neil: *Russians beyond Russia: The politics of national identity.* - London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995.

NATION, R. Craig: *Russia and the Caucasus.* - In: Connections, 2015. 14. évf. 2. sz. - 1-12.

NEUMANN, Iver B.: *Russia and the idea of Europe: A study in identity and international relations.* - London: Routledge, 1996.

PONARIN, Eduard: *Security implications of the Russian identity crisis*. *Program on new approaches to Russian security* - Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

POPPE, E., HAGENDOORN, L.: Types of identification among Russians in the "near abroad". - In. Europe-Asia Studies, 2001. 53. évf. 1. sz. - 57-71.

PRINA, Federica: *National minorities in Putin's Russia: Diversity and assimilation*. - London: Routledge, 2015.

RAPOPORT, T., LOMSKY-FEDER, E., HEIDER, A.: *Recollection and relocation in immigration: Russian-Jewish immigrants "normalize" their anti-Semitic experiences.* - In. Symbolic Interaction, 2002. 25. évf. - p. 175-198.

RIASANOVSKY, Nicholas V.: *Russian identities: A historical survey.* - New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

RYAZANTSEV, S., PISMENNAYA, E.: *Demographic development of Vietnam in the context of the "Asian vector" of Russia's foreign policy.* - In. Social Sciences, 2016. 11. évf. 23. sz. - 5643-5642.

SAFRAN, Gabriella: *Rewriting the Jew: Assimilation narratives in the Russian Empire.* - Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2002.

SHAIN, Y., BARTH, A.: *Diasporas and international relations theory.* - In. International Organization, 2003. 57. évf. 3. sz. - p. 449-479.

SHEVTSOVA, Lilia: *Terregnum: Russia between past and future.* - Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014.

SHLAPENTOKH Vladimir, SENDICH Munir, PAYIN Emil (szerk.): *The new Russian diaspora: Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics.* - London: Routledge, 1994.

SIEGEL, D., BOVENKERK, F.: *Crime and manipulation of identity among Russian-speaking immigrants in the Netherlands.* - In. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 2000. 16. évf. 4. sz. - p. 424-444.

SLEZKINE, Y.: *The USSR as a communal apartment, or how a socialist state promoted ethnic particularism.* - In. Slavic Review, 1994. 53. évf. 2. sz. - p. 414-452.

SMITH, Anthony D.: *National identity.* - London: Penguin Books, 1991.

TOLZ, V.: *Conflicting "homeland myths" and nation-state building in postcommunist Russia.* - In. Slavic Review, 1998. 57. évf. 2. sz. - p. 267-294.

TSYGANKOV, Andrei P.: Russia's foreign policy: Change and continuity in national identity. - London: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2010.

TUMINEZ, Astrid S.: *Nationalism, ethnic pressures, and the breakup of the Soviet Union.* - In: Journal of Cold War Studies, 2003. 5. évf. 4. sz. - p. 81-136.

VERTOVEC, Steven: *Religion and diaspora.* – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

WINCHESTER, D.: *Russia's identity crisis.* – In. Vision, current events and politics, 2008. - https://www.vision.org/russias-identity-crisis-836 [last accessed June 5, 2024].

YURDAKUL Gökçe, BODEMANN Y. Michal: *Introduction.* - In. BODEMANN Y. Michal, YURDAKUL Gökçe (szerk.): Migration, citizenship, ethnos. - New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. - p. 1-12.

Gudkov et al 2024: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_gudkov_inozemtsev_nekrasov_new_russian_diaspora_2024.pdf

Gulina 2023: https://www.pragueprocess.eu/ru/resources/repository/34-briefs/378-24-2022
Okrussians 2022: https://research-march.okrussians.org/

Volkova et al., 2023: https://nemtsovfund.org/cp/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/RUS_REPORT_Ideas_for_Russia_New_Diasporas_working_paper-1.pdf

Kamalov E, Sergeeva I, Kostenko V, Zavadskaya M. 2022. The Great Exodus: a portrait of new migrants from Russia. Report on the results of the March 2022 survey of the OutRush project. URL: outrush.io/report_march_2022

Kamalov, Emil, Ivetta Sergeeva, Margarita Zavadskaya, and Veronica Kostenko. 2023. "Six Months in Exile: A New Life of Russian Emigrants." SocArXiv. May 20. doi:10.31235/osf.io/epn2c.

Kamalov E., Sergeeva I., Zavadskaya M., Nugumanova K., Kostenko V. (January 2024). One and a half years later: progress and barriers in the integration of Russian emigrants. Analytical report on the third wave of the OutRush project survey. URL: outrush.io/report_january_2024.

Gulins 2023: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/international/20743.pdf

Exodus 22: https://exodus22team.wordpress.com/2023/03/07/pressrelease-rus/

Chernykh et al., 2024: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/osobennosti-zanyatosti-i-trudovogo-povedeniya-russkogovoryaschih-zhenschin-prozhivayuschih-v-zarubezhnyh-stranah

Carling et al. 2015 https://legacy.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=526&type=publicationfile

IOM Glossary on Migration, 2019 https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1 (1998) p. 10

Bell and Ward (2000) https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=73b3552a4789edd8df50740964449a34f572c872

Chen (2023): https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0197397523001704

AGHANIAN, Denise: *The Armenian diaspora: Cohesion and fracture.* - Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007.

ALBA, Richard D.: *Ethnic identity: The transformation of White America.* - New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.

ANDERSON, Benedict: *Imagined communities, reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism.* Revised Edition. - London and New York: Verso Books, 1991.

ANDERSON, Benedict: *Long-distance nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics*. - Amsterdam: Centre for Asian Studies Amsterdam, 1992.

ARMSTRONG, John A.: *Nations before nationalism.* - Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

BAKALIAN, Anny: *Armenian Americans: From being to feeling Armenian.* - New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993.

BÁRDI, N., FEDINEC, C.S., SZARKA, L. (szerk.): *Minority Hungarian Communities in the Twentieth Century.* - New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.

BÁRDI, Nándor: *Different images of the future of the Hungarian communities in neighbouring countries, 1989-2012.* – In. European Review, 2013. 21. sz. - p. 530-552.

BARTHA, Csilla: *Nyelvhasználat, nyelvmegtartás, nyelvcsere amerikai magyar közösségekben*. - In. Kovács Nóra, Szarka László (szerk.): Tér és terep: Tanulmányok az etnicitás és az identitás kérdésköréből, vol. 1. - Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2002. - p. 111-136.

BÍRÓ-NAGY, A., JUHÁSZ, V., SZÁSZI, Á., VARGA, A.: *The world through Hungarian Eyes: Foreign Policy Attitudes in Hungary in 2023.* - In. Policy Solutions, 2023.

BORBÉLY, Anna: *Kétnyelvűség: Variabilitás és változás magyarországi közösségekben*. - Budapest: L'Harmattan, 2014.

BRASS, Paul: *Elite groups, symbol manipulation and ethnic identity among the Muslims of South Asia.* - In. TAYLOR, David, YAPP, Malcolm (szerk.): Political identity in South Asia. - Dublin: Curzon Press, 1979 - p. 35-77.

BRASS, Paul: *Ethnicity and nationalism: Theory and comparison.* - Newburry Park: Sage Publications, 1991.

BREUILLY, John: *Nationalism and the state.* - Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993.

BRUBAKER, R., FEISCHMIDT, M., FOX, J. E., GRANCEA, L.: *Nacionalista politika és hétköznapi etnicitás egy erdélyi városban.* - Budapest: L'Harmattan, 2011.

BRUBAKER, R., FEISCHMIDT, M., FOX, J., GRANCEA, L: *Nationalist politics and everyday ethnicity in a Transylvanian town*. - Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

BRUBAKER, Rogers: *Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe.* - Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

CONNOR, Walker: *Eco- or ethno-nationalism*. - In. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1984. 7. évf. - p. 342-359.

CONNOR, Walker: *Ethnonationalism: The quest for understanding.* - Princeton, N. J: Princeton University Press, 1994.

CSEPELI, G. ÖRKÉNY, A., SZÉKELYI, M., POÓR, J.: *National identity in Hungary at the turn of the millennium.* - In. Kolosi, T., Vukovich, G., Tóth, I.G. (szerk.): Social Report 2004. - Budapest: TÁRKI, 2004. - p. 456-468.

CSEPELI, Gy., Örkény, A.: International Comparative Investigation into the National Identity. - In. Sociological Review, Special Issue in English, 1999. - p. 95-114.

CSEPELI, György: *Contemporary Hungarian National Identity.* - Highland Lakes, NJ: ARP, 1997.

DEUTSCH, Karl W.: *Nationalism and social communication: An inquiry into the foundations of nationality.* - Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press, 1966.

EGEDY, Gergely: *A multikulturalizmus vége?* - In. Kommentár, 2016. 2. sz. - p. 73-86.

EGRY, Gábor: *Otthonosság és idegenség identitáspolitika és nemzetfelfogás Magyarországon a rendszerváltás óta*. - Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 2010.

FEJŐS, Zoltán: *A chicagói magyarok két nemzedéke 1890-1940.* - Budapest: Közép-Európa Intézet, 1993.

GAGYI, József; *Örökített székelykapu. Környezetek, örökség, örökségesítés egy székelyföldi faluban az ezredfordulón.* - In. Marosvásárhely: Mentor Kiadó, 2004.

GANS, Herbert J.: *Symbolic ethnicity: The future of ethnic groups and cultures in America.* - In. GANS Herbert J. et al. (szerk.): On the making of Americans: Essays in honor of David Riesman. - Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979. - p. 193-220.

GAZSÓ, Dániel: *A magyar diaszpóra fejlődéstörténete*. - In. Kisebbségi Szemle, 2016. 1. évf. 1. sz. - p. 9-35.

GEERTZ, Clifford: *The interpretation of Cultures.* - London: Fontana, 1963.

GELLNER, Ernest: *Nations and nationalism: New perspectives on the past.* - Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1983.

GIDDENS, Anthony: *Lecture given at LSE*, 15th Nov. 2000.

GIDDENS, Anthony: *The nation-state and violence.* - Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.

GLICK SCHILLER, Nina: *Long-distance nationalism.* – In. EMBER Melvin, EMBER Carol R., SKOGGARD Ian (szerk.): Encyclopedia of diasporas: Immigrant and refugee cultures around the world, vol. 2. - New York: Springer, 2005. - p. 570-580.

GNITIEV, Sergei: *"Because two languages live in me at the same time": The relationship between language and identity among Russian immigrants in Hungary.* - In. Alkalmazott Nyelvtudomány, 2021. 21. évf. 2. sz. - p. 80-95.

GORDON, Milton M.: *Assimilation in America: Theory and reality.* - In. Daedalus, 1961. 90. évf. 2 sz. - p. 263-285.

GORDON, Milton M.: *Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion and national origins.* - New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

GREENFIELD, Liah: *Nationalism, five roads to modernity.* - Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

GROSBY, Steven: *Religion and nationality in antiquity*. - In. European Journal of Sociology, 1991, XXXII. sz. - p. 229-265.

GYURGYÁK, János: Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története. - Budapest: Osiris, 2007.

HAGENDOORN, L., CSEPELI, Gy., DEKKER, H., FARNEN, R. (szerk.): *European nations and nationalism.* - Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000.

HALÁSZ, Katalin: *The rise of the radical right in Europe and the case of Hungary: 'Gypsy crime' defines national identity?* - In. Development, 2009. 52. évf. 4. sz. - p. 490-494.

HANS, Kohn: The idea of nationalism: A study in its origins and background. - New York: Macmillan, 1944.

HANSEN, Marcus L.: *The problem of the third generation immigrant.* - Published lecture, Augustana Historical Society, Rock Island, IL, 1938.

HASTINGS, Adrian: *The construction of nationhood: Ethnicity, religion and nationalism.* - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997

HECHTER, Michael: *Internal colonialism: The Celtic fringe in British national development. 1536-1966.* - London: Rooutledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

HOBSBAWM, Eric J.: *Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality.* - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

HOBSBAWM, Eric, RANGER, Terence (szerk.): *Invention of tradition.* - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

HOFSTEDE, Geert: *Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations,* 2nd edition. - Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001.

HOGG, M. A., WILLIAMS, K. D.: *From I to we: Social identity and the collective self.* - In. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 2000. 4. évf. 1. sz. – 81-97.

HOLICZA, Peter: *Understanding Magyar: An analysis of Hungarian identity within the framework of cultural dimensions theory and additional metrics*. - In. Legal, Economic, Managerial and Environmental Aspects of Performance Competencies by Local Authorities: 4th international scientific correspondence conference, 2016. - p. 118-124.

HROCH, Miroslav: *A nemzeti mozgalomtól a nemzet teljes kifejlődéséig: a nemzetépítés folyamata Európában*. - In. Regio, 2000. 11. évf. 3. sz. - p. 3-24.

HUSEBY-DARVAS, Éva: *Extra Hungariam Non Est Vita? The relationships between Hungarian immigrants and their homeland.* - AHEA: E-journal of the American Hungarian Educators Association, 2012. 5. sz. - p. 76-90.

HUTCHINSON, J., SMITH, A. D.: *Nationalism.* - Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

ISAJIW, Wsevolod W.: *The assimilation retention hypothesis and the second and later generations.* - University of Toronto Research Repository, January 1993.

JARJABKA, Ákos: *Kultúramenedzselési ismeretek.* - Pécs: Carbocomp Publisher, 2012.

JENDIAN, Matthew A.: *Becoming American, remaining ethnic: The case of the Armenian-Americans in central California.* - New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2008.

KEMÉNYFI, Róbert: *A nemzeti tér építésének lokális útjai, mitikus képzetei és térképi megjelenítésének formái*. - Diss. Debreceni Egyetem, 2011.

KISS, Tamás: Defining the nation: Citizenship policies, classificatory struggles and discourses crosscutting the idea of national reunification in Hungary and Romania. - Manuscript, 2015.

KISS, Tamás: *Etnikai hegemónia és transznacionalizmus? A román közvélemény viszonya az erdélyi magyar etnopolitikai célkitüzésekhez és a magyar nemzetpolitikához.* - In. Pro minoritate, 2015. - p. 3–34.

KUNCZ, Egon: *Magyarok Ausztráliában*. - Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány, 1997.

MACK, Jane Barnes: *cultural pluralism and multiculturalism: E pluribus unum or ex uno plura?* - In. Hitotsubashi Journal Social Studies, 1994. 26. évf. 2. sz. - p. 63-72.

MÁTÉ, Anita: *Az amerikai magyar katolikusok és az óhaza (1918-1939).* - Budapest: Magyar Egyháztörténeti Enciklopédia Munkaközösség, 2011.

MCSWEENEY, Brendan: *Hofstede's model of national cultural differences and their consequences: A triumph of faith – a failure of analysis.* - In. Human Relations, 2002. 55. évf. 1. sz. - p. 89-117.

NAGY, Károly: *Amerikai magyar szigetvilágban.* - Szekszárd: Nap Kiadó, 2009.

NAIRN, Tom: *The break-up of Britain.* - London: New Left Books, 1997.

NORA, Pierre S.: *Emlékezet és történelem között*. - In. Múlt és jövő, 2003. 14. évf. 4. sz. - p. 3-16.

ÖRKÉNY, Antal: *Hungarian National Identity*. - In. International Journal of Sociology, 2006. 4. sz. - p. 28-48.

ORRIDGE, A. W.: *Uneven development and nationalism 2*. - In. Political Studies, 1981. 29. évf. 2. sz. - p.181-190.

ORRIDGE, A. W.: *Uneven development and nationalism*. - In. Political Studies, 1981. 29. évf. 1. sz. - p. 1-15.

ÖZKIRIMILI, Umut: *Theories of nationalism: A critical introduction.* - London: Macmillan Press Ldt, 2000.

PALOTAI, J., WETZL, V., JARJABKA, A.: *Identity preservation and Hungarian language education in diaspora communities*. - In. Hungarian Cultural Studies, 2019. 12. sz. - p. 108-124.

PEPINSKY, T.B., REIFF, Á, SZABÓ. K.: *The Ukrainian refugee crisis and the politics of public opinion: Evidence from Hungary.* – In. Perspectives on Politics, 2024. 22. évf. 4. sz. – p. 989-1014.

POGONYI, Szabolcs*: Extra-territorial ethnic politics, discourses and identities in Hungary*. - Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

SALINS, Peter D.: Assimilation, American style: An impassioned defence of immigration and assimilation as the foundation of American greatness and the American dream. - New York: BasicBooks, 1997.

SANDBERG, Neil: *Ethnic identity and assimilation: The Polish community case study of Metropolitan Los Angeles.* - In. New York: Praeger, 1974.

SETON-WATSON, Hugh: *Nationalism and communism: Essays 1946-1963*. - New York: Praeger, 1964.

SIK, Endre: *The level and social basis of xenophobia in contemporary Hungary*. - In. ENYEDI, Zs., ERÕS, F. (szerk.): Authoritarianism and prejudice: Central European perspectives. - Budapest: Osiris, 1999. - p. 193-213.

SMITH, Anthony D.: *Nationalism and Modernism: A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism.* - London, New York: Routledge, 1998.

SUMNER, William G.: *Folkways: A study of the sociological importance of usage, manners, customs, moves, and morals.* - New York: Dover, 1906.

SZABÓ-TÖRPÉNYI, Annamária U.: *Studies about French-Hungarian bilingual identity.* - In. BÁRDOSI Vilmos (szerk.): Tanulmányok: Nyelvtudományi Doktori Iskola. - Budapest: Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Humanities, 2012.

TAJFEL, Henri: *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations.* - New York: Academic Press, 1978.

TAYLOR, P. J., FLINT, C.: *Political geography: World-economy, nation-state and locality*. - London, New York: Routledge, 2000.

TURNER, J.C., BROWN, R.J., TAJFEL, H.: *Social comparison and group interest in ingroup favouritism.* - In. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1979. 9. sz. - p. 187-204.

van den BERGHE, Pierre: *Race and ethnicity: A sociobiological perspective*. - In. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1978. 1. évf. 4. sz. - p. 401-411.

VUKOVICH, G., BOJER, A., SIMON, E., WAFFENSCHMIDT, I, KOVÁCS, M., VÖRÖS, M.: *Population census 2011*. - Budapest: Central statistical office, 2012.

WALLACE, C., STOLA, D. (szerk.): *Patterns of migration in Central Europe.* - London: Palgrave, 2001.

WEBER, Max: *Economy and society.* - Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

ZICK, A., KÜPPER, B., HÖVERMANN, A.: *Intolerance, prejudice and discrimination: A European report.* - Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Forum, 2011.

APPENDIX

Collected Interviews

CASE 1: POLITICAL EMIGRANT

Case 1. Memo

Elena Zharinova emigrated from Russia to Slovakia in 2015 for political reasons, having received a temporary residence permit in Slovakia to study the Slovak language (type of visa: other). Today Elena has a permanent residence permit in Slovakia, she has opened her own business. In 2021, she moved to Budapest, Hungary. Single, no kids.

Before moving, she was a member of the "Writers' Case" in the media known as the "Markvo Case". In Moscow, Elena held one of the highest positions at Bureau 17, a company that organized cultural and educational events in Moscow. The company repeatedly won tenders and financial support from the Moscow government for the implementation of creative projects, including one of the largest projects "Books in the Park", a series of public lectures held in Moscow parks, which brought together all contemporary writers and artists with diverse socio-political views.

In 2014 on the website of one of the Russian media outlets, LifeNews, the publication was made titled "The Kremlin secretly financed Navalny" (Life, 2014). It claimed to have evidence of covert support of the opposition by the Russian authorities. In the publication the company Bureau 17 and its director Alexandrina Markvo were accused of embezzling more than 100 million rubles in total in 2010-2014. The article also indicates that Bureau 17 was involved in the case because the owner of the company, Alexandrina Markvo, was the common-law wife of activist Vladimir Ashurkov, an associate of Navalny (Life, 2014).

Later on, the investigation started and claimed, in particular, that Markvo's company stole the funds allocated for the "News from the Classics" literary competition and prizes for the winners, as well as for the popularization of reading in Moscow parks. It was also highlighted that famous writers who sympathize with the opposition took part in the events

organized by Alexandrina Markvo, e.g. Dmitry Bykov, Lev Rubinstein, Boris Akunin (BBC, 2015).

The Investigative Committee called for an investigation of all employees, and the head of the company was put on the wanted list and arrested in absentia. Alexandra Markvo emigrated to London with her common-law husband. Many workers also decided to emigrate, whether they applied for political refugee status or not.

Elena Zharinova was frightened by the persecution in connection with her position in the company and decided to emigrate to Slovakia for the study purpose (visa type: other).

Since emigration, she has repeatedly returned to Russia, took part in interrogations. In 2020, the Markvo case was officially closed, but Elena does not want to return to Russia and is not going to.

During her emigration, she was able to integrate into Slovak society (indicator: language and knowledge of culture), gain financial independence without using the labor market in Slovakia (the owner of a business registered in Slovakia). Elena's motive for moving to Hungary is connected with her love for the country and the built social circle in Budapest. Additionally, she purchased a real estate property in Budapest, Hungary.

She is a first-generation emigrant, determined to integrate into Hungarian society through starting a business and studying Hungarian culture. She does not speak Hungarian at the moment but plans to study in the future.

I expected that in an interview Elena would be quite negatively opposed to the Russian government, which is more reminiscent of the first wave of emigres who dreamed of returning to their homeland, but subject to a change of government to a more liberal one, while being a patriot of their country, not considering the country of emigration for a long-time basis. The second counter-expectation was within the framework of the fifth wave of emigration, which is probably the most embarrassed in its outline because emigration is voluntary, that is, unrestrained. Emigrating from Russia, people seem to be in search of a better life (economic, political, etc.). Elena’s case showed that yes, in Russia there are prerequisites for political emigration, direct and indirect, but modern emigrants (so far Elena's case) shows that emigrants are ready to ‘invest’ or give back to societies where they establish their life, so ‘if you are in a tribe, then be a part of the tribe’. An interesting conclusion follows from this that, while identifying themselves as Russian emigrants, they are cosmopolitan or 'global Russians', which might be a part of personality or identity that allows being integrated into any society of the world. Also, starting from the thought of the tribe, one can think about the concept of a digital nomad since Elena's business is managed remotely.

Case 1. Interview

Q[29]: When did you emigrate?

A[30]: In 2015.

Q: Why did you emigrate?

A: There are several reasons, but the main one is that the company I worked for was accused of having connections with Navalny. They began to drag us around the investigative committees and so on. I did not feel safe in Russia, so I quickly found an opportunity to leave there.

Q: What was the main legal reason for your emigration? Did you apply for political asylum?

A: No, I applied and got a study visa for the Slovak language course in Slovakia, as a temporary country. A month later, I was already there.

Q: How long have you lived in Slovakia until now?

A: 6.5 years

Q: Did you succeed in learning Slovak in the end?

A: Yes, that's fine.

Q: How has your life changed there in terms of work, activity?

A: I was lucky, I returned to the previous company I worked for, before the company that was accused of having ties with Navalny. This is one cultural project of liberal views. It is quite large and almost everyone who works for it lives abroad and already many people are banned from entering Russia because of that. Almost everyone works remotely and meets in Russia when it's needed and there is no other way.

Q: Do you visit Russia sometime?

A: Yes, I will visit Russia. But the first year it was not clear whether it was safe to go there. Because it wasn't clear and I wasn't even sure how I would survive financially…one of my friends said that if I did not have money and I would not be able to work, he would support me financially because it was not known whether we were allowed to visit Russia.

Q: Do you feel safe in Russia?

A: Now yes, because the case was closed last year [2020]. One of the case members received a sentence, the other one is in absentia because she is also not in Russia. More than 5 years have passed.

---

[29] 'Q' means question.

[30] 'A' means answer.

Q: What was the case’s name, Markvo?

A: Yes, that was Markvo’s case.

Q: What was the company’s name you worked for? A company called Bureau 17?

A: Yes.

Q: What kind of project did you do there?

A: I have done almost all the projects of Bureau 17. For example, a pop market festival, “Books in Parks”, a top trainer's competition, participation in various international projects in Paris, New York, and Madrid.

Q: Was the company engaged in cultural activities?

A: Yes, of course. We only dealt with culture. No political actions were carried out. We worked with the Moscow government, but we did good quality cultural projects, where sometimes, of course, we could invite different people to talk, such as Dmitry Bykov [the writer], some journalists of more liberal views, but these were just such public discussions without campaigning or something.

Q: Why do you think this project was eventually called political? In the media, it is now described as political.

A: As the owner of the company [Alexandra Markvo], she later married Vladimir Ashurkov [the oppositioner], who was then the director of FBK [Anti-corruption Foundation, marked as an extremist's organization in Russia]. They tied it up and suggested that in this way the Kremlin financed Navalny through our company, in which all of us, 5 people who worked were accused. Although this was completely untrue.

Q: That is, you also think that this is not true?

A: No, this is not true, because the budgets are small and since we did everything. There wasn't even a possibility that money still could not remain.

Q: The case involves a budget of about 60 million rubles, is that true?

A: You know, I’ll tell you this, I was interrogated. I came for the investigation process, and they asked me, “What do you see in the picture from the event?”. I said, “I see the TV”. The policeman answered, “And according to the technical specification there is a projector and a screen. So, the money has been stolen!”

Imagine the situation. If they were spent, relatively speaking, on the terms of reference for an event, and this is a free event. Participants were not paid there. Once one of them fell ill, had to change the date or cancel the event, and so the free tickets. The event is cancelled for a reason. This is one of the biggest disadvantages of funds, they want every coin accounted for within the plan and have no room for the possible reasons 'something went wrong. For them, it

means that they were not spent by the technical guideline. In no cultural project, it is impossible to spend everything ideally and according to the technical guideline. An event is a living organism, everything changes. Sixty million rubbles are the sum that we received for over five years by the company for all-all-all projects. They counted the loss there about 3-4 million.

Q: Which of the writers ended up emigrating?

A: Akunin [the writer]. I don't think it has anything to do with us. I think he was at some international exhibition or a book market festival with us. He probably didn't want to go to the interrogation.

Q: How did you find out that you were involved in this case? Have you received a summons or?

A: In general, we all learned about it from the media that our company was accused of. The next day, the directors were contacted by the investigative committee, asked to provide information, and summons for questioning were sent to all employees.

Q: When you were invited for interrogation, were you initially scared? Have you thought that it might be a one-day case?

A: No, I knew that it will last longer because that was a purely political action, invented for the anti-PR of the same Navalny. Moscow was just more liberal in those years [2014 and before]. In those years, in the park, we could hold some kind of discussion not on a political topic. Ok, not with the participation of Navalny, of course, but with Ksenia Sobchak [the former presidential candidate 2018, now oppositionist], who was in opposition. Ilya Yashin [oppositioner] also took part in one of our projects. People of semi-liberal views took part and it was encouraging. It is not like it was encouraging, it could be simply done, because of liberal freedoms. And then they [the Russian government] began to tighten the screws. What we have faced with the case of Markvo was the second step, and the first one was when the autumn of that year [2014] began.

We did the bookmarklet festival, on Krasnaya Presnya [the park in Moscow], two days before the festival, a report was released about the "cultural traitors" who performed in Ukraine, including Diana Arbenina [a Russian singer, musician, poet, and leader of the rock group Nochnye Snaipery]. She was our headliner, she was going to read poetry in the park. She was banned. We could not do anything, they made it clear to everyone that we had to cancel her performance. Because if we didn't cancel, then they would cancel us. For the company, this is a lot of money that you simply wouldn't be paid, and even more, we would receive a fine to pay for a government contract because we didn't follow. And the other situation is…even if you spent a million [rubles] for a project there, and you did not hold the festival for any reason, then

you must return the budget money to the Moscow government. You would not only bear the costs yourself, but you also have to return this money with a penalty. Therefore, we had no choice, we had to somehow hold the festival. This is also a political issue. A few months later, this article [Markvo case] came out about the fact that our company is accused. It was clear that they were already tightening the political screws through cultural influence.

At the first interrogations with a lawyer, I was asked about five times, “Who, who did you work with, what was the position”. Then they started asking in more detail.

On the one hand, you know the truth, on the other hand, you know that every word dropped can be turned out against the company's director [Alexandra Markvo]. Therefore, you think how wouldn’t tell too much information so that they won’t turn it over in any way, because nobody needs your truth there.

Q: So, did you assume that they knew the answer to what they asked you about and just lead you in the specific direction?

A: No, I don’t think so. From the very beginning, they just figured out what was happening, and then, a year and a half later, when I got to the chief of interrogation, he told me directly, “So, I need such and such information from you, I know that it was so, and so, and so. If you don't tell, we can say that you are perjury.”

Investigators fell into two categories. The first one was something like “look at this picture, how many microphones do you see, and what do you say if there are three microphones in the picture, and five microphones each?” Usually, the answer was “I don't remember, because it was five years ago!” In 2017, I was asked about the project we had in 2011. They considered a couple of projects there, it was enough for them to find a sufficient amount for the article they indicated. For example, we had park projects and, if it rained, the park did not allow an event to be held on that day due to heavy rain. According to the technical guideline, we had to hold an event every weekend. For example, on Saturday the park was closed, then you postponed it to another day with the same program. But that was illegal, according to the technical guideline. On the one hand, you did everything. You did not sleep at night because you supervised installation, dismantling… and generally worked six and a half days a week. On the other hand, it was considered the forfeit of a contract. Although the events were held, just in connection with some circumstances.

Q: Let us summarize again. Did you move in the first year the investigation started?

A: Yes, I moved immediately, simply because it was not clear. It is clear that it was a political matter, before that there was already one thing. It was not clear how it would develop, because

in our country if they wanted to, they could accuse even a cleaning lady. The investigative committee is not the most pleasant thing in life.

Q: How many times did you come to the investigative committee?

A: I can't say, but every time I visited Russia for sure. Maybe six times in total. My colleague, who remained in Russia, went there as if to work. Two times a month or twenty times in total.

Q: Had it ever happened that you or your family members were subjected to some kind of intimidation?

A: No. But, for example, when I had the apartment search by the police, it was already at the end of 2016, they said, "It's good that you came because all the others had already been searched". It was a search for a show. The court said that all witnesses should be searched. It is clear that they didn't find anything there because I had tenants living there already, but they directly said that if I wouldn't have come, then they would have to break the door at my address registration in Moscow because the term and warrant for the search were already approaching the deadline. The court gave the warrant. But I don't know if it can be considered intimidation, it's probably just a fact.

Q: What's about parents?

A: My parents were not intimidated, but I know that some parents of my colleagues were. My parents do not live in Moscow.

Q: Tell me, why did you initially choose Slovakia for emigration?

A: I just typed the request in Yandex [one of the largest search engines in Russia]: 'In which EU country can I get the documents the fastest?' The easiest way was to study the Slovak language.

Q: Was it difficult for you to draw up the documents?

A: No, the documents were very easy to process and issue. I needed the police clearance certificate, money, course booking and some more.

Q: Did you just follow the guidelines on the Slovak site, and thus you got a visa?

A: No, I paid an intermediary who arranged everything for me. That time it was pretty cheap. All together with the year of study, all documents and fees, it cost about one thousand five hundred euros. There were simply not so many immigrants that year. A year later it was a lot of Ukrainian migrants came.

Q: When you went there for the courses, did you plan to stay there for a long time? What was your plan anyway?

A: I thought I would live there for a couple of years and then move to Vienna. Slovakia is not such a dreamy place to live after Moscow. Well, then I somehow fell in love with Hungary and moved here.

Q: When you moved to Slovakia, was it difficult for you to build a social circle? Who were you mainly in the social circle?

A: Yes, it is difficult, because highly intelligent and educated people are still hard to find in Slovakia. Mostly they would go to Austria, Amsterdam, London, but these cities were completely beyond my financial capabilities. Simple people would go to Slovakia or the Czech Republic. From the circle of poets, writers, journalists and photographers, I came to the circle of students, managers who sold glasses in Ukraine, seamstresses and others. But some guys came there to do business, and we quickly became friends, because we had similar views.

Q: Do you communicate more with Russian-speaking people, Slovak or generally expats?

A: Russian-speaking people, because I don't know what to talk about with Slovaks at all. They are very conservative, and I began to communicate with expats only later, when my circle expanded, people appeared who work in international companies, and not just students who came to courses in the Slovak language.

Q: Did you use the opportunity to learn the Slovak language just for emigration That is, you did not have a special desire, but you could sacrifice it for the sake of emigration?

A: Yes, I was worried about how the situation might unfold, because I was the program director for these projects. Even though I was not officially registered, my name was on all the press releases. After the director and the creator, the third person was me, to whom they could come with questions. If you are a program director, where is your program, why is it not like that? So, I was worried, I wanted to leave Russia as quickly as possible.

Q: What is your level of proficiency in Slovak?

A: I think it's around B2 [upper intermediate].

Q: When you lived in Slovakia, did you start celebrating some of their national holidays? Have you somehow changed your cultural routine, Russian identification, shall we say so?

A: Not really, there are no interesting holidays in Slovakia. Well, there is the day of Cyril and Methodius, the liberation of Slovakia from the Nazis, the day of the Slovak popular uprising. They are so Catholic, they have Catholic holidays. In any case, you live with this calendar. Of course, I did not celebrate Catholic Easter, but I enjoyed the holidays with great pleasure for relaxation.

Q: Did you learn Slovak history at this time?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: Did you integrate as an emigrant?

A: I think yes. Additionally, I already have a permanent residence. In a couple of years, I can apply for a passport. I think I will do it, simply because within 10 years it is already possible to obtain a passport and it will be faster there than here.

Q: How did your identity change after moving to Slovakia initially? Can you say that anything in your usual Russian routine has changed?

A: Yes, in Slovakia people don't work at all. They are very relaxed. In Moscow you work all the time, that's a lot of money, but there you never work, in Slovakia, you don't need much money. You need enough money. You can work less for enough money, instead of six and a half days a week for good money that you have no time to spend.

Q: How did you get the idea to move to Hungary? Why Hungary?

A: For two reasons. I have long wanted to leave Slovakia, because it was boring there, especially after the corona happened and everything was closed, it became simply unbearable. But I had to wait for the permanent residence, which I received almost a year ago because it opens the way to any country in Europe. I was looking for a country, at that time I had a relationship with a man from Budapest, I spent almost all of my time in Budapest. Everything got to the point that from February to July, I was in Slovakia for only five weeks. I was either in Moscow or here. I have already spent most of this year here. I love Budapest. Budapest is a big city, similar to Moscow in terms of the rhythm of life. And to Tel Aviv. Before that, I had planned to leave for Israel, but it did not work out.

Q: When did you finally move to Hungary?

A: These days [28th of October 2021].

Q: Is it related to the purchase of an apartment here?

A: Yes. Six months ago, I bought an apartment here because I realised I had spent most of my time here. I cannot say that this is a gradual move. Again, my apartment in Slovakia has not yet been rented out [Elena owns an apartment there], but I rarely appear there.

Q: What are your plans for Hungary? Are you going to try to integrate here somehow?

A: Yes, I want to open a business here [referring to KATA]. I already have one property, maybe buy another one with the loan. I have almost all my friends here, they do not speak Russian. They are almost all expats.

Q: Do you have Hungarian friends already?

A: There are Ukrainian Hungarians, they have Hungarian passports. Other than that, I have not yet established closed ties with any Hungarians.

Q: When you started living in another country, did you change your political views? Have you started to follow Russian news less or pay more attention to local politics?

A: As a journalist, I follow all the news [Elena graduated from journalism]. Usually, in the morning I open Russian news, Slovak news, Hungarian news and Israeli news too, I often open it. But I read Slovakia, Hungary and Russia every day to be aware of the situation. Especially Slovak ones since I have a business there. If there are any subsidies because of the corona, I need to know about it. In Hungary, because I need to be aware of the news. In Russia, simply because it is interesting.

Q: Will you take part in local elections, if you are allowed to do so?

A: Of course. I will gladly take part in such things.

Q: What are your plans for the social circle? Do you have a goal to find Hungarians and get to know them better?

A: Since I do not speak Hungarian and will hardly master it above A1 [basics], there is no such goal. Honestly, I don't know about Hungarians. If they speak English, then yes, why not.

Q: What kind of image do you have in your head about Hungarians? When are you in the early stages of moving and adapting here?

A: I can only compare Hungarians with the Slovaks in this regard. Slovaks, are more conservative, there were even two jokes. One is that when Slovaks are leaving Slovakia, we always note them on the planes [because of the social behavior]. And another one, a typical Slovak goes once a year in the Tatras, the second time a year a typical Slovak has a vacation in Croatia, and the other 364 days he drinks beer every evening. It seems to me that the Hungarians are livelier. I don't have a relationship now, so I started communicating on Tinder [dating app] again. There are a lot of interesting people, they are always motivated to go out, go to theatres or museums. It seems to me that they have a higher cultural level.

Q: By the way, are you married? Do you have kids?

A: Not yet

Q: Are you planning to create children with a Russian-speaking person or are you still open to all possibilities. Do you have any preferences?

A: I am open to all possibilities. Recently I have been dating Russian-speaking Israelis. It all depends on the cultural level of the person. A person who moved from country to country will understand me more, than a person who moved from Ivanovo [the industrial city in Russia] to Austria because he stole some money. I am open to everything, but it turns out one-sided. I have nothing against the Hungarian men.

CASE 2: STUDENT EMIGRATION

Case 2. Memo

In Chapter II when describing the fifth way of emigration, it was mentioned that more and more young and educated people leave the country. It was assumed that the political movement does not have a direct influence but undoubtedly influences the decision of many (BBC News, 2012; Bushuev, 2019). This case shows two things at once.

Firstly, there is a strong desire to leave Russia for a better life but it's rather the mix of intertwining motives than the influence of one specific cause. The important role plays the identity stage in life and the set of social roles and status. In the case of Elizaveta, based on her interview, the decisive factor might be personal relationships development or work. Although, I think the relationships.

Secondly, the case shows that young people are possibly ready to emigrate for education purposes, meaning that they understand the set of rules for emigration, they purposely apply for studies to pursue their dream, whatever it is. In this case, the interviewee even proceeded further with the academic activity that can be counted as a win-win strategy. Although, despite the fact of the country's benefit and scholarship given, the immigrant hasn't been integrated or assimilated.

That would be curious to track other students' opinions, regarding perspectives living in Hungary.

Case 2. Interview

Q: Could you introduce yourself?

A: Elizaveta Mikhailovna

Q: What's your date of birth?

A: June 3, 1996

Q: Where are you from?

A: Taganrog, Rostov region, Russia

Q: What is your education?

A: MSc, Economics, Eszterházy Károly Catholic University [University in Hungary]

Q: What's about your bachelor's?

A: Bachelor's degree, tour operator & travel agency activity, Southern Federal University [Rostov-on-Don, Russia]

Q: How old were you when you completed your bachelor's degree?

A: I was 22.

Q: So, what is your activity at the moment?

A: I'm enrolled in a Ph.D. program at the Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Gödöllő campus [city in Hungary].

Q: What is the topic of the dissertation?

A: Virtual tourism. The idea is to study how virtual reality, tools, and its principles can be transferred to the classic tourism sector, in particular the organization of virtual tours. That is, the organization of full-fledged tours when you completely immerse yourself in virtual reality without virtual glasses and any other equipment of augmented reality.

Q: Who would benefit from this?

A: I think it would be useful for tourists who may not have the physical or financial capacity to go on a real tour. It also opens up a new niche for tour operators, travel agents. And, of course, in this case, money will be allocated for the development of these virtual reality technologies themselves.

Q: What is your marital status today?

A: In a relationship with a Jordan guy.

Q: When did you move to Hungary?

A: First, I came for six months in September 2017, and for good in 2018 in September

Q: Why did you emigrate?

A: Studies

Q: When you say “studies”, did you have a direct aim to study in Hungary or rather used it as a tool following your aims, goals, plans?

A: Rather, I used it as a tool

Q: Why?

A: I originally came to travel. That is, it was an opportunity to come to Europe, you have a Schengen visa, when you can travel anywhere, it was before the coronavirus. Then I met my boyfriend and already returned here to be together with him.

Q: What was your profession before? Have you ever worked?

A: I did not work, I have no experience at all.

Q: Do you have a scholarship here?

A: Yes, the university scholarship [refers to the Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship]

Q: Did your parents help you initially financially or not?

A: Yes, they did.

Q: How would you rate your family’s financial situation?

A: I'd say we are middle-class with an average income in Russia

Q: How did you decide to emigrate? Was it a strategic decision, did you want to go to Hungary or did you want to go to another country?

A: Initially, in 2017, I just wanted to go somewhere. It's just that somewhere not to Russia, to travel, to see how things are "there", maybe to pump up my English. When I arrived, it was the same program [Stipendium Hungaricum] for only six months, here I was only traveling. That is, all these 3-4 months it was only traveling [meaning: she didn't have a purpose to stay]. Financial support came from parents, from the university [Russian university], additionally, a scholarship here. In principle, I counted on one semester here and then planned to return home, I did not plan to emigrate. Then I met my boyfriend and decided to return. Since I was completing the 4th year of my bachelor's degree in Russia, I had the opportunity to return to my master's degree. I submitted documents in the same way and was selected. In September 2018 I was already here. Studying for a master's degree, living in a dormitory, nothing special. When I finished my master's degree, I decided to continue with graduate school. Again, that was influenced by the fact that it's easier for me to be here since they [Hungarian government, Tempus foundation, university] pay me a scholarship, they give me a hostel, I study and I can stay in the country for 4 years. I still don't have work experience, because I mostly study.

Q: Do I understand correctly that you were not particularly interested in Hungary, but more in the opportunity to travel in the EU?

A: Yes, I was lucky that I found this program. It allowed me to stay in the country for a long time and sponsored me in some way. It provides an opportunity to study. But it could be any other country, not necessarily Hungary.

Q: Have you worked here or tried to find a job?

A: At some point, I tried to find a job, but the corona hit, so everything turned out to be more complicated. Now I plan to either look for something in tourism, or wait another year while I study, and then start working on my research work. I think at that moment I will have more opportunities to find a job.

Q: What year are you in graduate school?

A: 2nd year.

Q: What are your plans after graduation?

A: I will graduate in 1.5-2 years, it takes 4 years of doctoral school. I plan to find some postgraduate program, not necessarily Hungary. Most likely it will be in some Scandinavian countries, for example, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands. But ideally, find something in Canada and move there.

Q: Why is it like that exactly?

A: I would like to see other countries. I was in the Netherlands, I liked it, I fell in love with the country, I want to live there. But again, there is some opportunity to move to Canada. I heard about a program that provides citizenship on a competitive basis, and in principle, this is also an interesting option to try to apply for.

Q: Why don't you want to stay in Hungary? What are the defining or repulsive factors that you do not consider Hungary as such a country to stay in the future?

A: I like the country very much and the cities in which I lived before [Eger, Gödöllő]. They are very small but cozy, they have their atmosphere. For example, nature, the mountains nearby. Everything is fine. Budapest is also a big developed city, the only thing I don't like is that it is rather dirty, and, in principle, some kind of bureaucracy is very repulsive everywhere. It takes 2 months to issue some documents. I'm not very good at communicating in Hungarian. And the Hungarians themselves do not speak English. That is, in Budapest, it is still somehow possible, but outside the capital, it is not. This limits your job search. I thought that I had been living here for 4 years for sure, I already discovered the country, found out what and how. I want something new, new experience, new countries and people.

Q: What was your path of movement through the cities here?

A: I lived in Eger, Gödöllő [cities in Hungary]. I have been living in Budapest since September.

Q: What do you think, what makes a Russian person a Russian and what elements of a Russian person can you define in yourself, which are unshakable values for you when you communicate with other cultures?

A: I don’t know. At some point, the experience of living abroad and communication in such an international society somehow blurred this 'identity' framework. There are no definite features of any nationality. If we take all Russians, we can say that most of them do not speak English, perhaps they are more closed-minded than other international people. But again, everything depends on each person, we are all different. I have met Russians who are quite open and cheerful, ready to communicate with everyone, at the same time Russians who are typical blondes with blue eyes, super cold with a scourge face. It all depends on the person. I do not particularly notice Russian features in myself. The biggest one is my love for traditional [Russian] cuisine. After 2 years of living here, I missed cutlets, vinaigrette, borscht, I have to cook it. But by nature, I do not particularly single out.

Q: What is your religion?

A: Russian Christian Orthodox, but I'm more of an agnostic.

Q: After moving to Hungary, do you continue to follow Russian politics? What is your attitude towards it?

A: Yes, I continue to follow. It seems to me that Russia and Hungary are similar. An irreplaceable leader who leads the country and has no replacement. It's sad. I continue to follow what is happening in Russia since I still have Russian citizenship, I pay taxes and so on. My family lives there, naturally, I am worried about the situation, I keep my finger on the pulse [Russian expression that means following something actively].

Q: Do you take an active part in the Russian elections? Do you passively follow it?

A: No, I don't participate but I passively follow

Q: Can you say that your economic well-being is better here than it could be in Russia?

A: Yes, for now, yes

Q: Do you celebrate Russian holidays?

A: Yes, together with the international community. We celebrate New Year Eve intensely [one of the Russian greatest celebrations], although here it is mainly Christmas. So, I still celebrate New Year's Eve with my community here. I discovered Shrovetide for myself because in Russia I didn't do this, but here there are pancakes and all kinds of fillings. I celebrate Russian Easter too.

Q: Do you also celebrate Hungarian holidays?

A: No, not really.

Q: About your social circle here. If you could define your social circle by nationalities, ethnicities, how would it be?

A: Here I mainly communicate with Arabs, because my boyfriend is an Arab, his social circle is my social circle. Well, there are separate units of any nationality. Kazakhs, Vietnamese, Africans, Russians, but mostly Arabs.

Q: What is the percentage of Russians in your entire circle of communication here?

A: 1-2%

Q: What about the Hungarians, do you have them in your circle?

A: Yes, about the same, 1-2%

Q: Are there any habits that you got right here? Those that have perhaps influenced your identity?

A: No, I can't single out anything special. Maybe I started sorting the garbage. This is something new for me.

Q: Do you think that life in Europe is better than in Russia?

A: The question is twofold. It depends on which country in Europe. Hungary is nevertheless closer to us both in mentality and terms of living standards than Germany or the Netherlands. There is still something better, something worse. The same medicine in Russia is cheaper and of better quality. Here I somehow came across this, but there were minimal successful results.

Q: Where is life better: in Russia or Hungary?

A: I find it difficult to answer. For me, Hungary is better. But I understand that it is good in Russia too. I felt it. The taste of vegetables in Russia is even better. Perhaps because I lived in the south. I'm better here, but again I would try to improve my situation and move to another country.

Q: Are you considering returning to Russia at some point?

A: As the most, most, most emergency case. If all my ideas, plans, opportunities fail, then perhaps I will return and most likely only to find another opportunity to leave. Not necessarily to Europe, possibly to Asia. Not because Russia is so bad, but because I want to try different places, different countries, live in different communities

Q: Do you speak Hungarian?

A: Very, very, very little. Basic moments, but not fluently.

Q: Why?

A: There was a language course, life in a small town pushed me to the need to study. I have no close friends with whom I could communicate in Hungarian. All Hungarians I communicate with speak fluent English and I don't need to learn Hungarian. Additionally, I do not consider the possibility that I will stay here for a long time. While I study, I study. I study in English, I look for a job, but I don’t need it so much that I’d like to learn the language. Moreover, Hungarian is used only in Hungary. If I move it will be a dead language for me.

Q: Are you open to building a family with a Hungarian, if there will be an opportunity?

A: In theory, yes, why not? But at the moment I have a boyfriend with whom everything is serious. It is possible to build a family in Hungary, but this is a failure. I would still like to move to the west.

Q: Do you participate in the social and political life of Hungary?

A: No

Q: What value do you bring to this country as an immigrant?

Q: In terms of study and terms of research. I live in Hungary; my studies include Hungarian people and serve Hungarian interests. If any research or project is successful, I will implement them in Hungary, since I live here and conduct my study here. Therefore, some kind of mission

is my potential contribution to scientific development. They allowed me to study here, gain knowledge. I would like to give back what I've been taught.

Q: Have you ever faced any nationalist sentiments against Russian here?

A: No, I did have this experience, but I had a friend who studied in China and her neighbor, a Hungarian woman, had a negative attitude towards Russians and Slavs. She was 40 years old. I know Hungarians 50-70 years old, or the younger generation. The average reacted negatively to the USSR and Russia. I understand that hatred can only come from here. But at the same time, the adult and young generation have a positive attitude towards Russians.

Q: Why do you want to emigrate from Hungary?

A: Mainly because of the economic situation. Everything rises in price; the scholarship does not increase. The political reason, the precarious position of Hungary, can be expelled from the EU. All this gossip affects my attitude. I understand that when I finish my studies and stay here, it may not be an EU country anymore, I will lose all the privileges of all travel and work. It pushes you to want to leave.

Q: What would be the influencing factor for you to stay here?

A: Maybe if I get a good job. If I got a job here, then yes, I probably would have stayed here. But if I had the opportunity to work in another country, I would have left. Again, because I am interested in seeing different countries, places where it is possible to live, to compare them with what I had.

Q: How well do you know Hungarian history?

A: I rather know the aspects that connected Hungary and Russia. Perhaps some moments from world history are associated with Austria. There were no courses where I'd learn more about Hungarian history, it's all like general history knowledge.

Q: So, do I understand right that it's not interesting for you?

A: No, I don't know much and it's out of my interest sphere.

Q: Why?

A: Every time I come, it seems like this is the last time. But for some reason I still stay for a couple of years, so I am busy with some pressing matters. Study, research, articles. I don't have free time to learn about the history of the country, about the holidays. But it should be. I live here, communicate with people. But again, because I want to move, I see no reason to waste time on this country if I leave in two years.

Q: Can you say that the political situation in Russia could be better?

A: Yes, I could

Q: And the economic one?

A: I think so

Q: What about Hungary?

A: Yes, that could be too. It seems to me that the problem of all these can be put in three matters: corruption, the irremovability of power and, perhaps, the general indifference of people to the situation. Hungarians are somehow lacking in initiative. They have a job, they have been told to do this, this and that. They don't even have a thought to do something more or somehow adapt to the situation. Based on what they should do, change it or solve some problem. For example, they will forward it to the manager and wait for a simple answer. In this regard, yes, they don't have initiative. This is not resolved at one level, but also the highest levels of the state, economic structures

Q: Is it better to live in Hungary than in Russia?

A: Yes, better, but you can find even better.

CASE 3: MIXED EMIGRATION: STUDIES & FAMILY

Case 3. Memo

Nadia's story is truly impressive. Nadia studied at one of the most liberal universities in Hungary, namely the Central European University. In her interview, one can see how her worldview and social reality changed with her education. How her return to her homeland culturally shocked her, where she no longer felt like a Russian, but a foreigner. Its values of European freedoms were contrasted with Russian realities. Here we can trace the change in her identity under the influence of European society. At the same time, Nadya did not express opposition or negative views on Russian politics or life in general. Moreover, she is apolitical.

It happened by chance that using the Russian social circle, she was able to return to Hungary as a migrant in circulation and later marry a Hungarian and have children. Her case shows full integration into Hungarian society.

I have an assumption that, in general, mixed Russian-Hungarian marriages increase the chances of integration and adaptation in the country.

Case 3. Interview

Q: How long ago did you leave Russia?

A: My first year abroad was in 2003-2004. I went to the United States while still a schoolgirl because I got a grant there. I spent an academic year there, then returned to Russia. The Russian

period began. In 2008-2009, I spent most of the year abroad. I studied to be a teacher of Russian as a foreign language, so I had internships one after another. I lived in Finland for about 3 months, then somewhere at the same time in Poland, and then I won a grant in CEU [Central European University] and left for the 2009-2010 academic year to Hungary. I studied here for a year and returned to Russia. In 2012 I returned to Hungary again and since then I have been here. That is, if you count from 2012, then this is 9 years, well, I would say 12 years in total. But in Hungary specifically it has been 10 years, but with a break.

Q: Between your internships, did you study at a university in Russia?

A: Yes, at the Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, Faculty of Philology, specialization in teaching Russian as a foreign language.

Q: How did your worldview and attitude towards Russia change along with your internships when you were abroad?

A: It started to change dramatically here, when I was studying in CEU, when I came to Hungary, because when I was on an internship at one of the secondary schools in Turku, Finland, then the next big internship was in Poland, there still my mission was to carry Russian culture to the masses. That is, here I am, a teacher of Russian as a foreign language, talking about Pushkin, Lomonosov, space, everything is cool, great, we sing Russian songs, listen to Russian poetry, talk about beautiful places in Russia. I felt like I was a promoter of Russia. We choose what we don't want to talk about, we add all the best. We carry this image to the masses. When I came here to study, the students were mostly from Eastern Europe. There were a lot of Yugoslavs in our faculty, also a country with a not very simple recent history, there were Poles, there were a lot of guys from all countries of the former Soviet Union. And we were all a little surprised when we learned that the look at a not-so-long history is very different. When you listen to different points of view and at the same time you communicate closely with people from all over the world, you understand that everything is not so simple. You begin to look at all this more critically, you begin to look closely, to understand slowly for yourself. I'm not saying that everything is bad in Russia, but everything is fine here, you just start to look differently and here is the question “does it suit me or not?” For a year I liked it, of course, I am such an independent and strong woman, I can do this and that, and so on.

When I returned to Russia, I suddenly realized that such free thinking was present only within the framework of the university. I now understand that it is not everywhere in Hungary either, but then it seemed to me that no, in Hungary this was not the case. And then I came back and somehow, what kind of patriarchal way of life, why everyone puts me in my place, and so on. At that moment it triggered me. I began to think that no, some kind of desynchronization in my

head. I still treat Russian culture with great trepidation, there are still important moments that determine who I am, what I am. After all, I am a linguist, the Russian language is a very important thing for me, the key to understanding Russian culture and so on. At the same time, I realized that this is all great, but in Russian society, I did not feel very comfortable after graduating from university. I began to look for escape routes, and I became catastrophically uncomfortable. When I returned to Russia, for financial reasons I urgently needed to find a job. It was found, but not in St. Petersburg, as I wanted, but in the Leningrad region. Employers forgot to tell me that yes, the bus goes to St. Petersburg for 2 hours, if it doesn't break down, there will be no traffic jams, etc., but it runs 3 times a day, and I didn't have my car then. There was a very small town there. After Budapest, all this intellectual movement, I felt insanely sad. My social circle here catastrophically did not understand me. We had an absolute conflict of worldviews. At that time, I decided that no, it needs to be finished, I want to go back.

Q: Do I understand correctly that you had some kind of alienation from Russian society?

A: I cannot say that about Russian society as a whole. I still have friends with whom we perfectly understood each other. It seems to me that this discord would appear even when I graduated from the Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, because Saint Petersburg in Saint Petersburg, and that small city where I worked had only 70k inhabitants, where there was nothing. There was only 1 cafe when I was 20-21 years old. My colleagues of the same age were already all married, they had completely different interests. I did not fall into this context, I was alone, I did not have a family, and there were no candidates for the role of husband. A conflict would have arisen anyway, but Budapest made it all worse.

Q: Besides these reasons, did you feel that the economic and political situation in Russia is not suitable for you?

A: I did not think about the economic situation, not because everything suited me, but because I am a philologist, I cannot calculate whether it is good or bad. Money was paid and thanks to God. As for the political situation, then it was 2011, then there were some bright hopes among people. I was not actively involved in all this, because activism is not my anthem. I have great respect for people who can climb the barricade, but I can't. I watched all this with sympathy and there was a feeling that something was about to change. And then, when it became clear that nothing had changed, I already moved to Hungary. At that time, I cannot say that the political situation was so hopeless.

Q: What was your job position at that time?

A: I worked in Tikhvin [the city in the Leningrad region, Russia] for exactly one year because there was a contract. If I terminated the contract, I would have to pay a forfeit. I worked as a

translator at a carriage building plant. The work was great. Working with the text, the word - that's my thing. Many engineers came. I was translating when they were installing the equipment. Then they conducted training for Russian personnel. There was a ton of legal and technical documentation, everything was on me for the first six months. Then I could no longer cope, I could not be in ten places at the same time, they recruited a whole staff of translators, but initially, I was alone. It was cool. I believe that I grew up there as a linguist, as a specialist who works with words. When a year passed, I started looking for something similar in St. Petersburg and found it. I worked for another year as a technical translation editor. Translations were sent to me every day; my task was to edit the text so that later it could be sent to the customer. The main one was the Atomstroyexport [company], which is now building a nuclear power plant in Paks [the city in Hungary]. At that time, the project was already being prepared, because we translated the Paks documentation. I liked the job. In St. Petersburg, there were already cafes, cinemas, friends, everything that was needed. But all the same, there was a thought to move, I wanted to return. I explained to myself that it was warm here. But I think the problem was deeper, I didn't quite fit into the context.

Q: How did you get back to Budapest?

A: This is also a very interesting story. I didn't have a goal to return to Budapest, I just wanted to emigrate. I just started looking for all kinds of projects. In general, at first, I had the idea "should I study more?" I wanted to find an Erasmus project that would pay my tuition. I searched for six months, but in the end, it didn't take me anywhere. It was very disappointing. I realized that I had to go the other way. I started looking for a job. Found it. The work was on cruise ships. There is a very long interview process. I passed the first one, they said that they want to hire me in the summer, but I had to go through some more interviews. And then the Brazilian TV series begins [It's a sarcastic way to describe the life situation]. In Hungary, I still have a friend from the Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia There was such story that when I received a grant to the university, she met a Russian boy who lived in Hungary on a summer vacation. They deeply fell in love, I went to study, and she went to him, but not to Budapest, but another city. But we talked constantly. I left, she got married, gave birth to a child. And she became bored and dreary with the decree, it occurred to her that she needed to be my match-maker and marry me off to some friend of her husband's. She laid it all out for me, I nodded, and I thought, "Poor girl, she sits within 4 walls in her small town with a small child. Her husband is at work all day." She said to me, "Well, I'll find someone for you then". I said, "Well, try it!" And now, according to my Hungarian husband, the Russian wife of his friend begins to pester with stories about some Russian girl in St. Petersburg, with whom he

urgently needed to get to know each other, because we are so compatible with each other. She gave my number and instructed him to write urgently. I forgot about that arrangement. I was sitting at work and a message came to me on Facebook, “Hi, my name is so and so, I'm a friend of your husband’s friend, if I don't write to you, she will kill me. Please tell her what I wrote to you.” It was written in such a funny way, I answered him in the same spirit hee-hee-ha-ha. And we shared joke after joke, in the end, I no longer worked, but corresponded with some incomprehensible boy. I came home, we were still texting each other, a week passed - the same thing, two weeks passed, he said, “I'll come to visit you in Russia.” I thought, “ha-ha, now I will tell you how to apply for a visa, and you will not go anywhere.” That’s what I wrote. It turns out that he read everything, submitted documents to the embassy and went there on day x. This was in November, and in February 2012 he had already arrived. And exactly one year later, in 2013, we got married in Budapest. In the end, I went to him. I terminated the pre-contract with the liners because he brought me to his family in September and announced both to me for the first time and to his family that I was moving in with him. I thought, “Well, everything suits me.”

I also found it very funny. I signed up for Hungarian courses, for which I got a visa. For a long time, I spun stories at the embassy about why I needed to learn Hungarian. The official story was that I am a linguist and that I urgently need to add Ugric to the Finnish language. I am eager to learn the Hungarian language. For some reason, they believed me…or pretended to believe. I was given a visa but in the “other” category. And with such a category, you cannot get a job. As long as this visa is open, it cannot be turned into a work visa. I had it open for six months, after that I would need to go back to Russia and wait for some company to open a work visa for me. I had only 2-years of work experience, I was not some kind of valuable employee, so I’d be chased by employers. Here we were sitting in Budapest, in a rented apartment, me with my "other" visa category and my husband, who graduated from the university a year ago and got his first job with a salary of 180.000 forints. I tried to freelance, but it was some ridiculous small money. We both tried to live on this. In November, it became clear that no one would hire me because of a visa. It was going to expire in March. The husband said that the only way out was to get married, the next day we went to apply. In February we got officially married and then I was given a job.

Q: Were you eager to learn Hungarian?

A: Not really, I just needed it for a visa.

Q: Did you learn it in the end?

A: Everything is in comparison. I think I speak like an average Hungarian wife. I started actively using Hungarian when my first son was born. I have three children. The son is now 6, the daughters are 3 and 1 years old. When my son was born, I had to go to the doctors with him, then he went to the nursery, then we began to go to the playgrounds and only then did I speak the language. I can negotiate with the teacher in the Hungarian kindergarten, I can talk to the doctor, I can make an order, and so on. I understand everything they tell me, but they don't always understand me. I do not lose hope that someday I will be understood.

Q: When you moved, besides the Hungarian language, did you invest your time in the study of Hungarian history?

A: So that purposefully, no. But my husband is a historian by degree, so I had to listen to that crash Hungarian History class he was holding himself for me in everyday conversations. I live in a constant stream of historical information. When we communicate with people who have lived the same amount of time in Hungary, historical references come from me, because my husband has already told me about them.

Q: Do you celebrate Hungarian holidays?

A: Yes, I do celebrate Christmas and Easter. I celebrate, rather, in the Hungarian manner. I try to preserve Russian holidays for children, for culture, etc., but still, the main holiday will always be Hungarian. All other Hungarian holidays in the calendar, for example, March 15 [Revolution and Independence Day] or October 23 [Revolution Day], at the suggestion of my husband, are no holidays at all, but days of remembrance. On March 15, we all put on cockades, we all walk, including me. I'm a Hungarian citizen too. Since October 23 it is also associated with the USSR, such an invasion of Soviet troops in 1956 is a delicate moment. We have three children who, we want, not to have conflicts in their self-determination. The husband is still a historian, he so accurately tells that yes, there were bad politicians, that's how it happened. He does not say that Russians are bad and Hungarians are good. Everything is very diplomatic. What will happen to my son when he goes to school, I do not know.

Q: Have you become involved in the political life of Hungary?

A: No, I did not participate in Russia either. I have never voted in Russia. To be honest, I wouldn't vote in Hungary either, but it's so important for my husband. When elections are approaching, I cannot stand aside, because all day long I hear, “So, here the political program is like this, here it is like that. This one got so many percent in this village... This cannot be, this village voted for another party.” Therefore, for the Hungarian elections, I just go with him to the company.

Q: What kind of elections do you vote at?

A: For all. Since I have citizenship, I have the right to go to any.

Q: When you lived in Russia, you said that you did not pay attention to political life, and then, running ahead, said that the situation was not critical. Does this mean that, while living here, you continue to follow the policy of Russia?

A: Just a little bit. I cannot say that my opinion on the political situation in Russia is, to put it mildly, incomplete. To create a fundamental opinion, you have to sit down straight, open different sources, look, read, and draw a conclusion. Better yet, come to Russia and see. And in my case, I don't do any of this. I have friends who stayed in Russia or friends who are more political here, when they repost something to themselves, Facebook spits it out to me. Therefore, what is visible and happening in Russia, which I have, is limited to my circle of contacts. What is happening in Hungary, I also don't study deeply. I keep track of moments that directly affect me and my family.

Q: How often do you go to Russia?

A: Infrequently. Firstly, I am from the Irkutsk region, my parents live there. From Moscow, by plane, it’s about 6 hours. It’s very expensive. The last time I was in Russia was in December 2017. I hope that we will go next year. I have old grandmothers there, I want to show them all my children. But, to be honest, I don't feel home-seeking or an emerging desire to go there.

Q: What about your social circle here? If you could analyze which nationalities do you communicate more with?

A: Now mostly with the Russians. When I studied here, there were Bulgarians, but they all left. Then at some point, I communicated with everyone a little bit. Then I became a mother and the question arose with the maintenance of the Russian language in the newly born. There is a very active society of Russian-speaking mothers in Budapest. One way or another, I fit into it. Through some joint meetings, projects, I formed my circle of friends for Russian-speaking girls. In general, those with whom I communicate very closely, except for one or two people, are girls from Russia, well, two girls from Latvia and Ukraine. It happened so. Additionally, the husbands of the girls are of different nationalities.

Q: Do you have a lot of Hungarians in your social circle?

A: Few. Somehow it didn't work out. When I first moved, let’s say my husband's friends did a lot to make me feel good in their circle. They tried very hard, at that time all my friends had left, and new ones had not yet appeared, so these Hungarian girls organized some kind of bachelorette party for me before the wedding, which helped in some matters. They are very cute, but it didn't work out somehow. And at work, in different companies, there has always been such a tendency that foreigners are separate, Hungarians are separate. I did not see the

burning desire of the Hungarians to join the company of foreigners, so the social circle at work always consisted of foreigners.

Q: You said you worked here. Are you working at the moment?

A: At the moment I am on maternity leave, but I am officially registered with the company. I worked here, this is a sad story, because when I was given a visa, I had no time for choosing a profession. I had to go where they would quickly take and pay as much money as possible because I wanted to eat [some kind of essential sarcasm]. I went to customer support, I did it for some time, they raised my salary, I was praised. I changed three companies in this direction. I left one because I was not told during the interview that Hungarian was needed there, and my Hungarian at that time was not at the working proficiency. There was an age group, and I was a young girl. I went to another company, everything was cool, there was no need for Hungarian language proficiency, the company was young and cheerful. After work, we went for a walk together and so on. At that time, this was what I needed. I left that job on the first maternity leave and realized that that was not quite what I needed after all. I have a child, it wasn't quite my vibe anymore. I wanted to grow. Where I worked as a real call center. The job I found afterward was better paid. And secondly, I became an account manager, but with clients from large companies and corporations. This was already more serious than just a call center. Then I went to the second maternity leave and from there immediately to the third. Honestly, I will go back there, because I need to go back, but I don't want to. Now I am trying to go into the freelance world and find freelance work that would pay me the same money as my current job. I decided to change my field of activity a little, and go into copywriting. I like it. I have a part-time job, but I'm insanely weak so far. Now I bought a course from Skillbox [a Russian online educational company that provides a variety of courses]. My goal is to take everything I can and start promoting myself as a copywriter. I have time until April. I don't want to drive an hour and 15 minutes from the house on the outskirts, which we bought, to work in the center. Then back. And then to pick up and take care of three children.

Q: Would you say that Russia and Hungary are to some extent similar? If so, at what points?

A: Yes, they are very similar. Society is similar. When I lived in the USA, people from my circle graduated from 12th grade and went to work, not because they are fools, but because it is not so easy to get a scholarship from a US university. If you have not got it, then you need to scrape up enough money to complete at least the initial stage. Therefore, people knew little about Russia, about everything in general. In 2003, I was asked if there are telephones and televisions in Russia. That is, people knew absolutely nothing. There is no need to explain anything here. Families work similarly, schools, kindergartens. The pensioners, the population,

the problems are very similar, and so on. The sense of humor is similar. This is precise because of the historical realities. Not because they were very similar, but they were similar anyway. Nothing needs to be explained. There are, of course, differences, but fundamentally similar.

Q: Have you ever encountered nationalism in Hungary?

A: In a very weak manifestation. As a counterbalance to this, I encountered the opposite: people were delighted when they found out that I was from Russia. They said that it's so cool in Russia. They asked, “What are you doing in our stupid Hungary, I have a dream to go to Russia and live there”. It was different. Even my husband's family was. When I first arrived, his grandfather, grew up professionally and financially during the socialist regime: from a village boy to almost to the director of a nuclear plant. He studied in Moscow, did not speak Russian, but somehow, he lived. For him, it was the ideal country. And when his grandson brought home a Russian girl, he was in the wildest delight. He followed me, brought me tea, coffee, straightened the pillows and in general was incredibly happy. The whole family laughed. This is a family from the mother's side. Let's say my father-in-law has a completely different history of relations with Russians. He grew up in a dysfunctional family, all their teenage years they fought with the soldiers of the Soviet garrison who stood in their city. Therefore, he has the opinion that Russia, Soviet Union are enemies in this context. But he treats me very well. Sometimes, of course, something slips through, but I don't think he notices it. It's not always negative-negative. For example, when he talks about a film or a person that has been made or born in any Slavic country, he calls it an excellent Hungarian formulation "something Slavic there", very dismissively. And I always dissect with this. You have such grandchildren and such a daughter-in-law. Moreover, his mother is half Polish. I say that he is also a quarter “something Slavic there”.

Q: Do you treat it as a sort of fun, sarcasm in the family?

A: My husband's family welcomed me well. I would not say that love is direct. They treat me with respect, and I treat them with respect too. The parents of the husband are divorced, the family of the father, who is with the second wife, expresses their feelings more emotionally. The mother's family is more reserved, but I can still see that they treat me with love. My children are called Daniil and Neva. Hungarians believe that the Neva is a river, I have a slightly different opinion on this matter. From the very birth, the husband's family accepted the fact that the names are Russian. The third daughter's name is Camilla, and as my friend joked, the third time we ran out of fantasy. Yes, that is, we have everything with humor. Flat, but humorous.

Q: Have you noticed that since you emigrated your Russian personality has slightly changed? Did you notice that you acquired some new habits?

A: It's hard to say, but probably yes. To understand this, you need to return to Russia and live there. Otherwise, at least spend a week, two, three there. The problem is that my identity is connected with the small town I was born in. With this city, my identity somehow ceased to come into contact with when I was already studying in St. Petersburg. I went back there and I was somehow uncomfortable. We parted for a long time in terms of habits, views of the world, the structure of everything. I haven't been in big cities for a very long time. But my husband says that I have no right to say anything about Russia because I haven't lived there for 10 years [sort of a joke], everything has changed. This is indeed the case. I came to Moscow on a business trip as a tourist. I only remember that Russia that existed in 2012.

Q: Do you think that you earn more here than you would earn in Russia?

A: It is difficult to answer because, at the time I left, my career was not at its peak. I was just getting started. I could develop in this direction, gain experience. And who knows how much I would get. When I started working in Hungary, I received about the same as I received at that time in Russia, that is, not much. At my last job, I was getting normal at that time, above average for such a position. If this amount was converted into rubbles and offered to that 22-year-old girl, then I would jump to the ceiling. It's hard for me to judge. Plus, at some point, my husband and I started from the same financial level, the same salary. And then the first decree, the second, the third. Now my husband has built a career, he is a big boss there. Therefore, it is difficult to say for sure.

Q: Do you have a desire or motivation, plans to return to Russia or move to another country?

A: In Russia, definitely not. If I were offered to go to another country, I would probably agree, but I can't imagine that we would stay there forever. It would be interesting for me to experience living in another country until the moment children go to school. I wouldn't mind living 2-3 years abroad, earning some money to arrange life in Hungary. I am only considering the option of leaving to earn a living in Buda [the part of Budapest]. I can only see myself here. I feel good here. I cannot say that I am in love with the country. However, I catch myself on the fact that in chats, pages on Facebook, when someone writes that the country is terrible, that is not true... I am feeling deeply offended because of that. For me, this is already home. I feel at home here.

CASE 4: RUSSIAN KAZAKH (RUSSIAN WORLD, GLOBAL RUSSIAN)

Case 4. Memo

Alexandra turned out to be a rather unusual immigrant interviewee. She was born in Almaty, Kazakhstan, but lived in Russia for some time and acquired Russian citizenship through her mother's side. Later, she and her family migrated back to Kazakhstan. Alexandra's first and only native language is Russian, however she is unlikely to be tied to Russia in terms of kinship. She identifies herself as a Kazakh by her former place of residence, but Russian in terms of nationality and language, while directively noting that she has no sensual ties with Russia.

Alexandra is currently married to a German citizen and has been living in Hungary since 2018, where her child and business are also growing. Alexandra does not speak Hungarian, noting that it is one of the most difficult languages, but she also does not feel the need for integration due to the fact that she speaks Russian and English (native and working language) that allows her to attract clients from all over the world, and Hungary is not the final destination. At the same time, her child was perfectly integrated into Hungarian society, having learned the Hungarian language in a Hungarian kindergarten. Alexandra runs a marketing business in Hungary and notes that the country has great potential, but poor PR, marketing and complicated language make it impossible to run a full-scale business here for foreigners. For myself, I noted the idea that perhaps this is why there is a turnover of migrants in Hungary who do not see the opportunity to build a startup or business in Hungary.

Apart from that, the interview with Alexandra gave me a lot of insights. First of all, it once again reminded us that nationality and ethnicity are two completely different collective identities. In the interview Alexandra mentioned several important concepts and aspects of identification.

Firstly, this is the Russian language as a cultural identification, which imaginatively connects many nationalities and ethnic groups on this basis, that is, it turns out that "Russian" by nationality, "a Russian" by ethnicity and a Russian by linguistic and cultural identification are three completely different identifications. It is important that people are aware of this.

Secondly, it is the connection of the former CIS countries, a kind of virtual or imaginary state that does not have clear physical boundaries, that is, a person can feel territorial affinity, but at the same time identify himself/herself both with the country of residence, and from an ethnic, national and cultural point vision. This, at first glance, is a completely absurd point of view, which finds confirmation, for example, when we refer to Hungarian migrants abroad and their cultural identification by Hungarian language.

Thirdly, Alexandra also presented herself as a citizen of the world, which leads to the idea or hypothesis that the imaginary state is limitless and, under the condition of new

migration, the immigrant will be able to build social ties using instrumental linguistic-cultural identification, as well as professional self-identification through business.

Fourth, what is of interest is the apoliticality of the immigrant. What I am questioning here is precisely the tendency of immigrants to be apolitical. It can be assumed that the identity of Russian immigrants to some extent reflects the nomadic lifestyle, that is, the absence of a permanent place of residence relieves the immigrant of the need to integrate into society on a temporary and permanent basis.

Last but not least, among the theoretical sample, some trends can already be distinguished in relation to the modification of the habits of immigrants after living in Hungary, this is, first of all, the environmental friendliness of life that can be found in waste sorting.

Case 4. Interview

Q: Where are you from?

A: I am from Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Q: You have a Russian passport, right?

A: Yes, I have a Russian passport. I happened to have it by chance. We lived in Russia for 6 years when I was still a child. My mother obtained Russian citizenship, then we returned to Kazakhstan again. When I turned 16, I got my passport and I had a choice, whether to get a Kazakh one, since I live here, or a Russian one, because my mother has citizenship. I decided to take Russian. I can get the Kazakh one at any moment, but the Russian one might suddenly come in handy. Therefore, I took a Russian one and lived with it in Kazakhstan, and now in Hungary.

Q: What region were you born in?

A: Initially, I was born in Kazakhstan, and when I was 6 years old, my family moved to Omsk, Russia. We lived there for 6 years. But the city was very cold, and there were some other circumstances. Mom decided to return with me to Almaty, to her homeland, and we continued to live there.

Q: But do you feel like a Russian or do you still identify yourself as a Kazakh?

A: There is a difference here, the nationality is Russian, because there is nothing Kazakh in me. I have Russian, Korean, even some Roma, Jewish, Ukrainian roots – whatever, but not Kazakh. There is the concept of Kazakh and Kazakhstan. A Kazakh woman is by origin, and a Kazakh woman by place of residence. There are a lot of nationalities there, more than 100. Therefore, despite the fact that I have a Russian passport, I feel more like a Kazakhstani because of the residence. This is my “native” country [meaning the country where I spent significant time of

life], I do not identify myself with Russia. In general, I know little about this country, but it happened that almost all relatives live there. Everyone left, there was no one left in Kazakhstan. I know Russia only from their stories and in general what I got to know. Recently, I have ceased to identify myself with Kazakhstan too. Of course, warm memories remain of this country, despite the fact that there are many objective gaps there. But I keep warm feelings about the country and the people. Now I identify myself as a citizen of the world. I don't care what developed country I live in, I know that I will be fine everywhere, I will find a job and friends everywhere.

Q: You mentioned the concept of a citizen of the world. What does this mean to you?

A: For me, it's the lack of attachment to one country, where you definitely need to live, because there are further reasons up to the mental framework "where you were born you will fit in" and so on. This is an absolutely equal attitude to any country. That is, you can come to any country and find pros and cons, but there will still be a country in which me and my family will be more comfortable. But the attitude to any nationality, geographical location is the same. We are all inhabitants of the Earth. This point in my affairs is now more comfortable. If tomorrow they change, then another point will be more appropriate. This will be my home, and no one has the right to say that it is not. I have no purpose for travelling. I just set life goals for myself, and if movement is needed to achieve them, then it will be. If not, then no.

Q: What was your first language that you spoke or studied?

A: I have only two languages: Russian and English. I don't speak any other languages. So far, two.

Q: Do you read the news? In what languages?

A: Yes, I do. More often in Russian, it's more comfortable for me. I also translate some foreign sources with Google translate if needed. That is, I have fluent English, but Russian is more convenient, I read it faster. I can walk diagonally and read the news in a few seconds. For example, in English, I need to spend 5-10 minutes reading thoughtfully and understand what it is about.

Q: What news do you usually read? What is your area of interest?

A: I read news on the Russian resource Meduza [Meduza is a Russian- and English- language independent news outlet based in Latvia and provide news and articles mainly for Russian speaking people], which I consider more objective. I keep reading the news of Russia and the CIS, so as not to lose contact with these countries. And if I see interesting news from the world community on any topic, then I go to the source indicated there. I read an article in English or translate it in the browser. I am purposefully looking for news in business, marketing in the

European press. Additionally, if I work on an oil industry project, then I read news in this sphere for months. When the project ends, then I stop reading this industry news.

Q: Have you ever had a desire to purposefully emigrate?

A: Yes, when I was 20 years old, I really wanted to move to Canada and even started learning French. But then personal circumstances developed differently, and, as it seemed to me, I pushed it to the background. I began to grow well in my career, earn money, live well, I was satisfied with being in Kazakhstan. When I turned 24 years, there was no longer a thought to leave the country.

Q: Why Canada? What are the criteria?

A: When I was 18 years old, I went on a work and travel program in the USA. I lived in the state of New York, on the great lakes. It is very close to the border with Canada, so we can say that the lifestyle there is close to this country, very calm. I lived in a small village, it was not a metropolis. I had a very positive impression of the United States as well. But if you choose between these two countries, then I would choose Canada. Firstly, it seemed more secure and less criminal, and secondly, at that time emigration to Canada was very popular, many people talked about it, there was an eased migration policy. It was easy enough to get there, but in the USA, it is more difficult. I considered these two countries as one, but it was easier to enter Canada.

Q: Which university did you graduate from and in what specialty?

A: I graduated from two universities. The first is tourism, the second is marketing. Both are in Almaty. In the 2nd year, tourism was divided into two areas, the first is tourism, and the second is the restaurant and hotel business. I went to the second one.

Q: Did you study in Russian?

A: Yes.

Q: So, is it a quite normal practice in Kazakhstan?

A: In Kazakhstan, most people speak Russian. In schools, universities and at work in cities, 80% of cases are in Russian. There are separate schools and faculties in the Kazakh language, but they are not yet popular.

Q: How did your career start and how did it develop?

A: It started by chance. I worked in a hotel by my specialty. There I organised various conferences, etc., and showed myself very well. One of the participants was the director of a recruiting company, took my contacts, said that he likes the way I work, and if there are any interesting positions, they will contact me. Feedback came very quickly, they said there is a marketing position in an American company. Salary was 2x higher than in the hotel. This was

the deciding factor. Now, looking from the outside, I understand that it was a great success, because I got into a different culture, American. This is a culture of work, communication with people, everything that I learned, it was where many people dream of getting, and at that time I did not even understand how lucky I was. I started working there, doing marketing. The duties were quite simple, so they took me without education. But over time, I realised that there was not enough base, so I entered the second higher evening education. Combined with work. In two years, I graduated from higher education, then I developed only in marketing. I was 19 years old when I came to them, I have been working for 15 years.

Q: When did you start your business? As far as I know you have it now.

A: Yes, here in Hungary. Moved 4 years ago, but opened a business 3 years ago. I had a newborn child, and when the baby was a bit older, I started my own business, also marketing.

Q: Was it in 2018?

A: Yes. We migrated to Hungary at the end of 2017. At the end of 2018, I started my own business.

Q: When did you decide to move to Hungary and what is your story?

A: The story is very simple. I was 9 months pregnant, 10 days before giving birth, my husband came up to me and said that he was offered a contract in Hungary. I quickly googled about this country, I knew very little about it. I knew that the capital was Budapest. I googled, liked the way it looked. The climate is good as well. I said let's go. And that's it. When the child was 3 months old, we moved.

Q: And legally it was a family reunion? Or how did you get the visa?

A: Yes, it was a family visa.

Q: How did you build your social circle here?

A: When I moved, I didn't have a goal to look for friends. Now I would have acted differently and would have looked, then I thought that somehow naturally I would find friends. I focused more on my child and work. At work, I got the idea to invite everyone to a seminar. I told them about marketing. It was very interesting Russian-speaking people who attended my event, and we became friends with some of them. I'd say that the work helped me, it is possible that without it, there would be fewer friends. The second moment, when my daughter went to kindergarten, there were several Russian-speaking children with their mothers. We began to communicate, one of them became a close friend.

Q: Are you surrounding yourself with Russian-speaking people only? Or do you still communicate with expats, Hungarians?

A: 80-90 percent are Russian-speaking. I also communicate with Hungarians, but with those who speak English. I can get to know a person and only then find out who he or she is a Hungarian or an expat.

Q: You mentioned business. So you started it in Hungary. Tell me, was it difficult to legally organise documents in Hungary?

A: No, it was easy. It takes 1 consultation with an accountant and a half-hour trip to the tax office.

Q: Did you open KATA [sole proprietorship]?

A: Yes, now it's a different form. But I started with KATA.

Q: How did you manage without language? Do I understand it right that you don't speak Hungarian?

A: Yes, I don't speak, but I first spoke with an accountant who speaks English, and then I found a Russian-speaking one.

Q: How do you like Hungary as a country where you can do business?

A: Good question. I'd say 95% of my clients are not from Hungary, I work with clients from the CIS, EU and worldwide, but least of all from Hungary. They exist, but they are few. In general, I consider Hungary a very potential country in some areas. I think that they know undeservedly little, for example, about Hungarian winemaking, gastronomy, and tourist places. Tourism is certainly popular, but it could be even more popular. I believe that the state lacks PR. Of course, this is a small country in terms of population, and secondly, incomes are not very high. Therefore, if there is a desire to run a big business, then it must go beyond.

Q: Do you think Hungary is generally an attractive country for business?

A: This needs to be compared. It is difficult for me to compare, because I do not know in detail the features of other countries. According to my feelings, in terms of legal, tax things, there is more or less the same as in other EU countries. There is nothing special. In terms of purchasing power, this is a very small country. If we are talking about foreign business, if they look at the countries they can enter, then Hungary will obviously not be in the first place, partly because of the complexity of the language.

Q: Your daughter actually grew up in Hungary. Does she speak Hungarian?

A: Yes, she does.

Q: Which kindergarten does she attend?

A: This is a private Hungarian kindergarten. From 1 to 3, she only spoke Hungarian when she was a baby, and now she speaks 50% Hungarian and 50% English.

Q: And how do you live with a child who knows more Hungarian than you?

A: Perfectly! I dream that my child knows more than me about everything. She even translates something to me from time to time.

Q: So, it didn't motivate you to learn more Hungarian?

A: No, because this is not our final destination. To learn Hungarian, I have to spend 2 years of my life, but I have more serious things to do.

Q: What is your destination then? Do I understand it right that you do not plan to stay in Hungary?

A: No, we never planned to stay here forever. We came under my husband's contract for several years, but in general we have a house in Germany. So far, the nearest point is Germany, but we'll see.

Q: Is it safe to live in Hungary?

A: At least in Budapest, yes. It seems to me that this is one of the safest countries.

Q: Why do you think so?

A: Firstly, I look at the statistics, and secondly, because I look around and, living in Hungary, I have not heard of any serious incidents. Moreover, I didn't even come across petty criminal dirty tricks. Of course, it should be considered that I live in one of the nicest areas of Budapest. I don't move around the city very much. All in my area. According to all my observations, I see calm streets, the absence of obvious crime, and so on.

Q: Your husband is not Hungarian?

A: He is German.

Q: Would you say that Hungary is similar to one of the CIS countries?

A: I think you can find the similarity of mentality. They say that Hungarians and Kazakhs have the same roots. I notice that some words in Hungarian are similar to Kazakh. Some constructions in speech are similar, despite the fact that the language is complex. There are echoes to the Soviet mentality. Throwing garbage, laughing out loud in public transport, drinking, etc. In social behaviour, a slightly dismissive attitude towards others is sometimes closer to the Soviet mentality than to the European one.

Q: Have you ever encountered nationalism in Hungary? Have there been any cases?

A: No, absolutely. I have never experienced nationalism in any country in the world.

Q: Are you generally a political person or apolitical?

A: I'm closer to the second one. Living in Kazakhstan, I was absolutely apolitical. I thought it didn't make sense. There is no point in wasting even a minute of your life trying to influence something, to understand something. It is much more efficient to build your happy life and improve something around you. This is the best thing I can do for the country. Having moved

to Europe, I, of course, understand that everything is different here. This is where we have influence. If we wish, we can have great influence. I do not consider myself competent in politics, because I do not understand everything.

Q: Do you take any social and political part in the life of Hungary?

A: Probably not.

Q: Do you vote?

A: I don't have permanent residence, so I don't have the right to vote. I do not take part in other things. I honestly pay taxes and do not litter on the street. That's all I do for the country.

Q: Do you know the history of Hungary and its cult figures in politics, culture, or anything?

A: In general terms, I know the history of Hungary, Budapest. I know very little about cult figures, sometimes I read about them, but I quickly forget their names, because they are very complex.

Q: Did you notice that you changed a little when you moved to Hungary? Any Hungarian habits?

A: Yes, of course I noticed. A person is shaped by his\her environment. I have become much more careful about society, about the people who surround me. Over the past 4 years, I began to sort garbage, began to smile at people more, and began to think about buying ecological things. I realised the importance of networking because, once in a new country, I realised the importance of filling my environment with quality people. It may or may not be growing up.

Q: Are you still planning to move?

A: Yes, I'm here temporarily. But if there is an opportunity to stay here longer, I will not be upset. I love this country very much.

CASE 5: WORK EMIGRATION

Case 5. Memo

The interview with Sasha was very tense. Throughout the interview, I felt that the answers were pre-considered and incredibly restrained. This can be seen in the immigrant's short, uncluttered responses. This situation made me very nervous and initially I thought not to include this interview in the theoretical sample of the dissertation. However, after some time, I revised this interview, and was able to draw a red line through a specific context.

First of all, it is worth noting that the immigrant owns a rather demanding profession of a UX designer that makes her an immigrant in demand. Sasha is quite young and rather introverted than extroverted. Through her interview, disappointment in Russian culture and its disunity at the stage of building a society with prevailing individualism is repeatedly noted. The

interviewee implicitly compares the mentality of the Russian people with weather conditions. Sasha also notes her complete apoliticality and detachment from the politics of the countries of Russia and Hungary, but through the conversation, her negative assessment of the Russian government nevertheless indirectly manifests itself. Perhaps it is worth noting here that the apathy of Russians is connected with the unwillingness to identify themselves collectively with Russia, which means the removal of responsibility for this or that action of the government and people living on the territory of Russia. This is also the reason why the immigrant is not looking for opportunities to be part of the Russian community in Hungary. Her social circle is mostly expats and Hungarians from work. For an immigrant, Hungarians are associated as friendly, understanding and open people.

The immigrant associates Hungarian culture with European culture, which has a positive connotation. In general, Sasha shows a desire to learn Hungarian, perhaps this is due to the fact that she considers Hungary to be her destination at the moment. Among the minuses of Hungary, the immigrant notes economic insolvency in relation to other countries, but is ready to stay in the country even despite this shortcoming.

Like many other immigrants, Sasha notes that her attitude towards the Hungarian holidays is rather a time when she officially can not work. She does not notice the nature of these holidays.

Case 5. Interview

Q: How long have you been living outside of Russia?

A: Not in Russia - 5 years, in Hungary - 3 years.

Q: Where are you from? From which city?

A: St. Petersburg.

Q: Where did you study?

A: I studied at St. Petersburg State University, at the Polytechnic University. Now it is called Peter the Great University. Faculty of industrial design.

Q: Have you ever wanted to move from Russia? Did you have such an idea?

A: Always. I don't want to live in Russia and never wanted to, although I love my city. I have family and friends there, but I knew that I would live in Europe. Moved as soon as I could. First, I went to Estonia, and then here.

Q: Why was there such a desire to move?

A: I don't like Russia.

Q: In what way?

A: In general. Mentality, some kind of cold in general. I was emotionally cramped there.

Q: Were there any aggressive reasons that did not allow you to stay there?

A: No, everything was fine.

Q: What was your attitude to politics at the time when you lived in Russia? Are you active or not?

A: No, not active, but since I'm against the system, I just decided not to live there. I'm not complaining, I feel good here in Europe.

Q: Did you work in Russia after you graduated from university?

A: Yes, a little, six months. I worked as a designer in an agency.

Q: Were you satisfied with your economic condition at work?

A: At that moment, yes.

Q: Do you agree with the expression that some people say, "It is not entirely safe to live in Russia?"

A: I believe that everywhere you can find troubles. I'd say it's more unsafe than in Europe I would say.

Q: When did you decide to move? How long did it take to get there?

A: Not for long. I really wanted this.

Q: How and why did you move to Estonia?

A: I really liked this country. At that time, I had a place to live. There were very good conditions, while I was still next to St. Petersburg. My ex boyfriend lived there, with whom I had very good, kind relations. Then I left this relationship and realised that I wanted to live in Hungary. And since it happened that I was single, I decided to move in two years. But in Estonia it was very good.

Q: Why did you choose Estonia?

A: Because it's Europe. It was the closest country for me.

Q: You said you had a boyfriend in Estonia. But besides relationships, what else did you do in Estonia?

A: I got a job in the design industry, so I worked legally.

Q: How did you move to Hungary?

A: Just moved quickly. I decided that Budapest was really nice. I also like that it's warm here. I quickly found a job and moved.

Q: What year did you move to Budapest?

A: I moved in 2018, in the middle of the year.

Q: How long have you been an immigrant?

A: About 5 years.

Q: Did you learn Estonian when you lived there? Did you delve into the history of the country?

A: It's a very difficult language, the same as Hungarian, so no…

Q: You found a job in Hungary and that's why you moved here. Was it difficult for you?

A: It was easy for me, because there are not many good UX designers here, as I was told. So, I found it quickly.

Q: When you migrated here, how did your social circle develop? How quickly did you find friends here, if you did of course?

A: Very fast, and incredible friends that I didn't have in Estonia or Russia. I changed, grew very quickly professionally, financially, emotionally, in all aspects. For me, the old environment in St. Petersburg is somehow outdated. There was nothing to communicate about with many people. And here I found very bright and interesting people who are with me to this day. We spend our time together very nicely.

Q: Where are they from?

A: All from different countries. I have some friends from work [IT], and outside of work, too.

Q: So, you don't get attached to the Russian community here?

A: No. I don't even know many Russians here. I didn't specifically look for it. I have nothing against it, Russian friends are just as good friends as non-Russians.

Q: Are there many Hungarians in your environment?

A: There are some, not many, but at work, yes.

Q: What would be the approximate percentage of the rest?

Q: Hard to say. I have a lot of cool guys at work, we communicate very closely, but if I put in more effort, maybe then we would be friends. But I myself do not spend time with them, so I would say that a smaller percentage. Approximately 30.

Q: Do you speak Hungarian?

A: No. I understand a little, I have been here 3 years after all, but I tried to learn it and it is very difficult. If there was a will, then maybe yes. I think I'll start doing it again soon.

Q: Do you know anything about Hungarian history?

A: Just some main things. Not much.

Q: Do you celebrate Hungarian holidays?

A: Everyone has a day off, so yes, let's say. I just know that some kind of holiday is coming and that's it. But I don't go to the city centre to celebrate it.

Q: Do you continue to celebrate Russian holidays?

A: We have almost all the same holidays. I celebrate New Year's, Christmas with the family of a former boyfriend, like a European Christmas.

Q: Would you say that Russia and Hungary are similar in cultural aspects and plans?

A: Yes, I would say so. Therefore, I live here easily among the Hungarians. They are similar to Russians, but they are more open and warmhearted. Russians are more distant and cold. Although there are different people everywhere, here it is somehow simpler with communication.

Q: In which aspect?

A: I'd say that here in Hungary you can feel that you're in Europe - people are more open and welcoming, everyone is affable and is willing to help. In Russia people are not the same unfortunately, but I can still see that the situation is changing now. But for now the atmosphere here is still much friendlier, so life is easier because of that.

Q: Do you take part in social and political life in Hungary?

A: No. I don't participate in politics at all.

Q: When you moved to Hungary, did you continue to follow the Russian news?
A: Of course, I'm updated on what's going on but I have never read the news on purpose, because I can't influence the situations that are happening in any way, and there is no point in wasting my life reading the news.
Q: Do you follow the Hungarian news?
A: No. But my colleagues always tell me when something interesting happens. So, if there's something I need to know, they tell me.
Q: Have you ever encountered nationalism in Hungary because of your Russian background?
A: No, never. Here, on the contrary, everyone is super polite, tolerant and nice, they try to help. It's even scary sometimes how people can be so kind.
Q: How has your Russian identity changed since you emigrated to Europe?
A: I became much more open. In Russia, I say hello to everyone, and everyone shies away, because this is not an accepted behaviour. Here, everybody is greeting each other and giving a smile. When I come to Russia, my greeting is met with silence. I see that things are getting better in Russia, so this is not always the case. Sometimes it happens, it's annoying. But I still think that Hungary is much nicer, warmer, and I myself have become more open.
Q: What about Russian traditions? For example, the one about girls getting married early? Has your overall attitude towards it changed?
A: Since I am interested in psychology, I look at this from a healthy point of view. I do not have a certain stereotype that, here, you need to be either a feminist or like a Russian woman. Just act as you feel. It's normal for me that someone gets married early, or vice versa. I'm fine.
Q: How do you see your life in a few years? Do you plan to move somewhere else or return to Russia?
A: I really like it here [in Hungary], I would like to live here. The economic situation, of course, is not the best, but I like Budapest. I think I'll probably stay here.
Q: What would be your determining factor for moving to another country?
A: If something terrible happens in the economy, something will change in my life from this point of view. Apart from it probably nothing.
Q: Do you think that the economic situation in Hungary is more financially beneficial for an immigrant than in Russia?
A: I think it's the same here. I do not win, but I lose to other countries. I see that I could work there, some offers, but I like Budapest, so I'd rather live here and lose financially.

CASE 6: CIRCULAR MIGRATION DUE TO "OTHER" REASON

Case 6. Memo

Daria's immigrant story demonstrates an undeniable love for Hungary that can be found in childhood memories and holidays spent in Hungary, as well as the desire to integrate and be

a good fit for Hungarian society, when it comes to the language and professional duties. Daria is almost fluent in the Hungarian language.

When describing this story, it is important to note that for Dara, migration to Hungary is repeated, since she previously lived here with her parents, that is, the circulating migration was purposeful in choice, but different in circumstances. At the time of the move, Daria had two children from a previous marriage and talked about the fact that Hungary is unambiguously associated with her as a country for comfortable and safe living with children, which cannot be said about Russia.

Describing her past in Russia, Daria does not note anything negative, except for the above mentioned. She describes herself as an apolitical immigrant, but also demonstrates awareness of the tense conflict relations between Russia and Ukraine. She remains apolitical in Hungary, she comes into contact with politics only at work, when on duties as a photographer.

After some time, Daria got married in Hungary and was able to build her social circle (consisting mainly of Hungarians) and business. Regarding the question of the similarity between Russians and Hungarians, Daria notes a certain similarity in mentality, but still a huge difference in cultures (using everyday situations as an example).

It is also interesting to suggest that, perhaps, the complete integration of a migrant is associated with a territorially sparsely populated area or the absence of other Russian migrants in the city where Daria lives.

Case 6. Interview

Q: How long have you been living outside of Russia?

A: I was granted permanent residence in Hungary 5 years ago. My family is connected to this country, so I visited Hungary with a tourist visa many times. Using it, I lived as long as possible (six months a year). Once I realised that it is not enough, I started thinking about moving here. It is also worth adding that when I was in the 5th grade, I went with my father to Hungary and went to school at the embassy for 3 months. We always travelled back and forth. For me, it was like going to a countryside house.

Q: Were you born in Russia?

A: Yes, in Moscow. And grew up there.

Q: Which university did you study at?

A: Moscow City Psychological and Pedagogical University. Specialty: psychology and education.

Q: Have you worked in Moscow or in Russia in general?

A: Yes, I worked at the Moscow Academy of Education.

Q: Did you like your job?

A: I liked it, I liked the scientific sphere. The only sad thing is that it does not bring much money, but I still liked it.

Q: Did you like living in Russia in general?

A: I liked it, but I always thought that the grass is greener on the other side. I liked working and living in Moscow, but I liked being in Hungary as well. And it turned out that the more I was in Hungary than in Russia, the more I liked the first option.

Q: Were there any things that you absolutely did not like in Russia, which affected your final decision to move to Hungary?

A: Actually, they were. I moved with two kids, but in the middle of it all, there was a divorce. My husband worked for an airline company so it wasn't a big deal. But that's not why I moved. He often came here, and I went with him. Been here for as long as I want. My twins and I went to the pool, everything was great. They floundered in life jackets as I swam up and down the path. Our family lived for a month in Hungary, a month in Russia, a month in Hungary, a month in Russia. When we arrived in Russia, I started looking for a pool where I would go with my children. Everywhere they rejected us, because you can swim only with children from 6 years old, and mine was a year old. In the end, they offered me a subscription for sixty thousand rubles a month, but when they found out that I had two children, they said that it was irresponsible and that I was harming them. And of course, lots of other rude moments. A mother with twins similar to a disabled person in Russia. There are no spaces adapted for a double stroller or once again for disabled people. In Hungary, things are different. Here I was always helped by complete strangers.

Q: What was your attitude towards politics when you lived in Russia?

A: I am very far from politics. We moved when this Russian-Ukrainian tension started. I found out about it only from the community of Russian mothers, who began to identify themselves very much because of this.

Q: How did it happen then that you finally migrated to Hungary?

A: It went very very smoothly. At some point such mini-things as a swimming pool, a supermarket, influenced the fact that I began to stay in Hungary more time, it became more comfortable and cheaper for me here. The level that I wanted and could afford, it was cheaper in Hungary than in Moscow. Then the question arose that the children should go to kindergarten. In Russia they could skip kindergarten, but in Hungary it is necessary to attend on a daily basis but not everybody is accepted. Therefore, I thought that if we manage to enrol

in it, then we will go for it, if not then we will return to Moscow. I tried twice, they took us in, so everything turned out well. In the same way we went to school. At that time, I already had a relationship with my current Hungarian husband. I already worked at the mayor's office [Balaton region], so my desire to stay here was more than go back to Moscow. As a result, we were taken to school, we stayed in Hungary. This was the sign. Then I also got married.

Q: Do I understand correctly that you emigrated alone as a single mother with children?

A: Yes. My parents have a house here, so I basically migrated when everything was prepared.

Q: Do you speak Hungarian?

A: Yes, not perfect, but I can speak. I can't speak when it comes to philosophy or something more difficult. With other than that I have no problem. I even go to a Hungarian psychologist.

Q: When did you start learning the language? Did you already know Hungarian when you moved?

A: I knew it, but not that well. Learned in the process. I also kinda started learning it when my parents learned Hungarian when I was a child. But I finally decided to learn the language when I came for the summer with my children. In our village, no one spoke English, they immediately switched to German, and I knew only the basics.

Q: Do you know Hungarian history?

A: Now I know it because my children go to school and tell me about it. I also knew it because I had a friend who taught Hungarian. When we chatted with her, she talked about Hungarian art, architecture, and history.

Q: When you have started living here, did you take part in public holidays and life more?

A: Yes, because it is not a tourist town here. It's just the City Hall, schools, and a hardware store. I had to prove to Hungary that I was a useful citizen. I needed to find a job. I came to the mayor's office, and said that I could be useful. The mayor said, "Well, cool, then show us what you can do". So, I took part wherever possible.

Q: With regard to political life. When you moved, did you attend any elections or any political related events?

A: No, first of all, I still can't vote. I participated only because I worked at the city hall, I had to take pictures. I know politicians, but still far from it.

Q: What about Russian politics? We have the right to go to the embassy.

A: Yes, I do that. We go to the polls with my children. This is part of my patriotism.

Q: Do you follow Russian news?

A: Yes, but I watch it because I want to stay close to my family. They live in Moscow. I need to understand what's going on there.

Q: What about Hungarian politics?

A: My husband tells me what interests him. I don't watch it on purpose.

Q: Some people say that living in Russia is generally unsafe. Do you agree with this?

A: I agree that in Russia you need to be ten times tenser so that nothing happens to you than in Hungary.

Q: Which language do you use for communication with your husband?

A: The mix of English-Hungarian.

Q: Would you say that Russia and Hungary are similar?

A: I would say no. Hungarians look like us, but they are not us at all, they are different. For me, when they come to visit me or I come, to cook something and eat together is normal. Here we were invited to visit in the evening, and I planned that we would have dinner. In the end, we drank water and that was it. For me it was completely unusual at first, but now I'm used to it. They even say in words that they are not going to feed. Another super-obscene thing: eating with someone. Either you eat and share, or you don't eat in front of everyone. In Hungary it is normal not to share any food. It turned out to be a big cultural difference for me. Also, about help. My Russian friends, if they see that I need help, they will offer it. Hungarians will sit just like that until you ask for it yourself.

Q: Do you have many friends in your social circle in Hungary?

A: Real friends-friends, not really. I have a lot of acquaintances.

Q: Where are they mostly from?

A: Hungarians. It happened by location, because where we live, there are no Russians. You have to work hard to find them. We have a Russian community, we go for walks with them, to picnics and so on, but mostly Hungarians.

Q: Did you notice that your Russian identity changed in immigration?

A: I became more of a patriot. I think it’s a defensive reaction. When the Hungarians did not understand me, did not accept me, it was easier to say that it is not you who are bad, but just because I am Russian, we are different. We Russians are like this. And it is not discussed.

Q: Did you encounter any nationalism in Hungary?

A: It’s rare here, but I wouldn say no, I never faced it. On Facebook, on the pages of our stores, I make an announcement for Russians when the delivery will be. Once an old man, who comes to us, greets us, asks how the children are, wrote, “do you make announcements to the Russian occupiers in Russian?” These mini-nasty things happen, but rarely.

Q: Do you consider Hungary as a temporary place? Are you planning to move somewhere? Maybe you plan to move elsewhere?

A: I don’t consider any other country. I always have a plan that I will come back to Russia, but this is just my psychological defense.

CASE 7: REPATRIATION. ETHNIC RUSSIAN-HUNGARIAN

Case 7. Memo

Erzhebet is the child of a mixed Russian-Hungarian marriage. Her mother is from the city of Mineralnye Vody, Stavropol Territory, Caucasus region, Russia. Her father is from Hungary. Erzhebet was born and raised in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan. It is far from a secret that each region of Russia has its own authentic culture, established traditions and sometimes even an ethnic language. It’s like a Russian matryoshka doll, when one collective identity contains a number of others, which are attached to the region, traditions, and own language.

Erzsébet's identity was formed precisely under the influence of such stratification. At school, she was forced to learn the Tatar language. At the same time, her native language is Russian.

Despite her ethnic Hungarian affiliation, Hungarian is Erzsebet's second language. At the age of 10, the whole family moved to Hungary, where the reshaping of her identity began, its, above all, its institutional Hungarianism. From the interview it becomes clear that initially Erzsébet associated herself with Russian identity mainly in terms of its formation in Russia and language. The identity crisis in the Hungarian school occurred when the immigrant realized that she could not integrate due to ignorance of the language and misunderstanding of the Hungarian mentality.

After 10 years of living in Hungary, Erzsébet's identity has changed and leveled off to Russian Hungarian or Hungarian Russian. She is currently going through a second identity crisis due to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

In the interview, she latently noted her fears on an ethnic-national basis and encounter of nationalism. It is interesting to note that in this crisis situation, she easily switches identity, choosing the Hungarian one, according to the situation at the moment. The migrant notes the importance of knowledge of languages. Erzsebet continues to build Russian-Hungarian and international relations using this tool.

Case 7. Interview

Q: Please tell me where you are from?

A: I am from Russia, I was born in Kazan, but apart from the fact that I was born in Kazan, none of my parents are from Kazan.

Q: Where are your parents from?

A: my mother is from the Mineralnye Vody, and my father is from Hungary

Q: When did you live in Russia?

A: from 2002 to 2012.

Q: It turns out you spent 10 years, right?

A: yes

Q: What year were you born?

A: 2002

Q: Oh, so you were born and raised there?

A: yes

Q: What was your first language that you started speaking?

A: My first language was Russian, of course.

Q: When did you start learning Hungarian?

A: When I moved to Hungary, I immediately started learning Hungarian, but when we lived in Russia, I knew some words. But not so many.

Q: Why did you know Hungarian words?

A: because our dad was talking Hungarian to us. Some words were only taught to us, and we understood them.

Q: That is, do I understand correctly that you went to school in Russia?

A: yes

Q: Did you like Russia at all?

A: My school was across the street, in that respect I really liked it. But in general, I went to the Tatar gymnasium [local school], where I had to study the Tatar language, and the only thing I didn't like there… Since we generally lived in Kazan, the Republic of Tatarstan, then well, it was necessary to learn Tatar language there. Of course, I did not understand why this had to be done, but I had to. But in the end, I still don't know Tatar. But I liked going to school, they prepared very well there. Even when I moved here, to Hungary, I noticed that what I studied here in the 5th grade in Hungary, I already knew in the 3rd grade in Russia.

Q: In general, did you like living in Russia?

A: In those years, I still didn't think about whether I liked living there. I liked it in the sense that this is my homeland, I was born there, that is, there I found my friends, somehow, well, sort of, adjusted my childhood life. I liked it.

Q: Do you have many friends left in Russia?

A: No, very little.

Q: Why did this happen?

A: Look, those friends that I had, even when I lived in Russia, they are good people, with 1 or 2 of them I remained friends, we still communicate. The rest – no, most likely, well, we didn't have to be so friendly then. But besides that, besides these friends, while in Hungary, I also found Russian friends, who are from Russia, on the Internet.

Q: that is, while living in Russia, you found more pen pals, Russians, as I understand it?

A: Yes. And at the same time, they have nothing to do with Hungary.

Q: interesting. But tell me, please, if you imagine such a Russian person, how can you characterise a "Russian person". Who can generally be called "Russian"?

A: Well, is it Russian-Russian?

Q: Yes, in your understanding. There is no correct answer here

A: In general, regarding this question, I would like to say that for me there is no such thing as Russian. And in general, for me there is no such thing as a Finn or an Austrian, or a Russian, no matter what nationality, for me all people are equal. Yes, they have some kind of their own mentality, some of their own riddles, each nation. Well, because every nation has its own traditions. I only distinguish people, everyone, regardless of the nation.

Q: But now you touched on the topic of mentality and the topic of traditions, just the same. What do you think, what is the Russian mentality and traditions? Again, there is no right answer here, this is what you think is correct.

A: As the song says: "our mentality is from paycheck to paycheck", I would not really like to say that, but the truth is, that it is difficult for many people to live in Russia. Mentality… is a difficult question for me. Well, in general, Russians are very hospitable, many Russians believe that we will defeat America and become winners of the world. Some people are just very good at preserving and believing in traditions, like Easter, for example. For example, we did not paint eggs for Russian Easter.

Q: How do you identify yourself? Like Russian or Hungarian?

A: By the way, this is a very relevant question, because for the last months, even for the last year, I have been thinking about this issue and I agreed that I am simply combined, so to speak, half-Hungarian - half-Russian, I have both.

Q: What is it based on?

A: I'm sorry, but I used to think, when, well, the first year I moved here, I thought that I was Russian, you can't change me - I'm Russian. But after a while, I got acquainted with the

Hungarian culture, traditions and how people behave here, but it all always depends on the language too, because how will you communicate with the Hungarians, how will you understand them when you do not speak their language . By the way, many Hungarians say, “how do you live here without speaking our language?” I criticise this, because you can communicate in any language, for example, in English. But apparently some Hungarians don’t want to accept other nationalities if they don't speak Hungarian. But it also, it seems to me, is connected with history, because there is a lot, well, not very much... but, for example, communism entered Hungary after World War II, and after that Hungary really wanted to get rid of it, peaceful people just... Well they always fought for independence, as well as with the Habsburgs, to be united, their own, belonging to no one, not to depend on someone.

Q: And you said that when you moved here, you felt like a Russian, while you said that “you can’t change me”, what do you put under this?

A: so... well, I just, because I went to school, and even in the 5-6-7th grade, then the child will not feel very comfortable, I didn’t feel myself in my class, I thought I was superfluous here, in terms of... what is the name of the word, wait, I won’t be able to say it for the second time... well, the social plan, as it were... a person needs his own importance in social terms, but in principle I now understand, because well... well, yes, you came from Russia, they will ask how things are going there, and who you are, but I don’t know, but they just didn’t want to take me close. Get to know each other, you can stay familiar, but we are each other... no, there was no such thing as to grab the same wave and go with it, it’s easy with us ... but it also depends on what kind of person you are.

Q: Do you think it was related to the language, or something else?

A: I was a very closed person, since I moved here, I did not understand anything. Well, that's why, probably, I closed myself in myself and then, at that period of time I had such ... such ... a creative life appeared. I found myself in drawing, painting, sports, and music. I did it intensively, as it were, less communication with people and more creativity, expressing yourself in just other ways.

Q: I understand. And when you lived in Russia, did you understand what was happening in terms of political, economics?

A: No, not at all.

Q: And when you moved to Hungary, how long did it take you to learn the Hungarian language to, like, a level that you became comfortable with?

A: I want to say this, a year later I was already quite normal, I spoke well at such a conversational level, a year later, but I feel really comfortable... In my opinion, you can feel

comfortable in any language when you start to tell jokes and it would not look stupid, you are not afraid that your joke will be criticized or someone will not understand it, here. And it happened, so I was 16 years old. That is, 5-6 years.

Q: Have you made any Hungarian friends during this time?

A: yes. For these 5-6 years or for all this time that I am here?

Q: Well, for all the time while you are here?

A: Yes, they did.

Q: How many of them do you have, friends of acquaintances, that is, in general, how can we call them a "social circle", so to speak?

A: yes. Well, look, I have a Russian social circle, I have a Hungarian one, I also have… we call it international, because you can't gather all nationalities into one, I don't know, then you'll have to distribute percentages very specifically. Since I only learned English about two years ago, other nationalities in my friends list are coming very slowly, so far. Initially, I was directly 90% Russian-Ukrainian-Kazakh, in general, everyone who speaks Russian, 90%. After that, the percentage began to decrease, I also began to communicate more with Hungarians, because I felt more comfortable with the Hungarian language and understood them more, so ... but at the moment it's somewhere 50/50, even so.

Q: What do you think about Russians and Hungarians, are they similar in mentality?

A: Can you explain to me what "mentality" is like?

Q: that is, for example, habits, or some kind of tradition, some kind of cultural code, or just some kind of behaviour, that is, a pattern of behaviour.

A: How similar are they?

Q: yes

A: They are similar... it seems to me from 100% approximately, well, 70-80%

Q: what do you think, in what areas, on cultural, some economic, political grounds or in general the conduct of life? Any interpretation.

A: In terms of economics, definitely not, in terms of politics, well, before, after the Second World War, 100% coincided very directly, but at the moment, at the moment, it seems to me not, according to habits and lifestyle... it always depends on what the state gives you and what you can dispose of. In Hungary, I think there are a lot more opportunities to be whoever you want to be. A freer country.

Q: … "freer" in which terms?

A: in self-expression. If you want to do something, you go and do it. Well, of course, in terms of normal, within the framework of normal, of course .. legal.

Q: I understand. When you moved, you started learning Hungarian. In general, you probably started to change, tell me, did you notice any habits that you developed in Hungary when you started living here?

A: A very noticeable habit is ketchup. In Russia I hated ketchup, but here I bought ketchup. But this is one of the most noticeable, what I got. There, in Russia, I did not engage in any creativity, here I, it seems to me, due to the fact that they did not understand me, I began to engage in creativity, I discovered new sides in myself, myself too. Also, I didn't study languages in Russia. Here I realised that I can learn languages, I'm even good at it, and I can make new friends, communicate with people of just different nationalities.

Q: Have you noticed that you have started to be more environmentally friendly?

A: Yes, yes. I just arrived in Hungary, I saw a person walking in front of me, who picked up garbage in front of me and put it in the trash can. I may never even see such a thing in Russia. Sorting plastic, sorting paper. I smoke, and even if, for example, I run out of a cigarette and there is no trash can nearby, I will not throw it away, I will wait until I get to the next trash can, I will throw it out.

Q: What do you think, is this a personal quality or is it just some kind of public one?

A: In any case, society somehow influences this. 100%. Because it seems to me that if I had stayed to live in Russia, such qualities would not have developed in me.

Q: interesting. Then the next question. Tell me, do you read the news, or any books, blogs?

A: Hungarian?

Q: In general, any. This will be the second question, Russian or Hungarian.

A: Yes, of course, of course.

Q: What do you read?

A: What do I raed? At the moment, I read everything related to my studies, my exams, which are coming up at the beginning of next month. I read a lot about history now, Hungarian grammar, language building, communication between people and other things related to this. And, I'm also interested in ... I look on Instagram most of all at the expense of what is now in fashion, in general, the fashion world.

Q: What languages do you mostly read?

A: It's always different, but the things related to studies are in Hungarian, since I study in Hungarian, and also related to studies in Russian, because some of my subjects are in Russian, everything I do is in Hungarian this is what you need right now… I don't do too much in Hungarian, I feel comfortable in Russian-English and also, in my opinion, the media in Hungary is not so developed. Media…

Q: media space?

A: Well, yes.

Q: Tell me, do you read the news?

A: I rarely read the news.

Q: Do you read Russian news?

A: Only “Ne Morgenshter” [Russian unofficial, blog news that publish on Telegram platform]

Q: That is, you only read this Telegram channel, right?

A: Well, I read it, it seems to me that it can be trusted. Also, because now these…how to say…military operations in Ukraine began, at that time a Ukrainian lived at my house and he sent me various pages, namely…their authors are Ukrainians. And he said: if you are interested in news, then you can read on these channels. Well, I’m just now watching the events of the military operation, and what’s happening there, and what’s happening all over the world. I'm looking at the “Ne Morgenshter” page... I also like to look at new clothes, music, and also cryptocurrency. I read about history, there are various interesting facts, and also entertainment content.

Q: Why is it important for you to read the news in Russian?

A: I will understand more

Q: Do you mean the world or what do you mean?

A: I will perceive the information better. If I read in Hungarian, it really doesn't matter what language to read, I’m just used to reading the news in Russian. Of course, I understand that if I read Russian, then this is the side, the point of view of the Russian side, well, Russia. And there are also authors who do not take into account whether I am on the side of Russia, or on the side of Switzerland, I am on the side of Germany, that is, he writes his own, his post, regardless of how it will positively affect me, how Germany will evaluate it or how this will be assessed by China, how it will influence its opinion. And I will generally write a fact, what happened, that is, I will not invent something superfluous there, but I will write a fact. On this date, at such a time, Elon Musk lit up the club at 5 o’clock in the morning, April 5th. Well, just a fact, the way it really happened or is happening.

Q: I understand you.

A: …I mean, I don’t like disinformation at all, and it’s very difficult for me to sort, I try to get by. Whenever I find something on the Internet, I check to see if it's a lie or not.

Q: Do you read Hungarian news?

A: yes.

Q: What channels do you mostly read or watch?

A: Well, what pops up in Google is news. Most likely related to politics. There was still a lot of news before the elections, too, like the teachers' strike . It was also connected with me, I read what teachers want and so on, how it will affect me, because I will have exams. Maybe my exam will be cancelled because of this. And also when there was a strike, the teachers did not teach for a week, this also affects me. This is related to me, so I read it.

Q: I understand. Tell me, do you follow politics in Russia and Hungary?

A: Time to time

Q: Why that?

A: I don't pull too hard to find out a lot of details about politics. Most likely about the events, the scale of the event and all.

Q: Do you think Hungary's policy is similar to Russia's policy?

A: I can't tell you because I don't understand politics and… but since I can only say, in my opinion, that life in Hungary and in Russia… At the moment I don't know how much it differs, but according to the stories of my friends in Russia, it is different. Life, quality of life, then politics should also be different, it also affects our lives.

Q: What is your assessment of political power in Hungary?

A: That is, an assessment of a five-point scale?

Q: no, that is, what do you think about it?

A: About FIDESZ?

Q: Well, or maybe you don't think about it at all?

A: I think about it, but in the end I always come to such an answer that I do not influence it and I cannot do anything about it. If I really want to think about it seriously, then I should go to study at Corvinus, probably... and if you think about it seriously and try to change something, then you need to take a good position so that people listen to you. And this is very difficult, it must be done very competently, well, this is not what really interests me in my life. I'm actually very inspired by Maria Theresa of Habsburgs, the duchess who was [Queen Erzhebet]... well, she inherited the throne and she made very big reforms and it's very, so to speak, I really like her point of view on how the world should look like. Even then, people did not seem to understand all this, and of course, different changes always bring inconvenience, but you just need to get used to them.

Q: the next question: do you take an active part in the public political life of Hungary?

A: Well, I go to vote, this is already from this year and that's it.

Q: What about Russian public political life?

A: No way.

Q: Do you go to any protests in Hungary?

A: I planned to go to a protest in support of teachers to increase their salaries, but apparently they were not so interested and therefore I did not go.

Q: Do you know about the existence of Hungarian national holidays?

A: Yes, some.

Q: What are your favourites? And do you have any favourites?

A: Hungary's favourite holidays… by the way, I want to say March 8th. It's International Women's Day, it's not celebrated that much in Hungary, and it's not such an important day in Hungary. I don't like it, I want a day off. And the holidays, well, look, this is Húsvét, this is Easter in Hungarian, this is a very good holiday. I like the holidays in Hungary even here…. Well, New Year's is not as important a holiday as Christmas. In Russia, if we celebrate Christmas, then... I actually realised here in Hungary how much Christmas is a very important holiday, in the sense that it is a family holiday. In Hungary, here, you are even somehow obliged, of course, you are not forced, but this is such a family holiday when you get together, have dinner, and celebrate. Just like Easter. But it seems to me that in Hungary, compared to Russia, that family traditions are... well, the family is more important

Q: Tell me, have you ever encountered nationalism in Hungary regarding your Russian identity?

A: Speaking of my Russian… yes, many times before the war. In Hungary they always say that if they hear that you are from Russia, then they won't list all the swear words, "bear, vodka, Putin", well, they rather show their respect for my nation. But after the start of the war, I no longer encountered them. I subconsciously, maybe consciously, somehow tried to avoid such contact at all in order to say that I am Russian. I don't want to show people that I'm Russian, that I'm here. The main thing is that I just don't want to… I don't know what people think, everyone has their own opinion and therefore it's better to avoid conflicts. But even, for example, last week I talked with a girl, she is from Ukraine. I said I am half Russian, but at the same time... well, she's just alone and I'm alone, and I can talk to her about it. Although she sincerely does not like Russians, well, not Russians themselves, but she generally does not like anyone who speaks badly about her country, here. Well, I said I'm Russian, but I respect whatever you think, because the circumstances and you have the right to think so.

Q: if you had the opportunity to move to some other country, or back, for example, to Russia, would you move?

A: Depending… Yes, I would move, but it always depends on what conditions. Even when choosing a university, I thought about moving to another country and studying there. But in the

end, my relationship held me back, and therefore, I still decided that I would study in Hungary, and, in principle, there is a good university here, why not.

Q: You said that you stopped saying that you are Russian a little after the war happened, is it because you are scared or do you have some other feeling about it?

A: I know, I have an acquaintance who, on my story, on the first day of the military operation, I posted that, just a photograph: a girl from Russia and a boy from Ukraine are kissing, simply, and my [Russian] buddy for no reason at all why did he start writing, that how they will win, how they will take over the world, Russians are the best, I just look at him, damn it, come on, I have known you for 5 years and you write like that, who are you, do I know you at all? And, as it were, I thought about how propaganda affects people, well, of course, every person will simply drown for his country, this is normal. I didn't mean that I wouldn't say I'm Russian. I can go and tell anyone: yes, I am Russian. But depending on what tone, in what situation. If they ask me, "where are you from", I will say, "I am from Russia, I am Russian". Of course, I will not write on the Internet about it ... my friends, anyone can see it, I will not say that I am Russian, God is with us, but at the same time I feel that I am Russian. I will not hide this if they ask me.

Q: Do you feel Russian because of the language, because your mother is Russian, or because you lived there?

A: all together, all together. I was born there, I grew up there, it's in me.